The exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism constitutes historically and philosophically the most important part of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. These Tropes represent the sum total of the wisdom of the older Sceptical School, and were held in high respect for centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but also by many outside the narrow limits of that School. In the first book of the Hypotyposes Sextus gives two classes of Tropes, those of ?ποχ? and the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus against Aetiology.

The Tropes of ?ποχ? are arranged in groups of ten, five and two, according to the period of the Sceptical School to which they belong; the first of these groups is historically the most important, or the Ten Tropes of ?ποχ?, as these are far more closely connected with the general development of Scepticism, than the later ones. By the name τρ?πο? or Trope, the Sceptic understood a manner of thought, or form of argument, or standpoint of judgement. It was a term common in Greek philosophy, used in this sense, from the time of Aristotle.[1] The Stoics, however, used the word with a different meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.[2] Stephanus and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word modus[3] and τρ?πο? also is often used interchangeably with the word λ?γο? by Sextus, Diogenes Laertius, and others; sometimes also as synonymous with τ?πο?, [4] and τρ?πο? is found in the oldest edition of Sextus.[5] Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or manner of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the condition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of probabilities, and he calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of doubt.[6] All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time of Aenesidemus give the Tropes the principal place in their treatment of the subject. Sextus occupies two thirds of the first book of the Hypotyposes in stating and discussing them; and about one fourth of his presentation of Scepticism is devoted to the Tropes by Diogenes. In addition to these two authors, Aristocles the Peripatetic refers to them in his attack on Scepticism.[7] Favorinus wrote a book entitled Pyrrhonean Tropes, and Plutarch one called The Ten (τ?ποι) Topes of Pyrrho.[8] Both of these latter works are lost.

[1] Pappenheim Erlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen, p. 35.

[2] Diog I. 76; Adv. Math. VIII. 227.

[3] Fabricius, Cap. XIV. 7.

[4] Hyp. I. 36.

[5] Fabricius on Hyp. I. 36; Cap. XIV. G.

[6] Diog. IX. 11, 79-108.

[7] Aristocles Euseb. praep. ev. X. 14, 18.

[8] Fabricius on Hyp. I. 36.

All authorities unite in attributing to Aenesidemus the work of systematizing and presenting to the world the ten Tropes of ?ποχ?. He was the first to conceive the project of opposing an organized philosophical system of Pyrrhonism to the dogmatism of his contemporaries.[1] Moreover, the fact that Diogenes introduces the Tropes into his life of Pyrrho, does not necessarily imply that he considered Pyrrho their author, for Diogenes invariably combines the teachings of the followers of a movement with those of the founders themselves; he gives these Tropes after speaking of Aenesidemus' work entitled Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes, and apparently quotes from this book, in giving at least a part of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directly or through, the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a correction of the text of Diogenes IX. 11, 79, which would make him quote the Tropes from a book by Theodosius,[2] author of a commentary on the works of Theodas. No writer of antiquity claims for the Tropes an older source than the books of Aenesidemus, to whom Aristocles also attributes them.[3] They are not mentioned in Diogenes' life of Timon, the immediate disciple of Pyrrho. Cicero has no knowledge of them, and does not refer to them in his discussion of Scepticism.

[1] Compare Saisset Op. cit. p. 78.

[2] Brochard Op. cit. 254, Note 4.

[3] Aristocles Eus. praep. ev. XIV. 18. 8.

Aenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate these Tropes, but many things tend to show that they resulted, in reality, from the gradual classification of the results of the teachings of Pyrrho, in the subsequent development of thought from his own time to that of Aenesidemus. The ideas contained in the Tropes were not original with Aenesidemus, but are more closely connected with the thought of earlier times. The decidedly empirical character of the Tropes proves this connection, for the eight Tropes of Aetiology, which were original with Aenesidemus, bear a far stronger dialectic stamp, thus showing a more decided dialectic influence of the Academy than is found in the Tropes of ?ποχ?. Many of the illustrations given of the Tropes also, testify to a time of greater antiquity than that of Aenesidemus. The name Trope was well known in ancient times, and the number ten reminds us of the ten opposing principles of Pythagoras, and the ten categories of Aristotle, the fourth of which was the same as the eighth Trope. The terminology, however, with very few exceptions, points to a later period than that of Pyrrho. Zeller points out a number of expressions in both Diogenes' and Sextus' exposition of the Tropes, which could not date back farther than the time of Aenesidemus.[1] One of the most striking features of the whole presentation of the Tropes, especially as given by Sextus, is their mosaic character, stamping them not as the work of one person, but as a growth, and also an agglutinous growth, lacking very decidedly the symmetry of thought that the work of one mind would have shown.

[1] Zeller Op. cit. p. 25.

At the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the Academy, no other force was as strong in giving life to the school as the systematic treatment by Aenesidemus of the Ten Tropes of ?ποχ?. The reason of this is evident. It was not that the ideas of the Sceptical Tropes were original with Aenesidemus, but because a definite statement of belief is always a far more powerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood and accepted. There is always, however, the danger to the Sceptic, in making a statement even of the principles of Scepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatic tendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even with Aenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not escape the accusation of dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in stating the grounds of their Scepticism, we know from Diogenes.[1] To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes, Sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not affirm things to be absolutely true, but states them as they appear to him, and that they may be otherwise from what he has said.[2]

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 102.

[2] Hyp. I. 4, 24.

Sextus tells us that "Certain Tropes, ten in number, for producing the state of ?ποχ? have been handed down from the older Sceptics."[1] He refers to them in another work as the "Tropes of Aenesidemus."[2] There is no evidence that the substance of these Tropes was changed after the time of Aenesidemus, although many of the illustrations given by Sextus must have been of a later date, added during the two centuries that elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus. In giving these Tropes Sextus does not claim to offer a systematic methodical classification, and closes his list of them, in their original concise form, with the remark, "We make this order ourselves."[3] The order is given differently by Diogenes, and also by Favorinus.[4] The Trope which Sextus gives as the tenth is the fifth given by Diogenes, the seventh by Sextus is the eighth given by Diogenes, the fifth by Sextus, the seventh by Diogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by Sextus. Diogenes says that the one he gives as the ninth Favorinus calls the eighth, and Sextus and Aenesidemus the tenth. This statement does not correspond with the list of the Tropes which Sextus gives, proving that Diogenes took some other text than that of Sextus as his authority.[5] The difference in the order of the Tropes shows, also, that the order was not considered a matter of great importance. There is a marked contrast in the spirit of the two presentations of the Tropes given by Sextus and Diogenes. The former gives them not only as an orator, but as one who feels that he is defending his own cause, and the school of which he is the leader, against mortal enemies, while Diogenes relates them as an historian.

[1] Hyp. I. 36.

[2] Adv. Math. VII. 345.

[3] Hyp. I. 38.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 87.

[5] Diog. IX. 11, 87.

Pappenheim tries to prove[1] that Aenesidemus originally gave only nine Tropes in his Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes, as Aristocles mentions only nine in referring to the Tropes of Aenesidemus, and that the tenth was added later. Had this been the case, however, the fact would surely have been mentioned either by Diogenes or Sextus, who both refer to the ten Tropes of Aenesidemus.

The Tropes claim to prove that the character of phenomena is so relative and changeable, that certain knowledge cannot be based upon them, and as we have shown, there is no other criterion of knowledge for the Sceptic than phenomena.[2] All of the Tropes, except the tenth, are connected with sense-perception, and relate to the difference of the results obtained through the senses under different circumstances. They may be divided into two classes, i.e., those based upon differences of our physical organism, and those based upon external differences. To the first class belong the first, second, third and fourth; to the second class, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, and also the ninth. The eighth, or that of relation, is applied objectively both by Sextus and Diogenes in their treatment of the Tropes, and is not used for objects of thought alone, but principally to show the relation of outward objects to each other. The tenth is the only one which has a moral significance, and it has also a higher subjective value than the others; it takes its arguments from an entirely different sphere of thought, and deals with metaphysical and religious contradictions in opinion, and with the question of good and evil. That this Trope is one of the oldest, we know from its distinct mention in connection with the foundation theories of Pyrrho, by Diogenes.[3] In treating of the subjective reasons for doubt as to the character of external reality, the Sceptics were very near the denial of all outward reality, a point, however, which they never quite reached.

[1] Pappenheim, Die Tropen der Griechen, p. 23.

[2] Hyp. I. 22.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

There is evidently much of Sextus' own thought mixed with the illustrations of the Tropes, but it is impossible to separate the original parts from the material that was the common property of the Sceptical School. Many of these illustrations show, however, perfect familiarity with the scientific and medical teachings of the time. Before entering upon his exposition of the Tropes, Sextus gives them in the short concise form in which they must first have existed[1]-

(i) Based upon the variety of animals.

(ii) Based upon the differences between men.

(iii) Based upon differences in the constitution of the sense organs.

(iv) Based upon circumstances.

(v) Based upon position, distance and place.

(vi) Based upon mixtures.

(vii) Based upon the quantities and constitutions of objects.

(viii) Relation.

(ix) Based upon frequency or rarity of occurences.

(x) Based upon systems, customs and laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions.

[1] Hyp. I. 36-38.

Although Sextus is careful not to dogmatise regarding the arrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his classification of them a regular gradation, from the arguments based upon differences in animals to those in man, first considering the latter in relation to the physical constitution, and then to circumstances outside of us, and finally the treatment of metaphysical and moral differences.

The First Trope.[1] That the same mental representations are not found in different animals, may be inferred from their differences in constitution resulting from their different origins, and from the variety in their organs of sense. Sextus takes up the five senses in order, giving illustrations to prove the relative results of the mental representations in all of them, as for example the subjectivity of color[2] and sound.[3] All knowledge of objects through the senses is relative and not absolute. Sextus does not, accordingly, confine the impossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that Locke regards as secondary, but includes also the primary ones in this statement.[4] The form and shape of objects as they appear to us may be changed by pressure on the eyeball. Furthermore, the character of reflections in mirrors depend entirely on their shape, as the images in concave mirrors are very different from those in convex ones; and so in the same way as the eyes of animals are of different shapes, and supplied with different fluids, the ideas of dogs, fishes, men and grasshoppers must be very different.[5]

[1] Hyp.. I. 40-61.

[2] Hyp.. I. 44-46.

[3] Hyp.. I. 50.

[4] Hyp.. I. 47.

[5] Hyp.. I. 49.

In discussing the mental representations of animals of different grades of intelligence, Sextus shows a very good comprehension of the philogenetic development of the organs of sense, and draws the final conclusion that external objects are regarded differently by animals, according to their difference in constitution.[1] These differences in the ideas which different animals have of the same objects are demonstrated by their different tastes, as the things desired by some are fatal to others.[2] The practical illustrations given of this result show a familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the tastes and habits of many animals,[3] but were probably few of them original with Sextus, unless perhaps in their application; that this train of reasoning was the common property of the Sceptic School, we know from the fact that Diogenes begins his exposition of the first Trope in a way similar to that of Sextus.[4] His illustrations are, however, few and meagre compared with those of Sextus, and the scientific facts used by both of them may mostly be found in other authors of antiquity given in a similar way.[5] The logical result of the reasoning used to explain the first Trope, is that we cannot compare the ideas of the animals with each other, nor with our own; nor can we prove that our ideas are more trustworthy than those of the animals.[6] As therefore an examination of ideas is impossible, any decided opinion about their trustworthiness is also impossible, and this Trope leads to the suspension of judgment regarding external objects, or to ?ποχ?.[7]

[1] Hyp.. I. 54.

[2] Hyp.. I. 55.

[3] Hyp.. I. 55-59.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 79-80.

[5] Pappenheim Erlauterung Pyrr. Grundzüge Par. 41.

[6] Hyp. I. 59.

[7] Hyp. I. 61.

After reaching this conclusion, Sextus introduces a long chapter to prove that animals can reason. There is no reference to this in Diogenes, but there is other testimony to show that it was a favourite line of argument with the Sceptics.[1] Sextus, however, says that his course of reasoning is different from that of most of the Sceptics on the subject,[2] as they usually applied their arguments to all animals, while he selected only one, namely the dog.[3] This chapter is full of sarcastic attacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special allusion to the Stoics as the greatest opponents of the Sceptics, which has been before referred to.[4]

Sextus claims with a greater freedom of diction than in some apparently less original chapters, and with a wealth of special illustrations, that the dog is superior to man in acuteness of perception,[5] that he has the power of choice, and possesses an art, that of hunting,[6] and, also, is not deprived of virtue,[7] as the true nature of virtue is to show justice to all, which the dog does by guarding loyally those who are kind to him, and keeping off those who do evil.[8] The reasoning power of this animal is proved by the story taken from Chrysippus, of the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in following a scent. After seeking the scent in vain in two of the roads, he takes the third road without scenting it as a result of a quick process of thought, which proves that he shares in the famous dialectic of Chrysippus,[9] the five forms of ?ναπ?δεικτοι λ?γοι, of which the dog chooses the fifth. Either A or B or C, not A or B, therefore C.

[1] Hyp. I. 238.

[2] Compare Brochard Op. cit. 256.

[3] Hyp. I. 62-63.

[4] Hyp. I. 65.

[5] Hyp. I. 64.

[6] Hyp. I. 66.

[7] Hyp. I. 67.

[8] Hyp. I. 67.

[9] Hyp. I. 69; Hyp. II. 166; Diog. VII. 1, 79.

The dog and other irrational animals may also possess spoken language, as the only proof that we have to the contrary, is the fact that we cannot understand the sounds that they make.[1] We have an example in this chapter of the humor of Sextus, who after enlarging on the perfect character of the dog, remarks, "For which reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured themselves with the name of this animal,"[2] thus making a sarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes.[3]

[1] Hyp. I. 74.

[2] Hyp. I. 72.

[3] Diog. VI. 1, 13.

The Second Trope. Passing on to the second Trope, Sextus aims to prove that even if we leave the differences of the mental images of animals out of the discussion, there is not a sufficient unanimity in the mental images of human beings to allow us to base any assertions upon them in regard to the character of external objects.[1] He had previously announced that he intended to oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual "in any way whatever,"[2] so he begins here by referring to the two parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and the body, and proceeds to discuss the differences among men in sense-perception and in opinion.[3] Most of the illustrations given of differences in sense-perception are medical ones; of the more general of these I will note the only two which are also given by Diogenes in his exposition of this Trope,[4] viz., Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, who shivered in the sun, and Andron the Argive, who was so free from thirst that he travelled through the desert of Libya without seeking a drink. Some have reasoned from the presence of the first of these illustrations in the exposition of the Tropes, that a part of this material at least goes back to the time of Pyrrho, as Pyrrho from his intimacy with Alexander, when he accompanied him to India, had abundant opportunities to observe the peculiarities of his servant Demophon.[5] The illustration of Andron the Argive is taken from Aristotle, according to Diogenes.[6]

[1] Hyp. I. 79.

[2] Hyp. I. 8.

[3] Hyp. I. 80.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 80-81.

[5] Compare Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive, Revue phil., Paris 1885, No. 5; Victor Brochard, p. 521.

[6] Diog. IX. 11, 81.

Passing on to differences of opinion, we have another example of the sarcastic humor of Sextus, as he refers to the φυσιογνωμονκ? σοφ?α[1] as the authority for believing that the body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of men differ, so the souls also probably differ. The differences of mind among men is not referred to by Diogenes, except in the general statement that they choose different professions; while Sextus elaborates this point, speaking of the great differences in opposing schools of philosophy, and in the objects of choice and avoidance, and sources of pleasure for different men.[2] The poets well understand this marked difference in human desires, as Homer says,

"One man enjoys this, another enjoys that."

Sextus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar,[3]

"One delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted horses,

Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold,

Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea.

[1] Hyp. I. 85.

[2] Hyp. I. 87-89.

[3] Hyp. I. 86.

The Third Trope. The third Trope limits the argument to the sense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if preferred, or to one whom the Dogmatics consider wise,[1] and states that as the ideas given by the different sense organs differ radically in a way that does not admit of their being compared with each other, they furnish no reliable testimony regarding the nature of objects.[2] "Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant brown and sweet." The apple was evidently the ordinary example given for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the same, but in a much more condensed form, and not with equal understanding of the results to be deduced from it.[3] The consequence of the incompatibility of the mental representations produced through the several sense organs by the apple, may be the acceptance of either of the three following propositions: (i) That only those qualities exist in the apple which we perceive. (ii) That more than these exist. (iii) That even those perceived do not exist.[4] Accordingly, any experience which can give rise to such different views regarding outward objects, cannot be relied upon as a testimony concerning them.

[1] Hyp. I. 90.

[2] Hyp. I. 94.

[3] Diog. IX. 11 81.

[4] Hyp. I. 99.

The non-homogeneous nature of the mental images connected with the different sense organs, as presented by Sextus, reminds us of the discussion of the same subject by Berkeley in his Theory of Vision.

Sextus says that a man born with less than the usual number of senses, would form altogether different ideas of the external world than those who have the usual number, and as our ideas of objects depend on our mental images, a greater number of sense organs would give us still different ideas of outward reality.[1] The strong argument of the Stoics against such reasoning as this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmony between nature and the soul, so that when a representation is produced in us of a real object, a καταληπτικ? φαντασ?α,[2] by this representation the soul grasps a real existence. There is a λ?γο? in us which is of the same kind, σ?γγενο?, or in relation to all nature. This argument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of the soul and the objects of nature, is the one that has been used in all ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that we apprehend the external world as it is. It was used against Kant by his opponents, who thought in this way to refute his teachings.[3] The Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theory of nature that included the soul and the external world in one harmonious whole, but Sextus in his discussion of the third Trope does not refute this argument as fully as he does later in his work against logic.[4] He simply states here that philosophers themselves cannot agree as to what nature is, and furthermore, that a philosopher himself is a part of the discord, and to be judged, rather than being capable of judging, and that no conclusion can be reached by those who are themselves an element of the uncertainty.[5]

[1] Hyp. I. 96-97.

[2] Adv. Math. VII. 93.

[3] Ueberweg Op. cit. 195.

[4] Adv. Math. VII. 354.

[5] Hyp. I. 98-99.

The Fourth Trope. This Trope limits the argument to each separate sense, and the effect is considered of the condition of body and mind upon sense-perception in relation to the several sense-organs.[1] The physical states which modify sense-perception are health and illness, sleeping and waking, youth and age, hunger and satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. All of these conditions of the body entirely change the character of the mental images, producing different judgments of the color, taste, and temperature of objects, and of the character of sounds. A man who is asleep is in a different world from one awake, the existence of both worlds being relative to the condition of waking and sleeping.[2]

The subjective states which Sextus mentions here as modifying the character of the mental representations are hating or loving, courage or fear, sorrow or joy, and sanity or insanity.[3] No man is ever twice in exactly the same condition of body or mind, and never able to review the differences of his ideas as a sum total, for those of the present moment only are subject to careful inspection.[4] Furthermore, no one is free from the influence of all conditions of body or mind, so that he can be unbiassed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can be established that can be shown to be true, but on the contrary, whatever course is pursued on the subject, both the criterion and the proof will be thrown into the circulus in probando, for the truth of each rests on the other.[5]

[1] Hyp. I. 100.

[2] Hyp. I. 104.

[3] Hyp. I. 100.

[4] Hyp. I. 112.

[5] Hyp. I. 117.

Diogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this Trope, but in a much more condensed form. The marked characteristic of this train of reasoning is the attempt to prove that abnormal conditions are also natural. In referring at first to the opposing states of body and mind, which so change the character of sense-perception, Sextus classifies them according to the popular usage as κατ? φ?σιν and παρ? φ?σιν. This distinction was an important one, even with Aristotle, and was especially developed by the Stoics[1] in a broader sense than referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics, however, considered only normal conditions as being according to nature. Sextus, on the contrary, declares that abnormal states are also conditions according to nature,[2] and just as those who are in health are in a state that is natural to those who are in health, so also those not in health are in a state that is natural to those not in health, and in some respects according to nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not absolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really exists for those who are asleep as the things that exist in waking exist, although they do not exist in sleep.[3] One mental representation, therefore, cannot be judged by another, which is also in a state of relation to existing physical and mental conditions. Diogenes states this principle even more decidedly in his exposition of this Trope. "The insane are not in a condition opposed to nature; why they more than we? For we also see the sun as if it were stationary."[4] Furthermore, in different periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond of balls and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things, and the aged still others.[5] The wisdom contained in this Trope in reference to the relative value of the things most sought after is not original with Sextus, but is found in the more earnest ethical teachings of older writers. Sextus does not, however, draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, but only uses it as an argument for ?ποχ?.

[1] Diog. VII. 1, 86.

[2] Hyp. I. 103.

[3] Hyp. I. 104.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 82.

[5] Hyp. I. 106.

The Fifth Trope. This Trope leaves the discussion of the dependence of the ideas upon the physical nature, and takes up the influence of the environment upon them. It makes the difference in ideas depend upon the position, distance, and place of objects, thus taking apparently their real existence for granted. Things change their form and shape according to the distance from which they are observed, and the position in which they stand.[1]

The same light or tone alters decidedly in different surroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the angle at which the picture is suspended.[2] With Diogenes this Trope is the seventh,[3] and his exposition of it is similar, but as usual, shorter. Both Sextus and Diogenes give the illustration[4] of the neck of the dove differing in color in different degrees of inclination, an illustration used by Protagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by the senses. "The black neck of the dove in the shade appears black, but in the light sunny and purple."[5] Since, then, all phenomena are regarded in a certain place, and from a certain distance, and according to a certain position, each of which relations makes a great difference with the mental images, we shall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the reserving of the opinion.[6]

[1] Hyp. I. 118.

[2] Hyp. I. 120

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 85.

[4] Hyp. I. 120; Diog. IX. 11, 86.

[5] Schol. zu Arist. 60, 18, ed. Brandis; Pappen. Er. Pyrr. Grundzüge, p. 54.

[6] Hyp. I. 121.

The Sixth Trope. This Trope leads to ?ποχ? regarding the nature of objects, because no object can ever be presented to the organs of sense directly, but must always be perceived through some medium, or in some mixture.[1] This mixture may be an outward one, connected with the temperature, or the rarity of the air, or the water[2] surrounding an object, or it may be a mixture resulting from the different humors of the sense-organs.[3] A man with the jaundice, for example, sees colors differently from one who is in health. The illustration of the jaundice is a favorite one with the Sceptics. Diogenes uses it several times in his presentation of Scepticism, and it occurs in Sextus' writings in all, as an illustration, in eight different places.[4] The condition of the organ of the ?γεμονικ?ν, or the ruling faculty, may also cause mixtures. Pappenheim thinks that we have here Kant's idea of a priori, only on a materialistic foundation.[5] A careful consideration of the passage, however, shows us that Sextus' thought is more in harmony with the discoveries of modern psychiatry than with the philosophy of Kant. If the sentence, ?σω? δ? κα? α?τη (? δι?νοια) ?πιμιξ?αν τιν? ?δ?αν ποιε?ται πρ?? τ? ?π? τ?ν α?σθ?σεων ?ναγγελλ?μενα, [6] stood alone, without further explanation, it might well refer to a priori laws of thought, but the explanation which follows beginning with "because" makes that impossible.[7] "Because in each of the places where the Dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is, we see present certain humors, which are the cause of mixtures." Sextus does not advance any opinion as to the place of the ruling faculty in the body, which is, according to the Stoics, the principal part of the soul, where ideas, desires, and reasoning originate,[8] but simply refers to the two theories of the Dogmatics, which claim on the one hand that it is in the brain, and on the other that it is in the heart.[9] This subject he deals with more fully in his work against logic.[10] As, however, he bases his argument, in discussing possible intellectual mixtures in illustration of the sixth Trope, entirely on the condition of the organ of the intellect, it is evident that his theory of the soul was a materialistic one.

[1] Hyp. I. 124.

[2] Hyp. I. 125.

[3] Hyp. I. 126.

[4] See Index to Bekker's edition of Sextus.

[5] Papp. Er. Pyr. Gr. p. 55.

[6] Hyp. I. 128.

[7] Hyp. I. 128.

[8] Diog. VII. 1, 159.

[9] Hyp. I. 128.

[10] Adv. Math. VII. 313.

The Seventh Trope. This Trope, based upon the quantities and compositions of objects, is illustrated by examples of different kinds of food, drink, and medicine, showing the different effects according to the quantity taken, as the harmfulness and the usefulness of most things depend on their quantity. Things act differently upon the senses if applied in small or large quantities, as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of sand have a different color and touch from the same taken in the form of a solid.[1] The result is that ideas vary according to the composition of the object, and this Trope also brings to confusion the existence of outward objects, and leads us to reserve our opinion in regard to them.[2] This Trope is illustrated by Diogenes with exceeding brevity.[3]

[1] Hyp. I. 129-131.

[2] Hyp. I. 134.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 86.

The Eighth Trope. The Trope based upon relation contains, as Sextus rightly remarks, the substance of the other nine,[1] for the general statement of the relativity of knowledge includes the other statements made. The prominence which Sextus gave this Trope in his introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expect here new illustrations and added[2] arguments for ?ποχ?. We find, however, neither of these, but simply a statement that all things are in relation in one of two ways, either directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two kinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might have been used to good purpose in the introduction to the Tropes, or at the end, to prove that all the others were really subordinate to the eighth. The reasoning is, however simply applied to the relation of objects to each other, and nothing is added that is not found elsewhere where as an argument for ?ποχ?.[3] This Trope is the tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens his reasoning in regard to it, by a statement that Sextus does not directly make, i.e., that everything is in relation to the understanding.[4]

[1] Hyp. I. 39.

[2] Hyp. I. 135-140.

[3] Hyp. I. 135-140.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 88.

The Ninth Trope. This is based upon the frequency and rarity of events, and refers to some of the phenomena of nature, such as the rising of the sun, and the sea, as no longer a source of astonishment, while a comet or an earthquake are wonders to those not accustomed to them.[1] The value of objects also depends on their rarity, as for example the value of gold.[2] Furthermore, things may be valuable at one time, and at another not so, according to the frequency and rarity of the occurrence.[3] Therefore this Trope also leads to ?ποχ?. Diogenes gives only two illustrations to this Trope, that of the sun and the earthquake.[4]

[1] Hyp. I. 141-142.

[2] Hyp. I. 143.

[3] Hyp. I. 144.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 87.

The Tenth Trope. We have already remarked on the difference in the character of the tenth Trope, dealing as it does, not with the ideas of objects, like the other nine Tropes, but with philosophical and religious opinions, and questions of right and wrong. It was the well-known aim of the Sceptics to submit to the laws and customs of the land where they were found, and to conform to certain moral teachings and religious ceremonies; this they did without either affirming or denying the truth of the principles upon which these teachings were based,[1] and also without any passion or strong feeling in regard to them,[2] as nothing in itself can be proved to be good or evil. The tenth Trope accordingly, brings forward contradictions in customs, laws, and the beliefs of different lands, to show that they are also changeable and relative, and not of absolute worth. The foundation-thought of this Trope is given twice by Diogenes, once as we have before stated in his introduction[3] to the life of Pyrrho, and also as one of the Tropes.[4] As it is apparently one of the oldest of the Tropes, it would naturally be much used in discussing with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a wide ethical significance, and must also have held an important place in the Sceptical School in all metaphysical and philosophical discussions. The definition[5] in the beginning of Sextus' exposition of this Trope Fabricius thinks was taken from Aristotle, of schools, laws, customs, mythical beliefs and dogmatic opinions,[6] and the definition which Diogenes gives of law in his life of Plato[7] is similar. Pappenheim, however, thinks they were taken from the Stoics, perhaps from Chrysippus.[8] The argument is based upon the differences in development of thought, as affecting the standpoint of judgment in philosophy, in morals, and religion, the results of which we find in the widely opposing schools of philosophy, in the variety in religious belief, and in the laws and customs of different countries. Therefore the decisions reached in the world of thought leave us equally in doubt regarding the absolute value of any standards, with those obtained through sense-perception, and the universal conflict of opinion regarding all questions of philosophy and ethics leads us also according to this Trope to the reserving of the opinion.[9] This Trope is the fifth as given by Diogenes, who placed it directly after the first four which relate more especially to human development,[10] while Sextus uses it as the final one, perhaps thinking that an argument based upon the higher powers of man deserves the last place, or is the summation of the other arguments.

[1] Hyp. I. 24.

[2] Hyp. III. 235.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 83.

[5] Hyp. I. 145-147.

[6] Fabricius, Cap. IV. H.

[7] Diog. III. 86.

[8] Pappenheim Gr. Pyrr. Grundzüge, p. 50.

[9] Hyp. I. 163.

[10] Diog. IX. 11, 83.

Following the exposition of the ten Tropes of the older Sceptics, Sextus gives the five Tropes which he attributes to the "later Sceptics."[1] Sextus nowhere mentions the author of these Tropes. Diogenes, however, attributes them to Agrippa, a man of whom we know nothing except his mention of him. He was evidently one of the followers of Aenesidemus, and a scholar of influence in the Sceptical School, who must have himself had disciples, as Diogenes says, ο? περ? ?γρ?ππαν [2] add to these tropes other five tropes, using the plural verb. Another Sceptic, also mentioned by Diogenes, and a man unknown from other sources, named some of his books after Agrippa.[3] Agrippa is not given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders of the Sceptical School, but[4] his influence in the development of the thought of the School must have been great, as the transition from the ten Tropes of the "older Sceptics" to the five attributed to Agrippa is a marked one, and shows the entrance into the school of a logical power before unknown in it. The latter are not a reduction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus, but are written from an entirely different standpoint. The ten Tropes are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of the foundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are rather rules of thought leading to logical proof, and are dialectic in their character. We find this distinction illustrated by the different way in which the Trope of relativity is treated in the two groups. In the first it points to an objective relativity, but with Agrippa to a general subjective logical principle. The originality of the Tropes of Agrippa does not lie in their substance matter, but in their formulation and use in the Sceptical School. These methods of proof were, of course, not new, but were well known to Aristotle, and were used by the Sceptical Academy, and probably also by Timon,[5] while the πρ?? τι goes back at least to Protagoras. The five Tropes are as follows.

(i) The one based upon discord.

(ii) The regressus in infinitum.

(iii) Relation.

(iv) The hypothetical.

(v) The circulus in probando.

Two of these are taken from the old list, the first and the third, and Sextus says that the five Tropes are intended to supplement the ten Tropes, and to show the audacity of the Dogmatics in a variety of ways.[6] The order of these Tropes is the same with Diogenes as with Sextus, but the definitions of them differ sufficiently to show that the two authors took their material from different sources. According to the first one everything in question is either sensible or intellectual, and in attempting to judge it either in life, practically, or "among philosophers," a position is developed from which it is impossible to reach a conclusion.[7] According to the second, every proof requires another proof, and so on to infinity, and there is no standpoint from which to begin the reasoning.[8] According to the third, all perceptions are relative, as the object is colored by the condition of the judge, and the influence of other things around it.[9] According to the fourth, it is impossible to escape from the regressus in infinitum by making a hypothesis the starting point, as the Dogmatics attempt to do.[10] And the fifth, or the circulus in probando, arises when that which should be the proof needs to be sustained by the thing to be proved.

[1] Hyp. I. 164.

[2] Diog. IX. 11, 88.

[3] Diog. IX. 11, 106.

[4] Diog. IX. 12, 115-116.

[5] Compare Natorp. Op. cit. p. 302.

[6] Hyp. I. 177.

[7] Hyp. I. 165.

[8] Hyp. I. 166.

[9] Hyp. I. 167.

[10] Hyp. I. 168.

Sextus claims that all things can be included in these Tropes, whether sensible or intellectual.[1] For whether, as some say, only the things of sense are true, or as others claim, only those of the understanding, or as still others contend, some things both of sense and understanding are true, a discord must arise that is impossible to be judged, for it cannot be judged by the sensible, nor by the intellectual, for the things of the intellect themselves require a proof; accordingly, the result of all reasoning must be either hypothetical, or fall into the regressus in infinitum or the circulus in probando.[2] The reference above to some who say that only the things of sense are true, is to Epicurus and Protagoras; to some that only the things of thought are true, to Democritus and Plato; and to those that claimed some of both to be true, to the Stoics and the Peripatetics.[3] The three new Tropes added by Agrippa have nothing to do with sense-perception, but bear entirely upon the possibility of reasoning, as demanded by the science of logic, in contrast to the earlier ones which related almost entirely, with the exception of the tenth, to material objects. Sextus claims that these five Tropes also lead to the suspension of judgment,[4] but their logical result is rather the dogmatic denial of all possibility of knowledge, showing as Hirzel has well demonstrated, far more the influence of the New Academy than the spirit of the Sceptical School.[5] It was the standpoint of the older Sceptics, that although the search for the truth had not yet succeeded, yet they were still seekers, and Sextus claims to be faithful to this old aim of the Pyrrhonists. He calls himself a seeker,[6] and in reproaching the New Academy for affirming that knowledge is impossible, Sextus says, "Moreover, we say that our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness."[7] The ten Tropes claim to establish doubt only in regard to a knowledge of the truth, but the five Tropes of Agrippa aim to logically prove the impossibility of knowledge. It is very strange that Sextus does not see this decided contrast in the attitude of the two sets of Tropes, and expresses his approval of those of Agrippa, and makes more frequent use of the fifth of these, ? δι?λληλο?, in his subsequent reasoning than of any other argument.[8]

[1] Hyp. I. 169.

[2] Hyp. I. 170-171.

[3] Adv. Math. VIII. 185-186; VIII. 56; VII. 369.

[4] Hyp. I. 177.

[5] Hirzel Op. cit. p. 131.

[6] Hyp. I. 3, 7.

[7] Hyp. I. 227.

[8] See Index of Bekker's edition of Sextus' works.

We find here in the Sceptical School, shortly after the time of Aenesidemus, the same tendency to dogmatic teaching that-so far as the dim and shadowy history of the last years of the New Academy can be unravelled, and the separation of Pyrrhonism can be understood, at the time that the Academy passed over into eclecticism-was one of the causes of that separation.

It is true that the Tropes of Agrippa show great progress in the development of thought. They furnish an organisation of the School far superior to what went before, placing the reasoning on the firm basis of the laws of logic, and simplifying the amount of material to be used. In a certain sense Saisset is correct in saying that Agrippa contributed more than any other in completing the organisation of Scepticism,[1] but it is not correct when we consider the true spirit of Scepticism with which the Tropes of Agrippa were not in harmony. It was through the very progress shown in the production of these Tropes that the school finally lost the strength of its position.

Not content with having reduced the number of the Tropes from ten to five, others tried to limit the number still further to two.[2] Sextus gives us no hint of the authorship of the two Tropes. Ritter attributes them to Menodotus and his followers, and Zeller agrees with that opinion,[3] while Saisset thinks that Agrippa was also the author of these,[4] which is a strange theory to propound, as some of the material of the five is repeated in the two, and the same man could certainly not appear as an advocate of five, and at the same time of two Tropes.

[1] Saisset Op. cit. p. 237.

[2] Hyp. I. 178.

[3] Zeller III. 38; Ritter IV. 277.

[4] Saisset Op. cit. p. 231.

The two Tropes are founded on the principle that anything must be known through itself or through something else. It cannot be known through itself, because of the discord existing between all things of the senses and intellect, nor can it be known through something else, as then either the regressus in infinitum or the circulus in probando follow.[1] Diogenes Laertius does not refer to these two Tropes.

In regard to all these Tropes of the suspension of judgment, Sextus has well remarked in his introduction to them, that they are included in the eighth, or that of relation.[2]

[1] Hyp. I. 178-179.

[2] Hyp. I. 39.

The Tropes of Aetiology. The eight Tropes against causality belong chronologically before the five Tropes of Agrippa, in the history of the development of sceptical thought. They have a much closer connection with the spirit of Scepticism than the Tropes of Agrippa, including, as they do, the fundamental thought of Pyrrhonism, i.e., that the phenomena do not reveal the unknown.

The Sceptics did not deny the phenomena, but they denied that the phenomena are signs capable of being interpreted, or of revealing the reality of causes. It is impossible by a research of the signs to find out the unknown, or the explanation of things, as the Stoics and Epicureans claim. The theory of Aenesidemus which lies at the foundation of his eight Tropes against aetiology, is given to us by Photius as follows:[1] "There are no visible signs of the unknown, and those who believe in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion." This statement of Aenesidemus is confirmed by a fuller explanation of it given later on by Sextus.[2] If phenomena are not signs of the unknown there is no causality, and a refutation of causality is a proof of the impossibility of science, as all science is the science of causes, the power of studying causes from effects, or as Sextus calls them, phenomena.

It is very noticeable to any one who reads the refutation of causality by Aenesidemus, as given by Sextus,[3] that there is no reference to the strongest argument of modern Scepticism, since the time of Hume, against causality, namely that the origin of the idea of causality cannot be so accounted for as to justify our relying upon it as a form of cognition.[4]

[1] Myriob. 170 B. 12.

[2] Adv. Math. VIII. 207.

[3] Hyp. I. 180-186.

[4] Ueberweg Op. cit. p. 217.

The eight Tropes are directed against the possibility of knowledge of nature, which Aenesidemus contested against in all his Tropes, the ten as well as the eight.[1] They are written from a materialistic standpoint. These Tropes are given with illustrations by Fabricius as follows:

I. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are unseen, it does not give testimony that is incontestable in regard to phenomena. For example, the Pythagoreans explain the distance of the planets by a musical proportion.

II. From many equally plausible reasons which might be given for the same thing, one only is arbitrarily chosen, as some explain the inundation of the Nile by a fall of snow at its source, while there could be other causes, as rain, or wind, or the action of the sun.

III. Things take place in an orderly manner, but the causes presented do not show any order, as for example, the motion of the stars is explained by their mutual pressure, which does not take into account the order that reigns among them.

IV. The unseen things are supposed to take place in the same way as phenomena, as vision is explained in the same way as the appearance of images in a dark room.

V. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology which agree with their own individual hypotheses about the elements, but not with common and accepted ideas, as to explain the world by atoms like Epicurus, by homoeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter and form like Aristotle.

VI. Theories are accepted which agree with individual hypotheses, and others equally probable are passed by, as Aristotle's explanation of comets, that they are a collection of vapors near the earth, because that coincided with his theory of the universe.

VII. Theories of aetiology are presented which conflict not only with individual hypotheses, but also with phenomena, as to admit like Epicurus an inclination or desire of the soul, which was incompatible with the necessity which he advocated.

VIII. The inscrutable is explained by things equally inscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is explained by the attraction of a sponge for water, a fact contested by some.[2]

[1] Hyp. I. 98.

[2] Hyp. I. 180-186; Fabricius, Cap. XVII. 180 z.

Diogenes does not mention these Tropes in this form, but he gives a resumé of the general arguments of the Sceptics against aetiology,[1] which has less in common with the eight Tropes of Aenesidemus, than with the presentation of the subject by Sextus later,[2] when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to show μηδ?ν ε?ναι α?τιον. Although the Tropes of Aenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character, it would not seem that he made the distinction, which is so prominent with Sextus, between the signs ?πομνηστικ? and ?νδειτικ?,[3] especially as Diogenes sums up his argument on the subject with the general assertion, Σημε?ον ο?κ ε?ναι,[4] and proceeds to introduce the logical consequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up of the Tropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the Hypotyposes, by Sextus:-"A cause in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, and with Scepticism, and with phenomena, is perhaps not possible, for the phenomena and the unknown altogether disagree."[5]

It is interesting to remark in connection with the seventh of these Tropes, that Aenesidemus asserts that causality has only a subjective value, which from his materialistic standpoint was an argument against its real existence, and the same argument is used by Kant to prove that causality is a necessary condition of thought.[6]

Chaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as false and sophistical,[7] but as Maccoll has well said, they are remarkable for their judicious and strong criticism, and are directed against the false method of observing facts through the light of preconceived opinion.[8] They have, however, a stronger critical side than sceptical, and show the positive tendency of the thought of Aenesidemus.

[1] Diog. IX. 11, 96-98.

[2] Hyp. III. 24-28.

[3] Adv. Math. VIII. 151.

[4] Diog. IX. 11, 96.

[5] Hyp. I. 185.

[6] Compare Maccoll Op. cit. p. 77.

[7] Chaignet Op. cit. 507.

[8] Maccoll Op. cit. p. 88.

* * *

Download Book