Chapter 5 VToC

EPILOG

The great war is over, and the Powers of the West have conquered. In the earlier pages I have given my own view of why they won in the tremendous struggle that now belongs to history. They had on their side moral forces which were lacking to their adversaries.

Germany went into the war with a conviction that had been carefully instilled into her people. It was that she was being ringed round with the intention that she should be crushed, and that presently it would be too late for her to deliver herself. The lesson so taught to her was not a true one. She might easily have obtained guarantees of peace which ought to have satisfied her, without undertaking a risk which in the end was to prove disastrous. No one here wanted to ruin her, no one who counted seriously in this country. And if we did not want to, no more in reality did France or Russia. She brought her fate on her head by the unwisdom of her methods. But her people hardly desired the dangers of unnecessary war, and her rulers dared not have ventured these dangers had they not first of all preached a wrong doctrine to those over whom they ruled. They had their way in the end, and disaster to sixty-eight millions of Germans was the consequence. The calculations of their chiefs were bad from the beginning. It is almost certain that the best and most eminent among even these really desired peace. They blundered in method. It was not by continually flashing the saber that peace was to be secured.

It is scarcely likely that the conditions under which this war became possible will recur. It is more than unlikely that they will recur in our time. But it is none the less worth while to consider how the unlikelihood can be made to approach most nearly to a certainty.

Not, I think, by causing the millions of German-speaking people to feel that they are in chains without possibility of freedom. More certainly, surely, by leading them to the faith that if they will play a part in the great world effort for permanent peace and for reconstruction they will be welcomed to the brotherhood of nations. The individual German citizen is more like the individual Anglo-Saxon than he is different from him. The same hopes and the same fears animate him, and he is sober and industrious quite as much as we are. He has similar problems and similar interests.

Time must pass before the angry feeling that a great struggle produces can die down. But there are already indications that this feeling is not as intense with us as it was even a short time ago. Germany made a colossal and unjustifiable blunder. She is responsible for the action of her late Government. We think so, and we are not likely to change our opinion on this point. The grief of our people over their dead, over the lives that were laid down for the nation from the highest kind of inspiration, will keep the public mind fixed on this conclusion. And so will the waste and misery to the whole world which an unnecessary war has brought in its train. But presently we shall ask ourselves, in moments of reflection, whether this ought to be our final word, and also, perhaps, whether some want of care on our own part, and certain deficiencies of which we are now more conscious than we used to be, may not have had something to do with the failure of other people to divine our real mood and intentions. I am not sure that in days that are to come we shall give ourselves the whole benefit of the doubt. However this may be, we are in no case a vindictive people.

But in any view something serious is at stake. It will be a bad thing for us, and it will be a bad thing for the world, if the people of the vanquished nations are left to feel that they have no hope of being restored to decent conditions of existence. At present despair is threatening them. Their estimate is that the crushing burden of the terms of peace, if carried out to their full possibilities, bars them from the prospect of a better future. Their only way of deliverance may well come to seem to them to lie in the grouping of the discontented nationalities, and the faith that by this means, at some time which may come hereafter, a new balance of power may begin to be set up.

Now this is not a good prospect, and the sooner we succeed in softening the sense of real hardship out of which it arises the better. Germany and Austria must pay the penalty they have incurred before the tribunal of international justice. But that penalty ought to be tempered by something that depends on even more than mercy. It is intended to be inflicted for the good of the world, and if it assumes a form which threatens the future safety of the world it is not wise to press it to its extreme consequences. We have to work toward a better state of things than that which is promised to-day. We have never hitherto kept up old animosities unduly long, and that has been one of the secrets of our strength in the world. The lessons of history point to the expediency of trying to heal instead of to keep open the wound which exists. Those who know the growth in the past of literature, of music, of science, of philosophy, of industry and of commerce, do not wish the German people to die out. It is only the ignorant that can desire this, and, hitherto in the course of our history, the ignorant have neither proved to be safe guides nor have they prevailed. To-day, as before, we must think of generations other than our own if we would preserve our strength.

I hope that a time is near in which we shall no longer proclaim old grievances, but instead cease to dwell on the past in this case, just as we have ceased in the cases of the French, the Spanish, the Russians, and the Boers. It is best in every way that it should come to be so.

It is not with any hope that these pages will satisfy the extremists of to-day that they have been written. They are intended for those who try to be dispassionate, and for them only, as a contribution to a vast heap of material that is being gathered together for consideration. It is well that those who were in any way directly connected with the story to which they relate should place on record what they saw. But the whole story in its fulness is beyond the knowledge of anyone of our time. The history of the world is, as has been said, the judgment of the world. It is therefore only after an interval that it can be sufficiently written. The ultimate and real origin of this war, the greatest humanity has ever had to endure, was a set of colossal suspicions of each other by the nations concerned. I do not mean that none of them were in the right or that some of them were not deeply in the wrong. What I do mean is that if there had been insight sufficient all round the nations concerned would not have misinterpreted each other.

To us it looks as tho Germany had been inspired throughout by a bad tradition, a spirit older than even the days of Frederick the Great. Had she been wise we think that she would have changed her national policy after Bismarck had brought it to unexampled success in things material. There are not wanting indications that he himself had the sense of the necessity of great caution in pursuing this policy farther, and felt that it could not be safely continued without modification. It was no policy that was safe for any but the strongest and sanest of minds, and even for those it had ceased to be safe. The potential resistance to it was becoming too serious.

But we do not need to doubt that there were many in Germany itself who saw this and did not desire to rely merely on blood and iron. The men and women in every country resemble those in other countries more than they differ from them. Germany was no exception to the rule. It is a great mistake to judge her as she was merely from a few newspapers and by the reports from Berlin of their special correspondents. Sixty-eight millions of people could not be estimated in their opinions by the attitude of a handful, however eminent and prominent, in the home of "Real politik." It is, of course, true that the Germans were taught to believe that they were a very great nation which had not got its full share of the good things of this world, a share of which they were more worthy and for which they were better organized than any other. But it is also true that we here thought that we ourselves were entitled to a great deal to which other people did not admit our moral title. It was not only Germany that was lacking in imagination. No doubt many Germans had the idea that we wished to hem them in and that we did not like them. Our failure to make ourselves understood left them not without reason for this belief. But dislike of Germany was not the attitude of the great mass of sober and God-fearing Englishmen, and I do not believe that the counter-attitude was that of the bulk of sober and God-fearing Germans. They and we alike mutually misjudged each other from what was written in newspapers and said in speeches by people who were not responsible exponents of opinion, and neither nation took sufficient trouble to make clear that what was thus written and said was not sufficient material on which to judge it. It is very difficult to diagnose general opinion in a foreign nation, and one of the reasons of the difficulty is that people at home do not pay sufficient attention to the fact that their unfriendly utterances about their neighbors are likely to receive more publicity and attention than the utterances that are friendly. It makes little difference that the latter may greatly preponderate in number. They are read in the main only in the country in which they are made.

Neither Germans nor Englishmen were careful before the war always to be pleasant to each other, and the same used to be true of Frenchmen and Englishmen. But just as we are coming to understand why and how France and England misinterpreted each other systematically a century and a half ago, so we may yet learn how we came to present, more than a hundred years later, difficulties to the Germans not wholly unlike those which they presented to us. No mere record of the dry facts will be enough to render this intelligible in its full significance. The historian who is to carry conviction must do more than present photographs. He must create a picture inspired by his own study and from the depth of his own mind, and presented in its real proportions with its proper lights and shadows, as a true artist alone can present it. Browning has told us something worth remembering. It is at the end of "The Ring and the Book":

Art may tell a truth

Obliquely, do the thing shall breed the thought,

Nor wrong the thought, missing the mediate word.

So may you paint your picture, twice show truth,

Beyond mere imagery on the wall,-

So, note by note, bring music from your mind,

Deeper than ever e'en Beethoven dived,-

So write a book shall mean beyond the facts,

Suffice the eye and save the soul beside.

The truth in its fulness and completeness can not be compassed in any single narrative of events. It is, of course, the case that history depends for its value on scientific accuracy, but that is not the only kind of truth on which it depends. No man, even the most careful and exacting, can rely on having the whole of the materials before his eye, and if he had them there they would not only be presented in tints depending on his outlook, but would be too vast to admit of his using more than isolated fragments to work into his picture of the whole. Selection is a necessity, and when to the fact that there must be selection there is added the other fact that every historian has his personal equation, the notion of a history constructed by a single man on the methods of the physicist is a delusion. The best that the great historian can do is to present the details in the light of the spirit of the period of which he is writing, and in order that he may present his narrative aright, as his mind has reconstructed it, he must estimate his details in the order in importance that was actually theirs. Now for this the balance and the measuring rod do not suffice. Quality counts as much as does quantity in determining importance. What is merely inert and mechanical is the subject neither of the artist nor the historian. It is, of course, necessary that by close and exact research the materials should first of all be collected and assembled. But that is only the first step, and it always has to be followed by a process of grouping and fashioning. The result may have to be the leaving out (or the leaving over for presentation by other artists) of aspects which are not dealt with. We see this when we compare even the best portraits. They do not wholly agree; it is enough if they correspond. For portraits may vary in expression, and yet each may be true. The characteristic of what is alive and is intelligent and spiritual is that it may have many expressions, every one of which really harmonizes with every other. It is because they can bring out expression in this fashion that we continue to set high store on the work of a Gibbon or a Mommsen.

The moral of this is twofold. We must, to begin with, be content for the present to remain in the stage at which all that can be done is to collect and assemble facts and personal impressions with as great care as we can. The whole truth we can not bring out or estimate until the later period, altho we may be sure enough of what we have before us to make us feel capable of doing justice of a rough kind, so far as necessary action is concerned.

And there is yet another deduction to be drawn. It is at all events possible that the wider view of a generation later than this may be one in which Germany will be judged more gently than the Allies can judge her to-day. We do not now look on the French Revolution as our forefathers looked on it. We see, because recent historians have impressed it on us, that it was a violent uprising against, not Louis XVI., but a Louis XIV. What France really made her great Revolution to bring about was the establishment of a Constitution. Horrible deeds were perpetrated in the name of Liberty, but it was not due to any horrible national spirit that they were perpetrated. France was responsible no doubt for the deeds of the men who acted in her name. But she could hardly have controlled them even had she passionately desired to do so. And she did not passionately desire to do so because, however little the mass of the people outside Paris may have wished to massacre the adherents of the old regime, the people as a whole welcomed deliverance from calamity, even at the price of violent action.

We judge the French nation wholly differently to-day from the way we judged it then, and it judges us differently. Yet it would have been well had we not in the end of the eighteenth century taken an exaggerated view of the French state of mind. We now realize that even so great a man as Burke mistook a fragment for the whole. Much blood and treasure might have been spared, and Napoleon might never have come into existence, had we and others been less hasty.

It is therefore a good thing to keep before us that it is at least possible that the verdict of mankind will be hereafter that when the victory was theirs the Allies judged the people of Germany in a hurry and reflected this judgment in the spirit in which certain of the terms of peace were declared. The war had its proximate origin in the Near East. It arose out of a supposed menace to Teuton by Slav. The Slavs were not easy people to deal with, and the Teutons were not easy people either. It was easy to drift into war. It may well prove true that no one really desired this, and that it was miscalculation about the likelihood of securing peace by a determined attitude that led to disaster. It is certain that the German Government was deeply responsible for the consequences. In the face of its traditional policy and of utterances that came from Berlin the members of that Government can not plead a mere blunder. None the less, a great deal may have been due to sheer ineptitude in estimating human nature. How much this was so, or how much an immoral tradition had its natural results, we can not as yet fully tell, for we have not the whole of the records before us. No one disputes that we were bound to impose heavy terms on the Central Powers. The Allies have won the war and they were entitled to reparation. This the Germans do not appear to controvert. They are a people with whom logic is held in high esteem. But we have to do something more than define the mere consequences of victory. We have also to make plain on what footing we shall be willing to live with the German nation in days that lie ahead. And here some enlargement of the spirit seems to be desirable in our own interests. We do not want to fall again into the mistake that Burke made.

The spirit is at least as important as the letter in the doctrine of a League of Nations. Such a League has for its main purpose the supersession of the old principle of balancing the Powers. In the absence of a League of Nations, or-what is the same thing in a less organized form-of an entente or concert of Powers so general that none are left shut out from it, the principle of balancing may have to be relied on. I believe this to have been unavoidable when the Entente between France, Russia and Great Britain was found to be required for safety if the tendency to dominate of the Triple Alliance was to be held in check. But in that case, and probably in every other case, reliance on the principle could only be admissible for self-protection and never for the mere exhibition of the power of the sword. If the principle is resorted to with the latter object the group that is suspected of aggressive intentions will by degrees find itself confronted with another group of nations that have huddled together for self-protection and may become very strong just because they have a moral justification for their action. It was this that happened before the war which broke out in 1914, and it was the state of tension which ensued that led up to that war. Had there been no counter-grouping to that of the Central Powers there would probably have been war all the same, but with this difference, that defeat and not victory would have been the lot of the Entente Powers.

Now the German-speaking peoples in the world amount to an enormous number, at least to a hundred millions if those outside Germany and Austria, and in the New World, as well as the Old, are taken into account. It may be difficult for them to organize themselves for war, but it will be less difficult for them to develop a common spirit which may penetrate all over the world. It is just this development that statesmen ought to watch carefully, for, given an interval long enough, it is impossible to predict what influence these hundred millions of people may not acquire and come to exercise. We do not want to have a prolonged period of growing anxiety and unrest, such as obtained in our relations with the French, notwithstanding the peace established by the Treaty of Vienna. Of the anxiety and unrest which were ours for more than one generation, the history of the Channel fortifications, of the Volunteer force and of several other great and often costly institutions, bears witness. Let us therefore take thought while there is time to do so. We do not wish to see repeated anything analogous to our former experience. The one thing that can avert it is the spirit in which a League of Nations has been brought to birth. That spirit alone can preclude the gradual nascence of desire to call into existence a new balance of power. It is not enough to tell Germany and Austria that if they behave well they will be admitted to the League of Nations. What really matters is the feeling and manner in which the invitation is given, and an obvious sincerity in the desire that they should work with us as equals in a common endeavor to make the best of a world which contains us both. One is quite conscious of the difficulties that must attend the attempt to approach the question in the frame of mind that is requisite. We may have to discipline ourselves considerably. But the people of this country are capable of reflection, and so are the people of the American Continent. The problem to be solved is one that presses on our great Allies in the United States, where the German-speaking population is very large, quite as much as it does on us. France and Belgium have more to forgive, and France has a hard past from which to avert her eyes. But she is a country of great intelligence, and it is for the sake of everybody, and not merely in the interest of our recent enemies, that enlargement of the spirit is requisite.

How the present situation is to be softened, how the people of the Central Powers are to be brought to feel that they are not to remain divided from us by an impassable gulf, this is not the occasion to suggest. It is enough to repeat that the question is not one simply of the letter of a treaty but is one of the spirit in which it is made. Conditions change in this world with a rapidity that is often startling. The fashion of the day passes before we know that what is novel and was unexpected has come upon us. The foundations of a peace that is to be enduring must therefore be sought in what is highest and most abiding in human nature.

* * *

INDEX

* * *

INDEXToC

Agadir incident, the, 68

Algeciras Conference, the, 69, 114

Alsace-Lorraine, question of, 114 the Kaiser on, 52, 53

America, Tschirsky on, 60

Anglo-French Entente, Bülow on, 56 Tschirsky, 59

views of German Emperor on, 52

Armaments, difficulty of question of, 21 Germany's, 94, 161

Army, British, advantages of voluntary system in, 199 question of compulsory service, 198

Asquith, Mr., consulted by Sir Edward Grey, 45 Premier and War Secretary, 50

presides at Imperial Defense Committee, 182

Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 70, 113 ultimatum to Serbia, 133

Bagdad Railway, the, William II. and, 63 et seq.

Balance of power, and the League of Nations, 222 principle of, 20, 22, 119

Balfour, A.J., and Imperial Defense, 184

Ballin, Herr, and Tirpitz, 144

Barnardiston, General, an unfounded charge against, 201

Berchtold, Count, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153

Berlin, a curious legend originating in, 201 and the Bagdad Railway question, 66

author's visit to, 37

Bethmann-Hollweg, and the Agadir crisis, 69, 71 at Potsdam conference, 151

author's interview with, and the formula of neutrality, 71, 73, 78, 79, 124

desires preservation of peace, 161

his accusation against Entente Powers, 103

informed of Austrian ultimatum, 153

letter to author after the Montreal address, 93

loyalty to the Kaiser, 114

succeeds Prince Bülow as Chancellor, 112

Bismarck, Countess Wilhelm, 146

Bismarck, Prince, a dictum of, 56 and Britain's indefinite policy, 17

and the inevitability of war, 23

and the military party in Germany, 89

and Tirpitz, 145-48

denounces abrogation of Reinsurance Treaty, 146

his affection for Emperor Frederick, 148

his hatred of "prestige politics," 120

Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, 126

Boer War, the, attitude of the Kaiser during, 115

Bosnia, annexation of, 70, 113

Botha, General, co-operates in military preparations, 188

Bridges, Colonel, British Military Attaché at Brussels, 202

Britain's command of the sea, 195

British Army, the reorganization of, 47

British Expeditionary Force, the, mobilization of, 50 organization of, 178

unrecognized work of, 197

British Government, the, paramount duty of, 18

British Navy, a War Staff introduced into, 139, 181 (See also Navy, British)

Bülow, Prince von, author's meeting with, 38 on the Anglo-French Entente, 56

opposes Bagdad Railway proposal, 67

succeeded by Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor, 112

Cambon, M. Jules, and relations between France and Germany, 113 informed of Berlin "conversations," 78

Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, and Imperial Defense, 182, 184 at Marienbad, 38

Caprivi and the organization of German Navy, 138 and the Reinsurance Treaty, 126, 127

Cassel, Sir Ernest, visits Berlin, 70 (and note)

Central Powers, the, preparations for war, 20 their responsibility for the world war, 22

Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. J., Tariff Reform policy of, 54

Churchill, Winston, naval policy of, 87, 181

Committee of Imperial Defense, the, and its functions, 158, 159, 177, 182

Compulsory service, author's views on, 198

Cowans, Sir John, and the military preparations, 188

Crewe, Lord, attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182

Curzon, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68

Czernin, Count, on William II., 170

D'Aerenthal, Count, diplomatic victory of, 113

Dawson, Harbutt, "German Empire" of, 120

Democracy and war, 27 vindicated by the war, 108

(See also Social Democracy)

Diplomacy before the war, 35 et seq.

Disarmament, German objections to, 55, 60

Donop, Sir Stanley von, Master General of the Ordnance, 188

Douglas, Sir Charles, and the voluntary system, 199

Education, author's activities for, 39

Edward VII., King, at Marienbad, 38 "encirclement" policy of: Bethmann-Hollweg on, 112

entertains the German Emperor, 62

Einem, General von, at Windsor, 62 author's interview with, 38

Ellison, Colonel, at Berlin, 38

England, a War Staff for the Navy in, 139, 181 commercial rivalry with Germany, 114

conservation of sea power and what it implied, 20, 21

efforts to preserve peace end in failure, 22

her alleged plans to violate Belgian neutrality, 201

propagandists for German military party in, 24

reorganization of army in, 185

voluntary military system of, and its advantages, 199

(See also Great Britain)

England's precautions against Germany's war designs, 168-69

Englishmen, defects and failings of, 28 psychology of, 17

Entente, the, England's entry into-and the alternative, 118, 119, 162 policy of, 106

Ewart, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184

Expeditionary Force (see British Expeditionary Force)

Falkenhayn, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151

France, apprehensive of Germany's intentions, 44 army of, 180

Frankfurter Zeitung opposes Tirpitz's war objectives, 143

Free Trade, Prince von Bülow's views on, 58 William II. on, 54

French Revolution, the, 217

French, Sir John, and reorganization of British Army, 48

George V., King, entertains German Emperor, 67

George, Lloyd, and the Agadir crisis, 70 at meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182

German desire of commercial development, 55, 58, 60 foreign policy: divided control of, 85

Germans, psychology of, 40

Germany, and the Agadir incident, 68 and the Hague Conference, 60

attitude of, before the war, 101 et seq.

cause of her downfall, 167

Chauvinist party in, 81

commercial rivalry with England, 114

decides upon war, 88

defect of Imperial system in, 109

desire for commercial expansion, 103

Fleet Laws passed in the Reichstag, 142

her responsibility for the world war, 90

increases her armaments, 21, 94, 161

influence of General Staff, 41, 107

militarist party of, 39, 89, 108

miscalculations at outbreak of war, 83, 159

naval program of, 142, 156

new Military Law passed, 136

organization of her Navy, 138

over-ambition of, 16

peaceful penetration policy of, 39, 41

politics in: an anecdote of, 85 (note)

result of military spirit in, 15, 22

scaremongers in, 24

shipbuilding program of, 74

the new Fleet Law, 75, 79, 87, 128

the Press and Tirpitz, 143

two inconsistent policies in, 107

why she entered the war, 207

Goltz, von der, his "Nation in Arms," 180

Goschen, Sir Edward, demands his passports, 44

Gosse, Edmund, meets the Emperor, 68

Grant Duff, Colonel, 185

Great Britain and Belgian neutrality, 202 ante-war policy of, 13, 17

deficiencies in military organization of, 46

enters the war, 95

her sea power before the war, 19

indefinite policy of, 17, 28, 30

question of her preparedness for war, 18, 177

the educational problem in, 39

Great War, the, and Germany's responsibility, 15 causes of, 161

Greindl, Baron, and a curious legend, 201

Grey, Sir Edward (Lord Grey of Fallodon), an historical speech by, 44 and the Bagdad Railway question, 64

at meetings of Imperial Defense Committee, 182

Bethmann-Hollweg on, 113

denies an insinuation originating in Berlin, 203

his efforts for peace, 88, 154, 155

negotiates with Germany, 163

presses Serbia to accept ultimatum, 155

proposes a conference, 154

Grierson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184

Hague Conference, the, 55 Germany's difficulty, 60

Haig, Sir Douglas, and military preparations for war, 188 and the reorganization of British Army, 48

Haldane, Lord, a luncheon to the German Emperor, 67 a visit to the United States and Canada, 37

addresses at Montreal and Oxford, 92, 145

advocates improved system of education, 39

and Expeditionary and Territorial Forces, 48, 50, 178

and the Bagdad Railway question, 63 et seq.

becomes Lord Chancellor, 37, 87

"conversations" at Berlin, 72, 124

criticizes Bethmann-Hollweg's book, 101 et seq.

dines with the Chancellor, 77

entertained by General Staff, 41

examines organization of German War Office, 38

frank conversation with William II., 52 et seq.

lunches with Emperor and Empress, 74

on military preparations, 177 et seq.

post-war problems and how they should be met, 208 et seq.

rebuts a statement by Tirpitz, 164

Secretary of State for War, 36

studies in Germany, 36

visits German Emperor, 37

witnesses review of German troops, 51

Hankey, Sir Maurice, his work recognized by Parliament, 185

Harcourt, Lord, at Imperial Defense Committee meetings, 182

Harnack, Professor, author's meeting with, 77

Herzegovina, annexation of, 70, 113

Hindenburg, General von, author's meeting with, 77

Huguet, Colonel, interviewed by author, 45

Imperial Defense Committee, the, 158, 159, 177, 182

Isvolsky, M., 113, 162

Jagow, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 133

Kiaochow (see Tsingtau)

Kiderlen-Waechter, Herr von, a talk with, 77

and the Agadir incident, 69

Kitchener, Lord, meets the Emperor, 68

personality of, 179

Kitchener's Army, 50, 178

Lansdowne, Lord, and the agreement with France, 21

Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, co-operates in military preparations, 188

League of Nations, the, 220, 222

Lucanus, von, snubbed by Bismarck, 148

Lyncker, von, commanded to Potsdam, 150, 151

Lyttelton, Sir Neville, 188

MacDonald, Ramsay, lunches with German Emperor, 68

Mahan, Admiral, his works studied by Tirpitz, 141

McKenna, Mr., and the Navy, 87

Metternich, Count, and Bagdad Railway question, 66 at Windsor, 62

author's relations with, 57

Miles, Sir Herbert, assists in military preparations, 188

Military preparations, the, 177 et seq.

Moltke, Count von, his scheme for rapid mobilization, 38

Moltke, General von, a chat with, 42 present at meeting of Bismarck and Kaiser, 148

Morley, Lord, at luncheon to the Emperor, 68 attends meetings of Committee of Imperial Defense, 182

Morocco difficulty, the, 115 France's request to England, 44

Moulton, Lord, meets German Emperor, 68

National philosophy, German, 30

Navy, British, mobilization of, 50 sea power the dominant element in military policy, 200

why strengthened and increased, 87, 129, 181

Navy, German, Bülow on, 57 William II. and, 54

Nicholson, Lord, and a new military system, 196 chief of General Staff, 188

Officers' Training Corps, organization of, 192

Ottley, Admiral Sir Charles, secretary of Committee of Imperial Defense, 185

Panther sent to Agadir, 68

Peace terms, the, burden of, 210

Post-war problems, and how they should be met, 208

Potsdam, a reported Crown Council at, and Tirpitz's version of, 131, 149

Reinsurance Treaty of 1884, 126, 146

Repington, Col. A'Court, 191

Reventlow, Count, 38 (note)

Richter opposes Tirpitz on the naval program, 142

Russia, army of, 180 her hostility to Austria, 113

not wishful for war, 162

Russo-Japanese War, William II. and, 116

Sargent, J.S., lunches with the Emperor, 68

Schoen, Baron von, accompanies William II. to England, 62 and the Bagdad Railway question, 65

Serbia as "provocative neighbor," 23 ultimatum to, 133

Skiernevice (see Reinsurance Treaty)

Social Democracy, and militarism, 108 in Germany, 84, 144

Special Reserve, the, organization of, 178

Spender, J.A., meets the Emperor, 68

Stosch, and the German Navy, 138

Tangier, William II. at, 53, 115

Tariff Reform, the Kaiser on, 55

Teaching universities, author and, 39

Technical colleges in England, 40

Territorial Force, the, its part in the world war, 49 mobilization of, 50

organization of, 48, 178

Tirpitz, Admiral von, an admission by, 138 an interview with, 74

and Bethmann-Hollweg's policy, 141

criticizes author, 160

demands a definite policy for war, 143

his "Erinnerungen" discussed, 137 et seq.

his influence in Germany, 82

informed of Austria's demands to Serbia, 153

mentality of, 137

outstanding thesis of his book, 141

tribute to British sea power, 161

visits Bismarck, 145, 148

Trench warfare, unpreparedness for, 191

Tschirsky, Herr von, and the ultimatum to Serbia, 153 author's interview with, 38

on Anglo-French Entente, 59

on the English Press, 61

Tsingtau as German naval base, 140

Two-Power standard, discussed with German Emperor and Prince Bülow, 54, 57 Tirpitz and, 76

United States (see America)

Voluntary system, the, advantages of, 199

William II., Emperor, an ominous admission by, 43 and the Agadir crisis, 69, 70

and the Anglo-French Entente, 52

Bismarck's message to, 148

consults Bethmann-Hollweg and Zimmermann, 132

Count Czernin on, 170

desires exchange of views between Berlin and London, 70, 71

Emperor of Austria's letter to, and memorandum on policy, 131

frank speech with author, 52 et seq.

his proposal on Bagdad Railway question, 66

his reception in London, 68

incautious speeches of, 69, 117, 161

pays surprise visit to Bismarck, 148

promises support to Austria, 150

reads a poem to author, 165

reviews his troops, 51

Tirpitz and, 142

visits King Edward and King George, 62, 67

Wilson, Admiral Sir Arthur, meets the Emperor, 68

Wilson, General, and the Committee of Imperial Defense, 184

Windsor, the German Emperor's visit to, 62

Zimmermann, Herr, at Potsdam conference, 151 meets author, 77

* * *

Typographical errors corrected in text:

Page 231: Landsdowne replaced by Lansdowne

Unusual spellings left in the text:

maneuvers

altho

tho

* * *