The Transvaal from Within

When, before resorting to extreme measures to obtain what the Uitlanders deemed to be their bare rights, the final appeal or declaration was made on Boxing Day, 1895, in the form of the manifesto published by the Chairman of the National Union, President Kruger, after an attentive consideration of the document as translated to him, remarked grimly: 'Their rights. Yes, they'll get them-over my dead body!' And volumes of explanation could not better illustrate the Boer attitude and policy towards the English-speaking immigrants.

'L'état c'est moi' is almost as true of the old Dopper President as it was of its originator; for in matters of external policy and in matters which concern the Boer as a party the President has his way as surely and as completely as any anointed autocrat. To anyone who has studied the Boers and their ways and policy-who has given more than passing consideration to the incidents and negotiations of the present year{01}-it must be clear that President Kruger does something more than represent the opinion of the people and execute their policy: he moulds them in the form he wills. By the force of his own strong convictions and prejudices, and of his indomitable will, he has made the Boers a people whom he regards as the germ of the Africander nation; a people chastened, selected, welded, and strong enough to attract and assimilate all their kindred in South Africa, and then to realize the dream of a Dutch Republic from the Zambesi to Capetown.

In the history of South Africa the figure of the grim old President will loom large and striking-picturesque, as the figure of one who by his character and will made and held his people; magnificent, as one who in the face of the blackest fortune never wavered from his aim or faltered in his effort; who, with a courage that seemed, and still seems, fatuous, but which may well be called heroic, stood up against the might of the greatest empire in the world. And, it may be, pathetic, too, as one whose limitations were great, one whose training and associations-whose very successes-had narrowed, and embittered and hardened him; as one who, when the greatness of success was his to take and to hold, turned his back on the supreme opportunity, and used his strength and qualities to fight against the spirit of progress, and all that the enlightenment of the age pronounces to be fitting and necessary to good government and a healthy State.

To an English nobleman, who, in the course of an interview, remarked, 'My father was a Minister of England, and twice Viceroy of Ireland,' the old Dutchman answered, 'And my father was a shepherd!' It was not pride rebuking pride; it was the ever-present fact which would not have been worth mentioning but for the suggestion of the antithesis. He too was a shepherd, and is-a peasant. It may be that he knows what would be right and good for his people, and it may be not; but it is sure that he realizes that to educate would be to emancipate, to broaden their views would be to break down the defences of their prejudices, to let in the new leaven would be to spoil the old bread, to give unto all men the rights of men would be to swamp for ever the party which is to him greater than the State. When one thinks on the one-century history of the people, much is seen that accounts for their extraordinary love of isolation, and their ingrained and passionate aversion to control; much too that draws to them a world of sympathy. And when one realizes the old Dopper President hemmed in once more by the hurrying tide of civilization, from which his people have fled for generations-trying to fight both fate and Nature-standing up to stem a tide as resistless as the eternal sea-one sees the pathos of the picture. But this is as another generation may see it.

To-day we are too close-so close that the meaner details, the blots and flaws, are all most plainly visible; the corruption, the insincerity, the injustice, the barbarity-all the unlovely touches that will by-and-by be forgotten-sponged away by the gentle hand of time, when only the picturesque will remain.

In order to understand the deep, ineradicable aversion to English rule which is in the heart and the blood and the bones of every Boer, and of a great many of their kindred who are themselves British subjects, one must recall the conditions under which the Dutch came under British rule. When, in 1814, the Cape was finally ceded to England, it had been twice acquired and held by conquest. The colonists were practically all Dutch, or Huguenots who had adopted Dutch as their language, and South Africa as their home. In any case they were people who, by tradition, teaching and experience, must have regarded the English as their enemies; people in whom there must have been roused bitter resentment against being handed over with the land to their traditional enemies. Were they serfs or subjects? has been asked on their behalf. Had Holland the right, the power, over freemen born, to say to them, 'You are our subjects, on our soil, and we have transferred the soil and with it your allegiance to England, whose sovereignty you will not be free to repudiate.' The Dutch colonist said 'No.' The English Government and the laws of the day said 'Yes.'

Early in the century the Boers began to trek away from the sphere of British rule. They were trekkers before that, indeed. Even in the days of Van Riebeck (1650) they had trekked away from the crowded parts, and opened up with the rifle and the plough new reaches of country; pioneering in a rough but most effective way, driving back the savage races, and clearing the way for civilization. There is, however, a great difference to be noted between the early treks of the emigrants and the treks 'from British rule.' In the former (with few exceptions) they went, knowing that their Government would follow them, and even anxious to have its support and its representatives; and the people who formed their migrating parties were those who had no or insufficient land in the settled parts, those who were starting life on their own account, or those whose families could not be located and provided for in the cramped circumstances of the more occupied parts. In the other case, rich and poor, old and young, went off as in the days and in the fashion of Moses or Abraham. They went without leave or help of the Government; secretly or openly they went, and they asked nothing but to be left alone. They left their homes, their people, the protection of an established Government and a rough civilization, and went out into the unknown. And they had, as it appeared to them, and as it will appear to many others, good reasons for taking so grave a step. For, although the colonists of South Africa enjoyed better government, and infinitely more liberty, under British rule, than they had under the tyrannical régime of the Dutch East India Company twenty years before (against which the Boers had twice risen in rebellion) there were many things which were not as they should have been. A generation had grown up which knew nothing of the arbitrary and oppressive rule of the old Dutch Company. Simple folks have long memories, and all the world over injuries make a deeper and more lasting impression than benefits; and the older generation of Boers, which could recall a condition of things contrasting unpleasantly with British rule, also remembered the executions of Slagters Nek-a vindication of the law which, when all allowance has been made for disturbed times, and the need of strong measures to stop rebellion in a newly-acquired country, seems to us to-day to have been harsh, unnecessary, and unwise in policy, and truly terrible in the manner of fulfilment.

The Boers have produced from their own ranks no literary champion to plead or defend their cause, and their earlier history is therefore little known, and often misunderstood; but to their aid has come Mr. George McCall Theal, the South African historian, whose years of laborious research have rescued for South Africa much that would otherwise have been lost. In his 'History of the Boers' Mr. Theal records the causes of the great emigration, and shows how the Boers stood up for fair treatment, and fought the cause, not of Boers alone, but of all colonists. Boers and British were alike harshly and ignorantly treated by high-handed Governors, and an ill-informed and prejudiced Colonial Office, who made no distinction on the grounds of nationality between the two; for we read that Englishmen had been expelled the country, thrown in gaol, had their property confiscated, and their newspapers suppressed for asserting their independence, and for trifling breaches of harsh laws. The following extract gives the best possible synopsis of the causes, and should whet an appetite which can be gratified by the purchase of Mr. Theal's book:

Why, then, did these men abandon their homes, sacrifice whatever property could not be carried away, and flee from English rule as from the most hateful tyranny? The causes are stated in a great mass of correspondence addressed by them to the Colonial Government, and now preserved, with other colonial records, in declarations published by some of them before leaving, in letters to their relatives and to newspapers, and in hundreds of pages of printed matter, prepared by friendly and hostile hands. The declaration of one of the ablest men among them assigns the following as the motives of himself and the party that went with him:

'GRAHAM'S TOWN,

'January 22, 1837

'1. We despair of saving the colony from those evils which threaten it by the turbulent and dishonest conduct of vagrants who are allowed to infest the country in every part; nor do we see any prospect of peace or happiness for our children in a country thus distracted by internal commotions.

'2. We complain of the severe losses which we have been forced to sustain by the emancipation of our slaves, and the vexatious laws which have been enacted respecting them.

'3. We complain of the continual system of plunder which we have for years endured from the Kaffirs and other coloured classes, and particularly by the last invasion of the colony, which has desolated the frontier districts, and ruined most of the inhabitants.

'4. We complain of the unjustifiable odium which has been cast upon us by interested and dishonest persons, under the name of religion, whose testimony is believed in England, to the exclusion of all evidence in our favour; and we can foresee, as the result of this prejudice, nothing but the total ruin of the country.

'5. We are resolved, wherever we go, that we will uphold the just principles of liberty; but, whilst we will take care that no one is brought by us into a condition of slavery, we will establish such regulations as may suppress crime, and preserve proper relations between master and servant.

'6. We solemnly declare that we leave this colony with a desire to enjoy a quieter life than we have hitherto had. We will not molest any people, nor deprive them of the smallest property; but, if attacked, we shall consider ourselves fully justified in defending our persons and effects, to the utmost of our ability, against every enemy.

'7. We make known that when we shall have framed a code of laws for our guidance, copies shall be forwarded to this colony for general information; but we take the opportunity of stating that it is our firm resolve to make provision for the summary punishment, even with death, of all traitors, without exception, who may be found amongst us.

'8. We purpose, in the course of our journey, and on arrival at the country in which we shall permanently reside, to make known to the native tribes our intentions, and our desire to live in peace and friendly intercourse with them.

'9. We quit this colony under the full assurance that the English Government has nothing more to require of us, and will allow us to govern ourselves without its interference in future.

'10. We are now leaving the fruitful land of our birth, in which we have suffered enormous losses and continual vexation, and are about to enter a strange and dangerous territory; but we go with a firm reliance on an all-seeing, just, and merciful God, whom we shall always fear, and humbly endeavour to obey.

'In the name of all who leave the colony with me,

'P. RETIEF.'

But formal declarations such as the above are not in all instances to be trusted. It is much safer to compare numerous documents written at different times, by different persons, and under different circumstances. For our subject this means of information is as complete as can be desired. The correspondence of the emigrants with the Cape Government was the work of many individuals, and extended over many years. The letters are usually of great length, badly constructed, and badly spelt-the productions, in short, of uneducated men; but so uniform is the vein of thought running through them all, that there is not the slightest difficulty in condensing them into a dozen pages. When analyzed, the statements contained in them are found to consist of two charges, one against the Imperial Government, the other against the agents in South Africa of the London Missionary Society.

The Imperial Government was charged with exposing the white inhabitants of the colony, without protection, to robbery and murder by the blacks; with giving credence in every dispute to statements made by interested persons in favour of savages, while refusing to credit the testimony, no matter how reliable, of colonists of European extraction; with liberating the slaves in an unjust manner; and generally with such undue partiality for persons with black skins and savage habits, as to make it preferable to seek a new home in the wilderness than remain under the English flag.

The missionaries of the London Society were charged with usurping authority that should properly belong to the civil magistrate; with misrepresenting facts; and with advocating schemes directly hostile to the progress of civilization, and to the observance of order. And it was asserted that the influence of these missionaries was all powerful at the Colonial Office in London, by which the colony, without a voice in the management of its affairs, was then ruled absolutely.

In support of the charges against the Imperial Government, the emigrants dwelt largely upon the devastation of the eastern districts by the Kaffirs' inroad of December, 1834, which was certainly unprovoked by the colonists. Yet Lord Glenelg, who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies, justified the Kaffirs, and not only refused to punish them, but actually gave them a large slip of land, including the dense jungles along the Fish River, that had long been part of the colony; and made no other provision against the recurrence of a destructive invasion than a series of treaties with a number of barbarous chiefs, who had no regard for their engagements. This event is the most prominent feature in the correspondence of the emigrants; it is fairly recorded, and the language used is in general much more moderate than that employed by the English frontier colonists when relating the same circumstance.

Next stands the removal of all restraint from the coloured population of the colony, without the protection to the whites of even a Vagrant Act. Several of the colonial divisions had been for ten or twelve years overrun by fugitives from the Basuto and Betshuana countries, who had been driven from their own homes by the troubles already recorded. These people were usually termed Mantatees or Makatees, from the supposition that they were all subjects of Ma Ntatisi. Towards the eastern frontiers Kaffirs, and after the war Fingos, wandered about practically wherever they chose. In the remainder of the colony Hottentots, free blacks, and mixed breeds came and went as they pleased. How is it possible, said the farmers, for us to cultivate the ground, or breed cattle, with all these savages and semi-savages constantly watching for opportunities to plunder us-with no police, and no law under which suspicious characters can be arrested and made to account for their manner of living?

Much is said of the reproofs of Sir Benjamin D'Urban by the Secretary of State, and, after 1838, of the dismissal of that Governor, (1) The emigrants asserted that he was the best Governor the colony had had since it became subject to England; they dwelt upon his benevolence, his ability, his strict justice, his impartiality to white and black, his efforts to promote civilization; and then they complained, in words more bitter than are to be found when they referred to any other subject, that the good Governor had been reproved, and finally deprived of his office, because he had told the plain truth, regardless of the London Missionary Society; and had endeavoured to mete out to black criminals the same justice that he would have meted out had they been white. There is now no one in South Africa who does not agree with the emigrants in this matter. Nearly half a century has passed away since Sir Benjamin D'Urban was forced into retirement by Lord Glenelg; and during that period the principal measures which he proposed have been approved of and adopted, while the successors of those missionaries who were his bitter opponents are at present among the strongest advocates of his system of dealing with the natives.

Sir Benjamin D'Urban remained in South Africa, after being deprived of office, until the reversal of his policy towards the natives was admitted by most people even in England to have been a mistake. He did not leave the Cape until April, 1846, just after the commencement of the War of the Axe.

Concerning the liberation of the slaves, there is less in this correspondence than one might reasonably expect to find. Many scores of pages can be examined without any allusion whatever to it. Nowhere is there a single word to be found in favour of slavery as an institution; the view of the emigrants, with hardly an exception, being fairly represented in the following sentence, taken from a letter of the Volksraad at Natal to Sir George Napier: 'A long and sad experience has sufficiently convinced us of the injury, loss, and dearness of slave labour, so that neither slavery nor the slave trade will ever be permitted among us.'

[The allusions to the emancipation of slaves, and to slavery as an institution, will be considered by many to need some modification or explanation. The Dutch even to-day speak of the emancipation as the real cause of the great exodus; and the system of indenture, and the treatment of natives generally by the Boers, cannot fairly be regarded as warranting the view expressed by Mr. Theal in connection with this letter to Sir George Napier.]

It is alleged, however, that the emancipation, as it was carried out, was an act of confiscation. It is stated that most of the slaves were brought to the colony in English ships, and sold by English subjects; that when, in 1795, the colony was invited by English officers of high rank to place itself under the protection of England, one of the inducements held out was security in slave property; at the same time those officers warning the colonists that if France obtained possession she would liberate the slaves, as she had done in Martinique, thereby ruining this colony as she had ruined that island; that the English Government had recently and suddenly changed its policy, and required them to conform to the change with equal alacrity, whereas they were convinced that gradual emancipation, with securities against vagrancy, was the only safe course. The emancipation had been sudden, and the slaves had been placed upon a perfect political equality with their former proprietors. The missionaries applauded this as a noble and generous act of the Imperial Government, and they were told that by everyone in England it was so regarded. But at whose expense was this noble and generous act carried out? Agents of the Imperial Government had appraised the slaves, generally at less than their market value. Two-fifths of this appraisement, being the share apportioned to the Cape out of the twenty million pounds sterling voted by the Imperial Parliament, had then been offered to the proprietors as compensation, if they chose to go to London for it, otherwise they could only dispose of their claims at a heavy discount. Thus, in point of fact, only about one-third of the appraised amount had been received. To all slave-holders this had meant a great reduction of wealth, while to many of those who were in debt it was equivalent to the utter deprivation of all property.

As regards the missionaries, a crusade was organized by some of these worthies, who had themselves married Kaffir women, and who spared no effort and showed no scruple in blackening the name of colonist.

The views and interests of the colonists and of these men were so different that concord was hardly possible. The missionaries desired that the blacks should be collected together in villages: the colonists were unwilling that they should be thus withdrawn from service. 'Teach them the first step in civilization, to labour honestly for their maintenance, and add to that oral instruction in the doctrines of Christianity,' said the colonists. 'Why should they be debarred from learning to read and write? And as there can only be schools if they are brought together in villages, why should they not be collected together?' replied the missionaries.

Then came another and a larger question. By whom should the waste places of the land, the vast areas which were without other occupants than a few roving Bushmen, be peopled? 'By the white man,' said the colonists; 'it is to the advantage of the world in all time to come that the higher race should expand and be dominant here; it would be treason to humanity to prevent its growth where it can grow without wrong to others, or to plant an inferior stock where the superior can take root and flourish.' 'By Africans,' said the missionaries; 'this is African soil; and if mission stations are established on its desolate tracts, people will be drawn to them from the far interior, the community will grow rapidly, those enlightened by Christianity here will desire in their turn to enlighten their friends beyond, and thus the Gospel teaching will spread until all Africa stretches out its hands to God.' Coupled with such arguments, which were constantly used by missionaries in the early part of this century, before their enthusiasm was cooled by experience, were calculations that appealed strongly to the commercial instincts of people in England. A dozen colonial farmers required something like a hundred square miles of land for their cattle runs; on this same ground, under missionary supervision, three or four hundred families of blacks could exist; these blacks would shortly need large quantities of manufactured goods; and thus it would be to the interest of trade to encourage them rather than the colonists. 'Already,' said they, 'after only a few years' training, many blacks can read as well or better than the ordinary colonists, and are exhibiting a decided taste for civilization.'

There was thus a broad line of demarcation between the colonists and such of the missionaries as held these views, and the tendency on each side was to make it still broader. It was deepened into positive antipathy towards those missionaries who, following Dr. Vanderkemp's example, united themselves in marriage with black women, and proclaimed themselves the champions of the black population against the white. Everyone acquainted with South African natives knows how ready they are to please their friends by bringing forward charges against anyone whom those friends dislike. Unfortunately the missionaries Vanderkemp and Read were deceived into believing a great number of charges of cruelty made against various colonists, which a little observation would have shown in most instances to be groundless; and thereupon they lodged accusations before the High Court of Justice. In 1811 between seventy and eighty such cases came before the Circuit Court for trial. There was hardly a family on the frontier of which some relative was not brought as a criminal before the judges to answer to a charge of murder or violent assault. Several months were occupied in the trials, and more than a thousand witnesses were examined, but in every instance the most serious charges were proved to be without foundation. Only a few convictions, and those of no very outrageous crimes, resulted from these prosecutions, which kept the entire colony in a ferment until long after the circuit was closed.

Thus far everyone will approve of the sentiments of one party or the other according to his sympathy, but in what follows no unprejudiced person who will take the trouble to study the matter thoroughly can acquit the anti-colonial missionaries of something more faulty than mere error of judgment. For years their writings teemed with charges against the colonists similar to those they had brought before the High Court of Justice. These writings were circulated widely in Europe, where the voice of the colonists was never heard, and they created impressions there which no refutation made in South Africa could ever counteract. The acts, the language, even the written petitions of the colonists, were so distorted in accounts sent home, that these accounts cannot now be read by those who have made themselves acquainted with the truth, without the liveliest feelings of indignation being excited.

The colonists learned that in England they were regarded as cruel barbarians because they refused to permit Hottentot herds, swarming with vermin, to be seated in their front rooms at the time of family prayer. They found themselves pictured as the harshest of taskmasters, as unfeeling violators of native rights. And of late years it had become plain to them that the views of their opponents were being acted upon at the Colonial Office, while their complaints were wholly disregarded.

Several causes of dissatisfaction, besides those above mentioned, contributed to the impulse of emigration, but all in a very slight degree. Judge Cloete, in his 'Five Lectures,' mentions the severe punishment inflicted upon the frontier insurgents of 1815 as one of them; and there is no doubt that it was so with some families, though no trace of it can be found in the correspondence of the emigrants. The substitution in 1827 of the English for the Dutch language in the colonial courts of law was certainly generally felt as a grievance. The alteration in 1813 of the system of land tenure, the redemption in 1825 of the paper currency at only thirty-six hundredths of its nominal value, and the abolition in 1827 of the courts of landdrost and heemraden, unquestionably caused much dissatisfaction, though all of these measures are now admitted by everyone to have been beneficial. The long delay in issuing titles to farms, the cost of which has been paid to Government years before, is mentioned as a grievance in some of the declarations.

Two parties-men, women, and children-numbering ninety-eight in all, pioneered the great trek; of these twenty-six survived fever and fighting, loss of provisions, waggons, and cattle, and a long weary tramp from Zoutpansberg to Delagoa Bay, and were rescued and taken thence to Natal, and two children were carried off by the natives. The survivors were three women with their twelve children-seven orphan children and four youths. Not a single grown man escaped.

During the winter of 1836 preparations for emigration were being made over the eastern and midland districts. The Governor was perfectly helpless in the matter. The Attorney-General, Mr. A. Oliphant, was consulted by the Governor, and gave his opinion that 'it seemed next to an impossibility to prevent persons passing out of the colony by laws in force, or by any which could be framed.' On August 19 Sir Benjamin D'Urban wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Andries Stockenstrom, that 'he could see no means of stopping the emigration, except by persuasion, and attention to the wants and necessities of the farmers.' In that direction the Governor had done all that was in his power, but he could not act in opposition to the instructions of the Secretary of State. Sir Andries Stockenstrom himself, in replying to an address from the inhabitants of Uitenhage, stated that 'he was not aware of any law which prevented any of his Majesty's subjects from leaving his dominions and settling in another country; and such a law, if it did exist, would be tyrannical and oppressive.'

The story of the trekkers is one of surpassing interest, and must enlist for them the sympathy and unbounded admiration of all.

By the middle of the year 1837 there were over one thousand waggons between the Caledon and Vaal rivers-truly a notable and alarming exodus; and the Boers then began the work of carving out new countries for themselves. Their history surpasses all fiction in its vicissitudes, successes, and tragedies. They fought and worked and trekked, onward, always onward-never returning-on beyond the furthermost outposts of civilization.

And so the story rolls on, gaining pathos, but losing no whit of interest from its eternal sameness. They fought, and worked, and starved, and died for their land of promise, where they might hope to be alone, like the simple people of their one Book; where they might never know the hated British rule; where they might never experience the forms and trammels, the restlessness and changes, the worries, the necessities or benefits, of progressing civilization. Their quarrel had been with the abuses and blunders of one Government; but a narrow experience moved them to mistrust all but their own pastoral patriarchal way, moulded on the records of the Bible, and to regard the evidences of progress as warnings of coming oppression and curtailment of liberty, and a departure from the simple and ideal way. The abuses from which they suffered are no more; the methods which were unjust have been abandoned; the ignorance of the ruler has been dispelled; in place of despotism there is autonomy; justice rules where ignorance and bias sat; liberty where there was interference; protection for oppression; progress and civilization have increased as in no other epoch; and the nation and Government from which they severed themselves have taken their place in the very forefront of all. But the Boer sees with the eyes of sixty years ago!

The ideal was impossible, the struggle hopeless, the end certain. They trekked, and trekked and trekked again; but the flag of England-emblem of all they hated-was close by; behind, beside, in front, or over them; and the something which they could not fight-the ever-advancing tide of civilization-lapped at their feet, and slowly, silently, and for ever blotted out the line where they had written, 'Thus far and no further.'

The South African Republic had been in existence as an independent State for twelve years when it reached that condition of insolvency which appeared to invite, or at least justify, annexation, as the only alternative to complete ruin and chaos. And there are very few, even among the most uncompromising supporters of the Boers, who seriously attempt to show that the Transvaal had any prospect of prolonging its existence as an independent State for more than a few months when Sir Theophilus Shepstone annexed it in 1877. The following picture is from a book published by the late Alfred Aylward, the Fenian, more anti-British than the Boer himself, who was present at the time, and wrote his book in order to enlist sympathy for the movement then (1878) organized to obtain a cancellation of the annexation. The value of Aylward's testimony would not be fairly appreciated without some explanation.

Sir Bartle Frere describes him (and quotes Scotland Yard authorities who knew him well) as one of the party who murdered the policeman at Manchester, and one of the worst and most active of the dynamiting Irishmen-a professional agitator, who boasted of his purpose to promote the Transvaal rebellion. Major Le Caron, too, stated on oath before the Parnell Commission that money was sent by the Irish Rebel Societies, through Aylward, to stir up the Transvaal rebellion. This is what Aylward says:

All South Africa was for the moment at rest, with the exception of the district of Utrecht, where an old-standing grievance with Cetewayo was the cause of some little alarm and excitement (i.e., Cetewayo's threatened invasion). Still, the Transvaal was disturbed throughout its whole extent by the expectation of some pending change-a change coming from the outside, which had been invited by an active, discontented party, chiefly foreigners, dwellers in towns, non-producers, place-hunters, deserters, refugees, land-speculators, 'development-men,' and pests of Transvaal society generally, who openly preached resistance to the law, refusal to pay taxes, and contempt of the natural and guaranteed owners of the country in which they lived, in the distinctly expressed hope that foreign intervention would fill the country with British gold, and conduce to their own material prosperity. The Boers, spread over a country larger than France, were stunned into stupor by the demonstrative loudness of the party of discontent. In some districts they (the Boers) were poor, and could not readily pay the taxes imposed upon them by the wars and railway projects of the Government. Their Volksraad was in Session, but its every action was paralyzed by the gloom of impending dissolution.

The Republic owed ￡215,000, which it had no immediate means of paying. Its creditors were clamorous; whilst the Executive, turn to which side it would, found itself confronted by threats, reproaches, accusations of slavery and cruelty based upon hearsay, and which, like the annexation that steadily approached, could not be met, because neither of them had yet assumed the evidenced consistency of actual fact. There was no public opinion to support the Government or to save the Republic. The Boers lived far apart from each other, whilst the annexationists and the party of disorder dwelt, in compact communities, in towns and mining villages. Into the midst of this confusion-into the capital of this bewildered State-entered Sir Theophilus Shepstone and his staff. He had not come to seize the country-he had come as 'an adviser, as a helper, and as a friend'; but his advent was a blight-an incubus which rendered additionally powerless the unfortunate President and his Council. The coming of Sir Theophilus Shepstone was, to the minds of nearly all, but too clearly the forerunner of change. In the face of this additional whet to the anticipations of the party of disturbance, something that has been described as anarchy prevailed. Everyone waited; all fell into a state of expectation; no one attempted to save the State, or repel the danger. At the same time, there was no anarchy in the proper sense of the word. Justice sat on her seat; criminals were arrested and brought to trial; actions at law were heard and determined; and in no one place, save the goldfields, was authority, even for a moment, defied. There the law vindicated itself without having used violence or shed one drop of blood. Not one single public outrage, not one unpunished crime, marked this period of suspense, which is described by partizan writers as a time of chaos and anarchy.

Peace was granted to Secocoeni, and the quietness and gloom of the country became even more profound.

Now, had a commission, royal or joint, been opened in Pretoria to inquire into the truth of the allegations made against the Government, history might perhaps be able to record that judgment, followed by justice, had overtaken the Transvaal. No commission was opened. There was a banquet and a ball. The suspense increased in intensity. Understrappers, and agents of the discontented faction, filled the country with rumours of impending annexation, and sometimes of impending conquest. The Boers, the inhabitants of the country, asked day after day what was the mission of the English Commissioner. They visited him in hundreds; but he knew the wonderful advantage to be gathered from the heightening of the mystery, and the intensifying of the excitement. He listened to everyone; but he maintained a gloomy and impassive silence, neither checking the aspirations of the annexationists, nor dissipating the forebodings of the farmers.

News arrived that troops were marching towards, and massing on, the border; rumours spread that annexation was inevitable. Sir Theophilus sought not to alleviate the anxieties of the Government, nor to quell the now rising alarm amongst the people; he simply sat still and listened, watching the writhings and stragglings of the doomed Volksraad, and awaiting a favourable moment to end its existence.

At length someone determined to ask: 'Was it not possible to avert this annexation which loomed before every mind, brooding like a shadow upon the country?' He went to Sir Theophilus; he asked his question; and at length the oracle spoke. Without moving a muscle of his wonderfully impassive countenance, without even raising his eyes to look at the interlocutor, Sir Theophilus calmly murmured: 'It is too late!-too late!' And so, without the authorization of the home Government, without the consent of her Majesty's High Commissioner, without the concurrence of the Volksraad, against the will of thirty-nine-fortieths of the people, and in defiance of the protest of their Executive, as Mr. Anthony Trollope puts it, Sir Theophilus said: 'Then and from thenceforth the Transvaal shall be British property!' So he put up the Queen's flag.

Now, it is impossible to conceive anything more admirable for its discretion, more wisely calculated as to the moment of its occurrence, or more suavely and yet firmly done than this act. There was not a blow struck, not a shot fired; and the first impulse of nearly every person in the country, whether in principle opposed to annexation or not, was to congratulate Sir Theophilus Shepstone on the skill, tact, and good fortune with which he had put an end to the excessive anxiety, the mental strain, the fears, hopes, and expectations by which the whole country was paralyzed. Whether the annexation be now held to be right or wrong, its execution, so far as regards the act itself, was an unparalleled triumph of tact, modesty, and firmness.

It was not discovered at the moment, and it never entered into any man's mind to consider, that it was the presence in Pretoria of Sir Theophilus himself that had created the anxiety, and caused the paralysis; and that it was his arts and presence that had tightened and strung up into quivering intensity the mind of the country. He had broken the spell; he had introduced certainty in place of uncertainty; and he was congratulated, and very properly so, for the manner in which he had brought to a conclusion his hazardous mission.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone's despatches record his negotiations with President Burgers, and the arrangement which allowed him to make a formal protest against the annexation, so as to satisfy his Irreconcilables, whilst he in reality not only assented to the measure, but even assisted the completion of it, and discussed the details with Shepstone, who in turn had revised President Burgers' 'protest.'

On April 3, 1877, Shepstone had written to Frere:

Mr. Burgers, who had been all along, as far as his conversation and professions to me went, in full accord with me, had suddenly taken alarm; he made impossible proposals, all of which involved infinite delay, and, of course, dangerous agitation. As far as I am concerned, it is impossible for me to retreat now, come what may. If I were to leave the country, civil war would at once take place, as the natives would consider it the sunshine in which they could make hay in the Transvaal; the goldfields are in a state of rebellion against the Transvaal Government, and they are kept from overt acts only by my warnings and entreaties.

And eight days later he wrote to Mr. Robert Herbert enclosing his letter under 'flying seal' to Frere:

There will be a protest against my act of annexation issued by the Government, but they will at the same time call upon the people to submit quietly, pending the issue; you need not be disquieted by such action, because it is taken merely to save appearances, and the members of the Government from the violence of a faction that seems for years to have held Pretoria in terror when any act of the Government displeased it.

You will better understand this when I tell you privately that the President has from the first fully acquiesced in the necessity for the change, and that most of the members of the Government have expressed themselves anxious for it; but none of them have had the courage openly to express their opinions, so I have had to act apparently against them; and this I have felt bound to do, knowing the state and danger of the country, and that three-fourths of the people will be thankful for the change when once it is made.

Yesterday morning Mr. Burgers came to me to arrange how the matter should be done. I read to him the draft of my Proclamation, and he proposed the alteration of two words only, to which I agreed. He brought to me a number of conditions which he wished me to insert, which I have accepted, and have embodied in my Proclamation. He told me that he could not help issuing a protest, to keep the noisy portion of the people quiet-and you will see grounds for this precaution when I tell you that there are only half a dozen native constables to represent the power of the State in Pretoria, and a considerable number of the Boers in the neighbourhood are of the lowest and most ignorant class. Mr. Burgers read me, too, the draft of his protest, and asked me if I saw any objection to it, or thought it too strong. I said that it appeared to me to pledge the people to resist by-and-by; to which he replied that it was to tide over the difficulty of the moment, seeing that my support, the troops, were a fortnight's march distant, and that by the time the answer to the protest came, all desire of opposition would have died out. I therefore did not persuade him from his protest.

You will see, when the proclamation reaches you, that I have taken high ground. Nothing but annexation will or can save the State, and nothing else can save South Africa from the direst consequences. All the thinking and intelligent people know this, and will be thankful to be delivered from the thraldom of petty factions, by which they are perpetually kept in a state of excitement and unrest, because the Government, and everything connected with it, is a thorough sham.

This arrangement with President Burgers was a most improper compromise on both sides. Moreover, Shepstone received the protests of the Executive Council and of the Volksraad before he issued his proclamation. He had plenty of evidence to show that even if his action was approved by the majority, the Boers were sufficiently divided to demand some delay. He knew that the members of the Government and of the Raad would not face the responsibility of relinquishing the State's independence, although he received private assurances and entreaties encouraging him to act. He had representations and deputations from the Boers themselves, sufficient in weight and number to warrant his belief that a large proportion of the people desired annexation. He should not have allowed the 'hedging' that was practised at his expense. The Boer leaders were 'between the devil and the deep sea.' There can be no doubt whatever that they dearly loved and prized their independence, and would have fought even then for it had they been in a position to preserve and profit by it; but they were not. They dared neither ask for relief at the price of annexation, nor reject the proffered relief at the price of continuing the hopeless struggle. So they compromised. They took the relief, they accepted pay of the new Government, and entered a protest, so as to put themselves right with the records and stand well with untamed ones of the party.

The Act of Annexation is so generally condemned by the friends and sympathizers of the Boers, and is so persistently quoted by them as the cause of the Boer War, that it is only right to show clearly what the opinion was at that time; and if it be deemed that overmuch space is given to this matter, the answer is, that it is quoted now as the crime which gave rise to the present hatred and mistrust of England, and it is all-important that the truth should be clear.

This is what Mr. J.F. Celliers, the patriotic editor of the Boer newspaper, De Volksstem, wrote in reviewing the work of the special session of the Volksraad, convened to deal with the questions of Lord Carnarvon's Federation Bill, and the rescuing of the country from ruin and chaos:-'During the session we have repeatedly had occasion to comment on the doings of the Raad. These comments have not been favourable, and we regret to say that we have found in the closing scenes of our Legislature no reason to alter our opinions.' Then follows a scathing account of the 'work done,' in which occur such references as:-'With the exception of a couple of members, no one had the sense or manliness to go into the question of confederation'; and 'The most surprising feature of the whole affair was this-that most of the speakers seemed not to have the faintest conception of the desperate condition in which the country stood....' And again, under date of March 28: 'About three months ago we said we would prefer confederation under the British flag if the state of anarchy then threatening were to continue. We know that a good and stable Government is better than anarchy any day.'

It is noteworthy that the writer of the above is the same Mr. Celliers who, two years later, was put in gaol by Colonel Lanyon on a charge of sedition, because he attacked the Administration for its failure to keep the promises made at the time of annexation.

Three thousand out of eight thousand voters actually signed petitions in favour of annexation. In the Raad, President Burgers openly reproached members for proclaiming in public, and for improper reasons, views diametrically opposed to those privately expressed on the confederation and annexation questions; and refused to consult with three out of four members appointed as a deputation to confer with him on these subjects, because they had not paid their taxes, and had so helped by example, not less than by the actual offence, to cause the ruin of the country and the loss of independence. And on March 3 President Burgers read an address to the Raad, in which the following words occur:

'I would rather be a policeman under a strong Government than the President of such a State. It is you-you members of the Raad and the Boers-who have lost the country, who have sold your independence for a soupe (a drink). You have ill-treated the natives, you have shot them down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to pay the penalty.'

* * *

'We should delude ourselves by entertaining the hope that matters would mend by-and-by. It would only be self-deceit. I tell you openly, matters are as bad as they ever can be; they cannot be worse. These are bitter truths, and people may perhaps turn their backs on me; but then I shall have the consolation of having done my duty.'

* * *

'It is said here this or that man must be released from taxes, because the Kaffirs have driven them off their farms, and occupy the latter. By this you proclaim to the world that the strongest man is master here, that the right of the strongest obtains here.' [Mr. Mare: 'This is not true.'] 'Then it is not true what the honourable member, Mr. Breytenbach, has told us about the state of the Lydenburg district; then it is not true either what another member has said about the farms in Zoutpansberg, which are occupied by Kaffirs. Neither is it true, then, what I saw with my own eyes at Lydenburg, where the burghers had been driven off their farms by the Kaffirs, and where Johannes was ploughing and sowing on the land of a burgher. These are facts, and they show that the strongest man is the master here. The fourth point which we have to take into account affects our relations with our English neighbours. It is asked, What have they got to do with our position? I tell you, as much as we have to do with that of our Kaffir neighbours. As little as we can allow barbarities among the Kaffirs on our borders, as little can they allow that in a state on their borders anarchy and rebellion should prevail.'

* * *

'Do you know what has recently happened in Turkey? Because no civilized government was carried on there, the Great Powers interfered and said, "Thus far, and no further." And if this is done to an empire, will a little republic be excused when it misbehaves?

* * *

'Complain to other Powers, and seek justice there? Yes, thank God! justice is still to be found, even for the most insignificant; but it is precisely the justice which will convict us. If we want justice, we must be in a position to ask it with unsullied hands.'

* * *

'Whence has arisen that urgency to make an appeal for interference elsewhere? Has that appeal been made only by enemies of the State? Oh no, gentlemen; it has arisen from real grievances. Our people have degenerated from their former position; they have become demoralised; they are not what they ought to be.'

* * *

'To-day a bill for ￡1,100 was laid before me for signature; but I would sooner have cut off my right hand than sign that paper, for I have not the slightest ground to expect that when that bill becomes due there will be a penny to pay it with.'

* * *

The President added, and his statements remained uncontradicted:

The principal thing which had brought them to their present position was that to which they would not give attention. It was not this or that thing which impeded their way, but they themselves stopped the way; and if they asked him what prevented the people from remaining independent, he answered that the Republic was itself the obstruction, owing to the inherent incapacity and weakness of the people. But whence this weakness? Was it because they were deformed? because they were worse than other people? because they were too few and too insignificant to occupy the country? Those arguments did not weigh with him. They were not true; he did not consider them of any importance. The people were as good as any other people, but they were completely demoralized; they had lost faith in God, reliance upon themselves, or trust in each other. Hence he believed they were inherently weak.

* * *

He did not believe that a new constitution would save them; for as little as the old constitution had brought them to ruin, so little would a new constitution bring them salvation.

* * *

The Great Powers, with all their greatness, all their thousands of soldiers, would fall as quickly as this State had fallen, and even more quickly, if their citizens were to do what the citizens of this State had done; if the citizens of England had behaved towards the Crown as the burghers of this State had behaved to their Government, England would never have stood as long as she had, not even as long as this State had stood. This State owed obligations to other countries; they knew that the fire which had nearly consumed this State would, if felt by them, very soon consume them also.

* * *

In several of the cities of Holland there were people who had subscribed for only one debenture, because they thought men of their own blood were living in South Africa. What was the consequence? The interest up to July last had been paid; in January of this year ￡2,250 was due for interest, and there was not a penny to meet it.

* * *

To take up arms and fight was nonsense; to draw the sword would be to draw the sword against God, for it was God's judgment that the State was in the condition it was to-day; and it was their duty to inquire whether they should immerse in blood the thousands of innocent inhabitants of this country, and if so, what for? For an idea-for something they had in their heads, but not in their hearts; for an independence which was not prized. Let them make the best of the situation, and get the best terms they possibly could; let them agree to join their hands to those of their brethren in the south, and then from the Cape to the Zambesi there would be one great people. Yes, there was something grand in that-grander even than their idea of a Republic-something which ministered to their national feeling. And would this be so miserable? Yes; this would be miserable for those who would not be under the law, for the rebel and revolutionist, but welfare and prosperity for the men of law and order.

* * *

They must not underrate their real and many difficulties. He could point to the south-western border, the Zulu, the goldfields, and other questions, and show them that it was their duty to come to an arrangement with the British Government, and to do so in a bold and manly manner. An hon. member on Saturday last had spoken with a fervent patriotism; but he had failed to appreciate the reference, because it amounted to this-that they must shut their eyes to everything, so as to keep their independence.

President Burgers, who left the Transvaal broken-hearted, more by the cruel and mean intriguing and dissensions among, and disloyalty of, his own people, which made the annexation possible, than by the Act itself, when dying left a statement of the case. It is too long to reproduce in its entirety. He shows how the English faction worked for annexation, and how the Dopper party, headed by Kruger, allied themselves with the former in intrigue against the Government, thwarting all effort at reform and organization, and encouraging the refusal to pay taxes. He states plainly that this course was pursued by Kruger in order to oust him from power, and secure the Presidency for himself. He shows how he opposed 'that other element which had formerly worked in secret, viz., British interference, which got a strong support from the Boers themselves, and one of their chief leaders, P. Kruger, who had betrayed me, after promising me his and his party's support.' He gives the final scene as follows:

The Volksraad had gone away, having done nothing but harm. The members of the Executive had gone home, as if all were safe, and I sat with a half-new Cabinet and part of an old one, half discharged. Yet I made one attempt more, and drafted a letter to Shepstone, intimating that I would oppose the annexation by force of arms, etc.; and showed this to two members of the Executive. The response to my appeal, however, was so weak (one of them being in league with the English) that I had to abandon the project, and try to prepare for the worst. When, therefore, Shepstone's announcement came-that he could wait no longer, that he had given us time enough to reform, and that he must issue his proclamation-I could do no more than advise a protest, and an appeal to foreign powers. This having been agreed to by my Government, I met Shepstone in presence of the Executive, and what could be saved for the country, such as its language, its legislature, the position of its officials, etc., was arranged. Before issuing his proclamation, Shepstone desired to see copies of both mine and the Government protest. This I promised, on condition he showed me his proclamation before publication: to which he agreed. To one clause I greatly objected, and protested-namely, the threat of confiscation of property for disobeying the proclamation. I pointed out that this was barbarous, and would be punishing a man's innocent family for his actions. The clause was omitted. This is the origin of the lie that I helped Shepstone in drawing up this proclamation. In justice to Shepstone, I must say that I would not consider an officer of my Government to have acted faithfully if he had not done what Shepstone did; and if the act was wrong (which undoubtedly it was), not he, but his Government, is to blame for it.

Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen left within a month to protest in England against the annexation.

Sir T. Shepstone wrote (May 9): 'Mr. Paul Kruger and his colleague, Dr. Jorissen, D.D., the Commission to Europe, leave to-day. I do not think that either of them wishes the Act of Annexation to be cancelled; Dr. Jorissen certainly does not.' And Mr. J.D. Barry, Recorder of Kimberley, wrote to Frere (May 15): 'The delegates, Paul Kruger and Dr. Jorissen, left Pretoria on the 8th, and even they do not seem to have much faith in their mission. Dr. Jorissen thinks that the reversal of Sir Theophilus's Act would not only be impossible, but a great injury to the country.'

It is not necessary to seek hostile testimony to establish the fact that the Boers as a whole acquiesced in the annexation; the foregoing quotation from Aylward's book supplies all that is needed-unintentionally, perhaps. The Zulu menace, which Aylward so lightly dismisses, was a very serious matter; the danger a very real one. It has frequently been asserted by the Boers and their friends that the Zulu trouble was fomented by a section of the Natal people, and that Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, if he did not openly encourage the Zulu King in his threats and encroachments on the Transvaal, at any rate refrained from using his unique influence and power with the Zulus in the direction of peace, and that he made a none too scrupulous use of the Zulu question when he forced the annexation of the Transvaal. It is stated that, in the first place, there was no real danger, and in the next place, if there were, such was Sir Theophilus's power with the Zulus that he could have averted it; and in support of the first point, and in demolition of Sir T. Shepstone's pro-annexation arguments, the following extract from the latter's despatches is quoted by Aylward and others:

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH, DATED UTRECHT, TRANSVAAL, JANUARY 29, 1878.

Sir T. Shepstone to Sir H. Bulwer.

Par. 12. 'Although this question has existed for many years, and the settlement of it has been long postponed, yet on no former occasion has it assumed so serious an aspect, or included so wide an area of territory; never before has there existed any bar to the farmers occupying their farms after an absence more or less temporary, caused by a temporary and local scare. Practically, the line of occupied farms has not been heretofore affected by the dispute about the beaconed boundary, but now the prohibition to these has become absolute by Zulu claims and action. Ruin is staring the farmers in the face, and their position is, for the time, worse under Her Majesty's Government than ever it was under the Republic.'

Had Sir T. Shepstone's power been as great as represented, it is fair to suppose that it would have been exerted, and would have prevailed in support of his own administration; but it seems clear that he could do nothing; and as to the reality of the danger, nothing could better establish that than the unpleasant admissions in the foregoing extract and the initial disasters in the Zulu War a year later. The Boers' protective power was not lessened by the annexation-quite otherwise. It was supplemented by British money, arms, and soldiers, and the prestige of the British flag, and yet things happened as above described. What would they have been under the old conditions?

The day before he issued the proclamation Sir T. Shepstone sent a messenger to Cetewayo, telling him that the Transvaal would be under British sovereignty, and warning him against aggression in that direction. Cetewayo replied: 'I thank my father Somtseu (Shepstone) for his message. I am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch have tired me out, and I intended to fight with them once, only once, and to drive them over the Vaal. Kabana, you see my impis are gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together. Now I will send them back to their houses.' (C. 1883, p. 19.)

Colonel A.W. Durnford; R.E., in a memorandum of July 5, 1877, wrote:

About this time (April 10) Cetewayo had massed his forces in three corps on the borders, and would undoubtedly have swept the Transvaal, at least up to the Vaal River, if not to Pretoria itself, had the country not been taken over by the English. In my opinion, he would have cleared the country to Pretoria.

'I am convinced,' wrote Sir A. Cunynghame, June 12, from Pretoria, 'that had this country not been annexed, it would have been ravaged by the native tribes. Forty square miles of country had been overrun by natives, and every house burned, just before the annexation.' And he wrote again, July 6: 'Every day convinces me that unless this country had been annexed it would have been a prey to plunder and rapine from the natives on its border, joined by Secocoeni, Mapok, and other tribes in the Transvaal. Feeling the influence of the British Government, they are now tranquil.'

So much for the reality of the danger. As to the causes of it and the alleged responsibility of Natal, Sir Bartle Frere, in a letter to General Ponsonby, made the following remarks:

The fact is, that while the Boer Republic was a rival and semi-hostile power, it was a Natal weakness rather to pet the Zulus as one might a tame wolf, who only devoured one's neighbour's sheep. We always remonstrated, but rather feebly; and now that both flocks belong to us, we are rather embarrassed in stopping the wolf's ravages.

Sir B. Frere realized fully the dangers, and gave his testimony as to Boer opinion. On December 15, 1877, he wrote, concerning his policy towards the Zulus:

My great anxiety is, of course, to avoid collision, and I am satisfied that the only chance I have of keeping clear of it is to show that I do not fear it. The Boers are, of course, in a state of great apprehension, and I have ordered those of the two frontier districts of Utrecht and Wakkerstroom to hold themselves in readiness, should I find it necessary to call upon them for active service.

Sir T. Shepstone also wrote, concerning the reality of the danger, under date December 25:

The Boers are still flying, and I think by this time there must be a belt of more than a hundred miles long and thirty broad, in which, with three insignificant exceptions, there is nothing but absolute desolation. This will give your Excellency some idea of the mischief which Cetewayo's conduct has caused.

And again (April 30, 1878):

I find that Secocoeni acts as a kind of lieutenant to Cetewayo. He received directions from the Zulu King, and these directions are by Secocoeni issued to the various Basuto tribes in the Transvaal.

Sir T. Shepstone rushed the annexation. He plucked the fruit that would have fallen. He himself has said that he might have waited until the Zulus actually made their threatened murderous raid. That might have been Macchiavelian statecraft, but it would not have been humanity; and there was nothing in the attitude of the Boer leaders at the time of the annexation which foreshadowed the fierce and determined opposition which afterwards developed. The fact seems to be that the people of the Transvaal were either in favour of the annexation, or were overpowered and dazed by the hopelessness of the Republic's outlook; and they passively assented to the action of Sir Theophilus Shepstone and his twenty-five policemen. The Boers were quite unable to pay the taxes necessary to self-government and the prosecution of the Kaffir wars. The Treasury was empty-save for the much-quoted 12s. 6d. The Government ￡1 bluebacks were selling at 1s. Civil servants' salaries were months in arrear. The President himself-the excitable, unstable, visionary, but truly enlightened and patriotic Burgers-had not only drawn no salary, but had expended his private fortune, and incurred a very heavy liability, in the prosecution of the unsuccessful Secocoeni war. No amount of ex post facto evidence as to the supposed feelings and opinions of the Boers can alter a single one of the very serious facts which, taken together, seemed to Sir Theophilus to justify the annexation. But it all comes down to this: If the passive acquiescence in the annexation coincided strangely with the Republic's failure to defeat its enemies and pay its debts, it is no whit less odd that Lord Carnarvon's anxiety for the Republic's safety synchronized with his attempt to confederate South Africa.

The real mistakes of the British Government began after the annexation. The failure to fulfil promises; the deviation from old ways of government; the appointment of unsuitable officials, who did not understand the people or their language; the neglect to convene the Volksraad or to hold fresh elections, as definitely promised; the establishment of personal rule by military men, who treated the Boers with harshness and contempt, and would make no allowance for their simple, old-fashioned ways, their deep-seated prejudices, and, if you like, their stupid opposition to modern ideas: these things and others caused great dissatisfaction, and gave ample material for the nucleus of irreconcilables to work with.

During the occupation period Mr. Kruger took office under the British Government, as also did Dr. Jorissen and Chief Justice (then Judge) Kotzé, and indeed all the officials who had protested against the annexation, except Mr. Piet Joubert, who declined to do so, and who, if actions be the test and not words, was the only honest protestant. Mr. Kruger retained his office for some time after he had concerned himself in the Repeal agitation, but finally resigned his post on being refused an increased remuneration, for which he had repeatedly applied. There can be but little doubt that had this inducement been forthcoming, he would have remained a loyal British subject.

The effect of the annexation was to start the wells of plenty bubbling-with British gold. The country's debts were paid. Secocoeni and Cetewayo would be dealt with, and the responsibility for all things was on other and broader shoulders. With the revival of trade, and the removal of responsibilities and burdens, came time to think and to talk. The wave of the magician's wand looked so very simple that the price began to seem heavy. The eaten bread was forgotten. The dangers and difficulties that were past were of small account now that they were past; and so the men who had remained passive, and recorded formal protests when they should have resisted, and taken steps to show that they were in earnest, began their Repeal agitation. All the benefits which the Boers hoped from the annexation had now been reaped. Their pressing needs were relieved. Their debts had been paid; their trade and credit restored; their enemies were being dealt with. Repeal would rob them of none of these; they would, in fact, eat their cake and still have it. The Zulu question had been taken up, and could not now be left by the Imperial Government to settle itself. The debts discharged for them and the outlays incurred might, it is true, be charged to them. They could not be repaid, of course, for the same reason that you cannot get blood from stone; and the amount would, therefore, be a National Debt, which was exactly what they had been trying for years to incur, and the condition of their credit had made it impossible to do.

The causes of discontent before given were serious, but the failure to fulfil promises was not deliberate. Circumstances combined to prevent Sir Bartle Frere from visiting the Transvaal, as intended and promised. Native wars (Gaika and Galeka), disagreements between the Colonial and Imperial authorities, the obstructions and eventual dismissal of the Molteno-Merriman Ministry-the first under Responsible Government-Natal and Diamond-fields affairs, and, above all, the Zulu War, all combined to prevent Sir Bartle Frere from fulfilling his obligations to settle Transvaal matters.

In the meantime two deputations had been sent to England, representing the Boers' case against annexation. The active party among the Boers, i.e., the Voortrekker party, the most anti-British and Republican, though small in itself, had now succeeded in completely dominating the rest of the Boers, and galvanizing them into something like national life and cohesion again-a result achieved partly by earnest persuasion, but largely also by a kind of terrorism.

Sir Bartle Frere, who managed at last to visit the Transvaal, in April, 1879, had evidence of this on his journey up, and in a despatch to Sir M. Hicks Beach from Standerton on the 6th of that month he wrote:

I was particularly impressed by the replies of a very fine specimen of a Boer of the old school. He had been six weeks in an English prison, daily expecting execution as a rebel, and had been wounded by all the enemies against whom his countrymen had fought-English, Zulus, Basutos, Griquas, and Bushmen.

'But,' he said, 'that was in the days of my youth and inexperience. Had I known then what I know now, I would never have fought against the English, and I will never fight them again. Old as I am, I would now gladly turn out against the Zulus, and take fifty friends of my own, who would follow me anywhere; but I dare not leave my home till assured it will not be destroyed and my property carried off in my absence, by the men who call me "rebel" because I will not join them against the Government. My wife, brought up like a civilized woman in the Cape Colony, has had five times in her life to run from the house and sleep in the veld when attacked by Zulus and Basutos. One of our twelve sons was assegaied in sight of our house, within the last ten years, by a marauding party; and in my absence from the house, when it was surrounded by Basutos, my wife had to fly in the night by herself, leading one child and carrying another on her back. She walked nearly fifty miles through the Lion Veld, seeing three lions on the way, before she reached a place of safety. It is not likely that we should forget such things, nor wish them to recur; but how can I leave her on my farm and go to Zululand, when the malcontent leaders threaten me that if I go they will burn my house and drive off all my stock? Assure me that we are not to be deserted by the English Government, and left to the mercy of these malcontent adventurers, and I and my people will gladly turn out to assist Colonel Wood.'

I find that this idea that the English Government will give up the Transvaal, as it formerly did the Orange Free State, has been industriously propagated, and has taken a great hold on the minds of the well-disposed Boers, and is, I believe, one main cause of reluctance to support the Government actively.

They argue that what has been done before may be done again, and they have no feeling of assurance that if they stand by the English Government to-day they will not be left to bear the brunt of the malcontents' vengeance when a Republic is established.

And again on the 9th, from Heidelberg:

The idea that we should somehow be compelled or induced to abandon the country had taken great hold on the minds of some of the more intelligent men that I met. It has been seduously written up by a portion of the South African press, English as well as Dutch. I marked its effect particularly on men who said they had come from the old Colony since the annexation, but would never have done so had they believed that English rule would be withdrawn, and the country left to its former state of anarchy....

But there is great practical difficulty in conveying to the mass of the people any idea of the real power of Government.

It is not possible to pen a more severe and pregnant comment on the after-policy of England than that suggested by the italicized lines, written as they were by England's Plenipotentiary-an idea reported to headquarters, not as a feeler, but as a suggestion so absurd that it called for no expression of opinion. But he lived to find that it was not too absurd to be realized; and perhaps, after all, it was written as a warning, and the wise and cool-headed old statesman in his inmost soul had a premonition of what eventually occurred.

Sir Bartle Frere met the Boers in their camp, and discussed with them their grievances. He informed them that he had no power to revoke the annexation, nor would he recommend it, as, in his judgment, such a course would be a reversion to chaos and ruin. The Boers pressed steadily for nothing less than repeal. Sir Bartle Frere reported the historical meeting at Erasmus Farm to Sir M. Hicks Beach:

April 14, 1879.

They were evidently much disappointed.... Our meeting separated with no more definite decision than that they must report to the 'people,' and be guided by their decision as to what was to be done.

If I may judge from the gentlemen composing the deputation, and others of their class, whom I have had the honour of meeting since coming to the Transvaal, the leaders are, with few exceptions, men who deserve respect and regard for many valuable and amiable qualities as citizens and subjects....

Of the results of our meeting it is impossible at present to say more than that it must have cleared away misconceptions on all sides If they have learnt anything as to the finality of the act of annexation-that I have no power to undo it, and do not believe that it will ever be undone, in the only sense in which they will ask it-I have, on the other hand, been shown the stubbornness of a determination to be content with nothing else, for which I was not prepared by the general testimony of officials who had been longer in the country, and who professed to believe that the opposition of the Boers was mere bluster, and that they had not the courage of their professed opinions.... I feel assured that the majority of the Committee felt very deeply what they believed to be a great national wrong.... But my conviction is that the real malcontents are far from being a majority of the whole white population, or even of their own class of Boer farmers.

I have no doubt whatever that if the Executive were in a position to assert the supremacy of the law, to put an effectual stop to the reign of terrorism which exists at present, the discontented minority would cease to agitate, and would soon cease to feel grievances which a very brief discussion shows to be in the main sentimental; not the less keenly felt on that account, but not likely to survive the prosperity and good government, with a fair measure of self-government in its train, which are within their reach under British rule.

And, again, he wrote to Lady Frere:

PRETORIA, April 20, 1879.

My last letter had not been gone many hours by the mail express when Lanyon ran into my room, to tell me that the Boer camp was actually broken up and the Boers dispersing.

I need not tell you how thankful I was. The one thing I dreaded was civil war and bloodshed, and had a single malcontent been shot, I should have considered it a greater misfortune than the death of a dozen Piet Retiefs, or Uys, dying like heroes in the field of battle for their country and brethren. So you may imagine how thankful I felt to the Giver of all good, who has guided and protected us through life.

I am to see a deputation from the Boers' Committee again to-morrow, and then I hope we shall have done with meetings and grievances-for the present a phrase which they carefully put into all references to their breaking up, and which they evidently mean. It was clear to me that it was not the annexation, so much as the neglect to fulfil the promises and the expectations held out by Shepstone when he took over the Government, that has stirred up the great mass of the Boers, and given a handle to agitators.{02}

There it is in a single sentence! It was not the annexation which caused the war; for nine men in every ten admitted that it was welcomed and justified by considerations of general South African policy, or else simply inevitable. No! It was the failure to fulfil the conditions of annexation!

In 'A Narrative of the Boer War,' Mr. Thomas Fortescue Carter has given with admirable skill and impartiality a full account of the causes which led to the outbreak. His history is, indeed, so determinedly just as to have met with considerable disapproval in quarters where feelings are hot on either side, and where plain truths are not palatable. Mr. Carter resided in the country for years before the annexation, and went through the war as correspondent of a well-known London daily, and this is his opinion:

Anyone who knows the acquaintance Sir T. Shepstone had with the Boers of the Transvaal, years prior to the annexation, cannot doubt that, regarded as a friend and almost as one of themselves, no one better than he could have been selected for the task of ascertaining the desires of the people; and no one who knows Sir T. Shepstone will believe that he did not take sufficient evidence to prove to any man that the Boers were anxious to be extricated from the dilemma they were in, and really willing at that time that their country should be annexed. Men who during the late war were our foes were at the time of the annexation clamouring for it, welcoming Sir Theophilus Shepstone as the deliverer and saviour of the country. I mention Swart Dirk Uys, an eminent Boer, who fought against the English in 1880-81, as one amongst the hundreds and thousands who went out to meet Sir Theophilus Shepstone with palm branches in their hands.

The natural aversion of the people to English rule was overcome for the moment by their greater aversion to being wiped off the face of the Transvaal by the blacks; that was a contingency staring them in the face, and yet not even that imminent common danger availed to secure unity amongst them, or would rouse men individually to take upon their shoulders the responsibility which rests upon every member of a State.

The Boer Volksraad, after promising to appeal to their constituents on the subject of the new constitution proposed, almost immediately passed a measure, which was familiarly styled by the people the 'Hou jou smoel law.' The literal translation of this term is 'Hold your jaw.' In brief, it was an Act which made it high treason for any man to discuss the question of either confederation or annexation.

I come to the conclusion, then, that the cause of the annexation was England's historical greed of territory, especially rich territory; and that, however unworthy the motive on the part of the visiting power, the Boers did not at that time receive the visitor with other feelings than those of satisfaction, and practically surrendered their country voluntarily and gladly to the ruler of a greater power, under the impression that Sir Theophilus Shepstone would be permitted to carry out, and that he therefore would carry out, the promises he made them. As the programme was open before them, they had everything to gain and nothing to lose, except the loss entailed by nominal government by the British. No man, whether Boer or Britisher, who was living in the Transvaal, or knew the feelings of the Boers at the time of annexation, would in 1877 have given any other account of the feeling of the nation; and if I have formed too low an opinion of the motives of English statesmen at that time, and am not justified in attributing the annexation to greed instead of to the purer and nobler desire to protect England's colonies, or even the Transvaal itself, from the inroads of savages, then my excuse must be that the failure of England to send out at that time a force equal to the task of restraining those savages and maintaining peace, has helped materially to lead me to the unwarrantable conclusion.{03}

And so came the war. The history of it is written that all may read; and it is not necessary here to refer at length to the details of it. The utterly unjust treatment of Bezuidenhout at Potchefstroom was the immediate cause of the outbreak. The armed interference of the Potchefstroom burghers with the Imperial officials followed on December 16, to be in turn succeeded by the battle of Bronkhorst Spruit on the 20th.

The following account of the affair is taken from Mr. Carter's book:

All went well on this day till about 2.30 p.m., when the following was about the order of march: One mounted infantryman in advance of the main body next the band; of F company, forty men; of A company, forty men; then followed the quarter-guard, thirteen men; and provost-escort and prisoners, twenty-three men. The remainder of the force was posted along the string of waggons, with the exception of the rear-guard of about twenty men, which were some distance behind. Colonel Anstruther, Captains Nairne and Elliott, Lieutenant Hume, and Adjutant Harrison were riding just in front of the band, when suddenly Boers appeared all round. The locality that the regiment had reached at the time was one where stood several farms, and the trees surrounding these homesteads afforded cover under which a hostile force could assemble without being perceived from a distance. On the right was a ravine with wood in it, and amongst that the Boers were lying in ambush. How unexpected was the appearance of a force of Boers to the English may be judged from the fact that the band of the regiment was playing at the time. Colonel Anstruther, immediately he caught sight of the enemy on the crest of a slight rise to the front, called a halt, and the order was passed to the rear for the waggons to close up. Before this could be done a messenger from the enemy, carrying a white flag, came forward and handed the Colonel a note signed by Piet Joubert, and countersigned by other Boer leaders, desiring him to halt where he was until a reply had been received from Sir Owen Lanyon to the ultimatum the Boers had addressed to him. The message also contained the warning that if the soldiers advanced beyond a small stream in front of them, it would be taken as a declaration of war. Colonel Anstruther, with Conductor Egerton, had ridden out in front of the advanced guard to meet this flag of truce; after he had read the message, the bearer of it informed him verbally that two minutes were allowed for his decision. Colonel Anstruther verbally replied that he should march on to Pretoria, and, to use his own words, as published in his despatch written just before he died, the Boer messenger 'said that he would take my message to the Commandant-General; and I asked him to let me know the result, to which he nodded assent. Almost immediately, however, the enemy's line advanced.'

Whilst this short parley was going on, every effort was being made in the rear to get the waggons up, but without much good result, because when the Boers opened fire the rear-guard would be at least half a mile behind the head of the column. Even those who were guarding the waggons had not time to join the main body. When Colonel Anstruther saw the Boers advancing, he gave the order to his men to extend in skirmishing order, but before they could open out to more than loose files they were met with a murderous volley, and at the same time Boers on the right and left flank and in the rear, who had previously measured and marked off the distances, picked off every man within sight. Our men returned the fire as best they could, but in less than ten minutes 120 were either killed or wounded, besides a large proportion of the oxen in the waggons shot. The officers who exposed themselves were picked off almost immediately by the Boer marksmen. Captain Nairne, Lieutenant M'Sweeney, Lieutenant and Adjutant Harrison, Lieutenant Hume, Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General Barter, Conductor Egerton, Surgeon Ward, were all wounded, besides Colonel Anstruther himself, who was shot in two or three places.

It was useless to contend against such odds, and the 'cease fire' was sounded, and handkerchiefs waved to denote submission. During this unequal struggle, Mrs. Smith, the widow of the bandmaster of the regiment, who, with the wife of Sergeant-Major Fox and some children, were riding in one of the foremost waggons, came fearlessly up to where the wounded lay, and, tearing strips from her clothing, helped the surgeon to bandage the wounds. The sergeant-major's wife was severely wounded, as was also Fox himself. There was no lack of heroism during those awful ten minutes, whilst men were being shot down like dogs. Lieutenant Harrison was shot through the head while cheering on his men; Lieutenant Hume was equally conspicuous for his coolness. An orderly-room clerk named Maistre and the Sergeant-Master-Tailor Pears quietly concealed the regimental colours in a waggon-box when they saw the danger of them falling into the hands of the enemy; and their work was not in vain, as Conductor Egerton managed subsequently to wrap them round his body under his tunic, and having obtained permission after the fight was over to walk to Pretoria for medical assistance, he carried them safely to the capital, as well as the disastrous news of the engagement. Forty-two miles traversed by a wounded man on foot in eleven hours is in itself a feat worth mentioning, and one the value of which can only be really estimated by those who know what South African roads are in the rainy seasons.

As soon as our force surrendered, Franz Joubert, who had been in command of the Boers, and who, it is said, fired the first shot, with the exclamation, 'What is the use of waiting?' came forward with some of his men, and on finding poor Colonel Anstruther severely wounded expressed sorrow.

Whether the affair of Bronkhorst Spruit can be called an act of treachery on the part of the Boers is rather a nice question. Colonel Anstruther's words-the words of a dying man-rather go to prove that he was unfairly treated, though he does not say so directly. He was given to understand by the messenger who came with the flag of truce that another communication would be made to him as soon as his reply to the request to halt had been reported to the Boer Commandant. The only reply given him was 'a murderous volley.' The Boers cannot lay claim to much bravery or superiority (except in numbers) over our soldiers in this fight. Theirs was a deliberately-planned ambush to entrap men who had no idea that they were marching in an enemy's country. Bronkhorst Spruit engagement is the one during the whole of the war which does not redound to the credit of the Dutch, even if it does not reflect great discredit upon them. If a reasonable time had been allowed Colonel Anstruther to give his reply, the 94th could not then say, as they do say and will say, that they were treacherously surprised. 'Two minutes' looks, under the circumstances, very much like an idle pretence of fair dealing to cover an intentional act of cowardice which subsequent conduct could hardly palliate. The Boers say that they had not more men than were marching with the 94th on that occasion; that statement is worth very little, considering the evidence of our officers, and, above all, the harsh evidence of the facts that the 94th was from advance-guard to rear-guard practically surrounded and outnumbered in every direction.

The preparedness of the Boers and the precision of their fire may be gathered from the testimony of Dr. Crow, of Pretoria, who attended the wounded, and vouched for an average of five wounds per man. Dr. Crow also wrote:

But as disastrous as the late war in the Transvaal had been to British prestige, thank God those at Bronkhorst Spruit did their duty and died like men, a noble example to any army. If any stain has been cast on the British flag in the Transvaal, the gallant 94th did all that was possible by their deeds at Bronkhorst Spruit to obliterate it.

The news of this affair was received with horror, and the feelings roused by the details of it have never been allayed. Race-hatred may have its origin in a hundred little incidents, but in the Transvaal there were two which undoubtedly, whether justly or otherwise, gave a character to the Boers that has embittered feeling against them more than any which had occurred in generations previous. The second affair followed very closely on the Bronkhorst Spruit engagement-i.e., the infamous murder of Captain Elliott, the only surviving unwounded officer from Bronkhorst Spruit. Captains Elliott and Lambert were taken prisoners, and were offered the choice of two alternatives-either to remain prisoners of war during the hostilities in the Transvaal, or to be released on parole d'honneur on condition that they should leave the Transvaal at once, cross into the Free State under escort, and not bear arms against the Republican Government during the war. The second alternative was chosen. They received an escort and free pass from Commandant-General Piet Joubert. The following is extracted from Captain Lambert's Report to Sir George Colley on January 5:

We started about 1 p.m. from the Boer camp, passing through the town of Heidelberg. After going about six to eight miles, I noticed we were not going the right road, and mentioned the fact to the escort, who said it was all right. Having been 'look-out' officer in the Transvaal, I knew the district well. I was certain we were going wrong, but we had to obey orders. At nightfall we found ourselves nowhere near the river drift, and were ordered to outspan for the night, and next morning the escort told us they would look for the drift. Inspanning at daybreak, we again started, but after driving about for some hours across country, I told the escort we would stop where we were while they went to search for the drift. Shortly after they returned and said they had found it, and we must come, which we did, eventually arriving at the junction of two rivers (Vaal and Klip), where we found the Vaal impassable, but a small punt, capable of holding only two passengers at most, by which they said we must cross. I pointed out that it was impossible to get my carriage or horses over by it, and that it was not the punt the General said we were to cross. The escort replied it was Pretorius's punt that the General told them to take us, and we must cross; that we must leave the carriage behind and swim the horses, which we refused to do, as we then should have had no means of getting on. I asked them to show me their written instructions, which they did (written in Dutch), and I pointed out that the name of Pretorius was not in it. I then told them they must either take us back to the Boer camp again or on to the proper drift. We turned back, and after going a few miles the escort disappeared. Not knowing where we were, I proposed to Captain Elliott we should go to the banks of the Vaal, and follow the river till we came to the proper punt. After travelling all Monday, Tuesday, and up till Wednesday about 1 p.m., when we found ourselves four hours, or twenty-five miles, from Spencer's punt, we were suddenly stopped by two armed Boers, who handed us an official letter, which was opened, and found to be from the Secretary to the Republican Government, stating that the members were surprised that, as officers and gentlemen, we had broken our parole d'honneur, and refused to leave the Transvaal; that if we did not do so immediately by the nearest drift, which the bearers would show us, we must return as prisoners of war; that as through our ignorance of the language of the country there might be some misunderstanding, they were loth to think we had willingly broken our promise. We explained that we should reply to the letter, and request them to take it to their Government, and were prepared to go with them at once. They took us back to a farmhouse, where we were told to wait until they fetched their commandant, who arrived about 6 p.m., and repeated to us the same that was contained in our letter of that day. We told him we were ready to explain matters, and requested him to take our answer back to camp. He then ordered us to start at once for the drift. I asked him, as it was then getting dark, if we could start early next morning, but he refused. So we started, he having said we should cross at Spencer's, being closest. As we left the farmhouse, I pointed out to him that we were going in the wrong direction; but he said, 'Never mind; come on across a drift close at hand.' When we got opposite it, he kept straight on; I called to him, and said that this was where we were to cross. His reply was, 'Come on!' I then said to Captain Elliott, 'They intend taking us back to Pretoria,' distant some forty miles. Suddenly the escort (which had all at once increased from two to eight men, which Captain Elliott pointed out to me; and I replied, 'I suppose they are determined we shall not escape, which they need not be afraid of, as we are too keen to get over the border') wheeled sharp down to the river, stopped, and, pointing to the banks, said, 'There is the drift-cross!' I drove my horses into the river, when they immediately fell; lifted them, and drove on about five or six yards, when we fell into a hole. Got them out with difficulty, and advanced another yard, when we got stuck against a rock. The current was now so strong and drift deep, my cart was turned over on to its side, and water rushed over the seat. I called out to the commandant on the bank that we were stuck and to send assistance, or might we return, to which he replied, 'If you do, we will shoot you.' I then tried, but failed, to get the horses to move. Turning to Captain Elliott, who was sitting beside me, I said, 'We must swim for it'; and asked could he swim, to which he replied, 'Yes.' I said, 'If you can't, I will stick to you, for I can.' While we were holding this conversation, a volley from the bank, ten or fifteen yards off, was fired into us, the bullets passing through the tent of my cart, one of which must have mortally wounded poor Elliott, who only uttered the single word 'Oh!' and fell headlong into the river from the carriage. I immediately sprang in after him, but was swept down the river under the current some yards. On gaining the surface of the water, I could see nothing of Elliott, but I called out his name twice, but received no reply. Immediately another volley was fired at me, making the water hiss around where the bullets struck. I now struck out for the opposite bank, which I reached with difficulty in about ten minutes; but as it was deep, black mud, on landing I stuck fast, but eventually reached the top of the bank, and ran for about two hundred yards under a heavy fire the whole while.

The Boers then invaded Natal and took up a position on Laing's Nek, four miles inside the Natal border, from which, on January 28, Sir George Colley endeavoured to oust them with a mounted force of 70 men and some 500 men of the 58th Regiment. The position is one difficult enough to climb unencumbered by military accoutrements, but the disposition of the little mounted force covered the approach. By some unexplained mistake, however, half of the mounted infantry charged and carried the Boer position before the 58th had climbed the hill, but were too weak to hold it and retired, leaving the 58th uncovered in a terrible ascent. But few of the exhausted men reached the top of the hill, and those, led by Colonel Deane, only to be shot down. Of the mounted men, 17 were killed and wounded; of the 58th, 73 were killed and 100 wounded. The result was absolute defeat of the British forces. The number of Boers engaged is not known, but the force behind the Nek consisted of several thousands, and no doubt a fair proportion engaged in the fight.

On February 8 General Colley made a demonstration in force on the Ingogo Heights. The force consisted of under 300 men, with 4 guns and 38 mounted men. On the Boer side there were about 1,000 men, and the fight lasted from morning until after dark. It was a drawn fight, in which both parties left the battlefield at night. There cannot be any doubt, however, that the balance of advantage was with the Boers, since the loss on the British side was very severe: 76 men were killed and 69 wounded.

On February 27 came Majuba, when Sir George Colley designed to retrieve his fortunes and strike an effective blow without the aid of his second-in-command, Sir Evelyn Wood, whom he had sent to hurry up reinforcements. The scaling of the mountain at night was a fine performance. The neglect to take the rocket apparatus or mountain guns, or to fortify the position in any way, or even to acquaint the members of the force with the nature of the position which they had taken up in the dark, and the failure to use the bayonets, were the principal causes of disaster. The Boers attacked in force a position which should have been absolutely impregnable, held as it was by a force of 554 soldiers. The Boer force is not known, but probably consisted of upwards of 1,000 men, since Christian Joubert after the fight offered to take a portion of the men, numbering, as he said, some 500, to attack a small British laager on one of the spurs of the mountain. The splendid feat of taking the hill-top, however, was accomplished by a small storming party of less than 200 men, the balance of the Boer forces covering the approach of their comrades by an accurate and incessant long-range fire. The result, as is known, was terrible disaster: 92 killed and 134 wounded, and a number taken prisoners, represented the British loss, whilst the Boers lost 1 killed and 5 wounded. No attempt had been made to occupy positions below the crown of the hill which commanded the approaches, and the Boers were able to creep up under good cover from place to place by the exercise of their admirable tactics. It is impossible to detract from the performance of the Boers, and a glance at the position leaves one more astonished than ever that a successful attack could ever have been made upon it. The Boers displayed on this day the finest fighting qualities. The generalship of their fighting Commandant, Nikolas Smit, was of the highest order. The cleverness of the attack, and the personal bravery and audacity of the storming party are beyond praise.

By the time Sir Evelyn Wood had ranged his forces for an effective and extended attack on the Boers, and by the time Sir Frederick Roberts with the command of about 10,000 men had reached South Africa, the administration of Mr. Gladstone had awakened to the fact that the war was an unjust-not to say costly-one. An armistice was arranged and peace made without another blow.

The terms of the settlement proposed by the Liberal Government fitly illustrate the generosity of their motives. They proposed doing 'simple justice' to the Boers, but at the same time retaining the districts of Lydenburg, Middelburg, Wakkerstroom, and Utrecht, not to mention handing back Zoutpansberg to the original native occupants. So anxious were the Boer leaders to effect a peaceful settlement, so fearful were they of the actions of their followers, that when they arranged the long armistice they did not announce to their party the intentions of the British Government regarding the above districts. General Joubert did not communicate to his army the terms of peace, but simply stated that a Royal Commission was to settle everything. A month later, when some inkling of the terms reached the Boers, a solemn protest and warning was issued, and when the Royal Commission actually sat, the British representatives were informed that any such curtailment of the territories would be followed by a resumption of hostilities. Needless to say the proposals were abandoned and the Boers got their way. So ended the war.

Ingogo has been called a drawn battle. Bronkhorst Spruit was-such as it was. At Laing's Nek and Majuba the Boers beat us, as Mr. Carter fairly puts it, 'when they were on the top of the hill and we were at the bottom, and when we were on the top of the hill and they were at the bottom.' The narrative of these events is about as humiliating a one as an Englishman can read. Here and there it is redeemed by the heroic conduct of individuals in the midst of general disaster. In the smaller affairs, such as the particularly gallant defences of Standerton, Potchefstroom, and Rustenberg, where little garrisons held their own with conspicuous ability and courage, there is something to cheer the disheartened reader. The defence of Potchefstroom by Colonel Winslow should be read in full for several reasons. The siege of Standerton witnessed several acts of valour, but, above all, that of Hall the volunteer, who single handed deliberately engaged a force of over 300 Boers, drawing their fire on himself in order to warn his comrades of the danger of being cut off and to give them a chance of escape-a noble act in which the gallant fellow achieved his object but lost his life. It was in Rustenberg where Captain Auchinleck, with about seventy men armed only with rifles, held his laager against hundreds of the enemy, fighting day and night for weeks; and eventually drove off the Boers who were trenching towards his position by charging at night with from nine to fourteen of his men and clearing the enemy out of the trenches with the bayonet. This performance he repeated three times, himself badly wounded on each occasion. The impression created on the enemy by these tactics was such that they overcame their desire to get at close quarters with him, and left him severely alone.

It is not necessary to refer in great detail to the settlement In effect it was that the Boers gained nearly all that they required, but not until the haggling and threatening had robbed concessions of all appearance of grace and justice. The natives were referred to in the conventional spirit. The unfortunate loyalists were left to take care of themselves. The men who had entered the Transvaal, and invested their capital and expended their energies there upon the most positive and sacred assurances of the British Government that the Queen's authority would never be withdrawn,-assurances given in public by the Conservative Government and confirmed by Mr. Gladstone's Government, assurances published by Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Garnet Wolseley, who said that 'as long as the sun would shine the British flag would fly over the Transvaal,'-were heartlessly abandoned, their protests were unheeded, the compensation allotted to them, namely, ￡1,400,000, was amended by the elimination of the million, their representations to Mr. Gladstone's Government were finally left unanswered-unless it be that the sneering reference made by that right honourable gentleman in the House of Commons to 'interested contractors and landjobbers' may be considered an adequate answer to a protest as moderate, as able, as truthful, and as necessary as Mr. Gladstone's remark was the reverse. In very truth, the position in which the British Premier had placed himself through his intemperate speeches in the Midlothian campaign, and his subsequent 'explaining away,' was an extremely unpleasant one. In Opposition Mr. Gladstone had denounced the annexation and demanded a repeal. On accession to power he adopted the policy of his predecessors, and affirmed that the annexation could never be revoked. On June 8, 1880, he had written to this effect to Messrs. Kruger and Joubert, the Transvaal deputation. Later on, in answer to an appeal that he should allay the apprehensions of the loyalists, who feared the results of the Boer agitation, he referred them to this very letter as a final expression of opinion, and authorized the publication of this message. When, however, peace had been concluded, and the loyalists, amazed and heartbroken at their threatened desertion, reminded him of his pledges and implored him to respect them, he answered them in a letter which is surely without parallel in the record of self-respecting Governments. The wriggling, the equivocation, the distortion of phrases, the shameless 'explaining away,' are of a character that would again justify the remark of Lord Salisbury (then Lord Robert Cecil) in another matter many years before, that they were 'tactics worthy of a pettifogging attorney,' and even the subsequent apology-to the attorney. But what answer could be made to a protest which reminded the right honourable gentlemen of the following deliberate and official expression of his Government's policy?-

In your letter to me (wrote Mr. White for the loyalists) you claim that the language of your letter does not justify the description given. With the greatest respect I submit that it does, and I will quote the words on which I and also my colleagues base the opinion that it does unequivocally pledge the Government to the non-relinquishment of the Transvaal.

The actual words of your letter are:

'Looking at all the circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest of South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal of the disorders, which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only to the Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa, our judgment is that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish the Transvaal; but, consistently with the maintenance of that sovereignty, we desire that the white inhabitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice to the rest of the population, enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their local affairs.'

But your letter of the 8th of June not only contained this final and absolute announcement of the policy of England, but it gave the reasons for arriving at it in words which so aptly express the case of the loyalists that I quote them in extenso. They are as follows:

'It is undoubtedly matter for much regret that it should, since the annexation, have appeared that so large a number of the population of Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexation of that territory, but it is impossible now to consider that question as if it were presented for the first time. We have to do with a state of things which has existed for a considerable period, during which obligations have been contracted, especially, though not exclusively, towards the native population, which cannot be set aside.'

In your speech in the House of Commons, on the debate on Mr. Peter Rylands' motion condemning the annexation of the country and the enforcement of British supremacy in it, which was defeated by a majority of ninety-six, on the 21st of January in the current year, you used words of similar import. You are reported in the Times of the 22nd of January as saying:

'To disapprove the annexation of a country is one thing; to abandon that annexation is another. Whatever we do, we must not blind ourselves to the legitimate consequences of facts. By the annexation of the Transvaal we contracted new obligations.... I must look at the obligations entailed by the annexation, and if in my opinion, and in the opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by the annexation itself, that would not warrant us in doing fresh, distinct, and separate wrong by a disregard of the obligation which that annexation entailed. These obligations have been referred to in this debate, and have been mentioned in the compass of a single sentence. First, there was the obligation entailed towards the English and other settlers in the Transvaal, perhaps including a minority, though a very small minority, of the Dutch Boers themselves; secondly, there was the obligation to the native races; and thirdly, there was the obligation we entailed upon ourselves in respect of the responsibility which was already incumbent upon us, and which we, by the annexation, largely extended, for the future peace and tranquillity of South Africa.'

Nor was this all. The loyalists proceeded to remind him that Lord Kimberley, his Secretary of State for the Colonies, had telegraphed in May, 1880, 'Under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be relinquished,' and had confirmed the telegram in a despatch following; and that his lordship had also stated in the House of Lords on May 24 that '... after a careful consideration of the position, we have come to the conclusion that we could not relinquish the Transvaal. Nothing could be more unfortunate than uncertainty in respect to such a matter.' (Hansard, cclii., p. 208.)

The effects of the settlement, and the exposures in connection with it, and the attitude of the Imperial Government were most deplorable. No credit was given by the Boers to a Government which was clearly moved by the meanest considerations. No feeling but contempt, disgust, and even hatred, could be entertained by the loyalists for the Government which had so shamelessly deserted them. The settlement has left its indelible mark upon the sentiment of South Africa. The war, it will generally be admitted, was a most unfortunate occurrence. Only one thing could have been more unfortunate, and that was such a settlement as actually was effected-a settlement which satisfied no one, which outraged all, which threw South Africa into a state of boiling discontent. In some quarters the defeats of Majuba and Laing's Nek rankled deeply; yet they were fair fights, and Time can be trusted to allay the feelings of those who are worsted in a fair fight; but there were other matters which roused a spirit in the English-speaking people of South Africa that had never been known before.

The former records of the Boers, favourable and unfavourable, are consistent with the records established in the War of Independence. None dare belittle the spirit which moved them to take up arms against the greatest Power in the world. Their ignorance may have been great, but not so great as to blind them to the fact that they were undertaking an unequal contest. It is not possible to say, with due regard to their records, that they are not a courageous people. Individual bravery, of the kind which takes no heed of personal risk, reckless heroic dash, they have not, nor do they pretend to have. Their system is entirely otherwise. They do not seek fighting for fighting's sake. They do not like exposing themselves to risk and danger. Their caution and their care for personal safety are such that, judged by the standard of other people's conduct in similar positions, they are frequently considered to be wanting in personal courage. It seems a hard thing to say of a people who have produced men like the first Bezuidenhout, who fought and died single-handed against the British troops; men like Piet Retief, as gallant a man as ever walked; men like Piet Uys, an example to all men for all time, and only one of many generations in one family of equally gallant Dutchmen; but it would truly seem that such examples do not occur with such frequency among the Boers as among nations with whom they have been compared. Where they have been able to choose their own positions, or where they have been stimulated by previous successes, they have done all that could possibly be asked of them; but their particular military system does not conduce to success under circumstances where men are suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to exhibit the virtues of discipline, to make what to the individual may appear a useless sacrifice of life, or, in cold blood and in the face of previous defeat, to attempt to retrieve a lost position.

The Boer military power has been called the biggest unpricked bubble in the world. Whether this be so or not-whether the early conflicts between the British troops and the Boers in the Cape Colony and Natal justify the view that the Boers cannot take a beating and come up again-is a matter for those to decide who will give their impartial attention to the records.

Whilst conspicuous personal daring among the Boers may not be proverbial, it must be remembered to their everlasting credit that they, as did the Southerners in the American Civil War, robbed the cradle and the grave to defend their country. Boys who were mere children bore rifles very nearly as long as themselves; old men, who had surely earned by a life of hardship and exposure an immunity from such calls, jumped on their horses and rode without hesitation and without provision to fight for their independence.

There were, however, unfortunately, matters connected with the war which gave birth to a bitter and aching desire for revenge. Bronkhorst Spruit and the murder of Captain Elliott were among the earliest. Another was the shooting of Dr. Barbour (who was killed instantly) and Mr. Walter Dyas (wounded) by their escort under circumstances similar to those of the Elliott murder, with the exception that in this case the prisoners had been released on foot and in daylight, and were then shot down.

But there were others too. There was the murder of Green in Lydenburg, who was called to the Boer camp, where he went unarmed and in good faith, only to have his brains blown out by the Boer with whom he was conversing; there was the public flogging of another Englishman by the notorious Abel Erasmus because he was an Englishman and had British sympathies; and there were the various white flag incidents. At Ingogo the Boers raised the white flag, and when in response to this General Colley ordered the hoisting of a similar flag to indicate that it was seen, a perfect hail of lead was poured on the position where the General stood; and it was obvious that the hoisting of the flag was merely a ruse to ascertain where the General and his staff were. There was the ambulance affair on Majuba, when the Boers came upon an unarmed party bearing the wounded with the red cross flying over them, and after asking who they were and getting a reply, fired a volley into the group, killing Surgeon-Major Cornish. There was the siege of Potchefstroom, during which the Boer force under Commandant Cronjé were guilty of actions contrary to the usages of civilized warfare. They are matters of history, and can easily be verified. Reference is made to them elsewhere in this volume in connection with Commandant Cronjé's action on another occasion.

And so the war left the country, as wars will, divided into two parties, with feelings towards each other that are deplorable enough in themselves, and not easily allayed. The curtain was rung down, and the scene was lost to the view of the world, but the play went on all the same behind the curtain. And this is what the new Government said to the world on August 8, 1881, when they took over the administration of the country:

To all inhabitants, without exception, we promise the protection of the law, and all the privileges attendant thereon.

To inhabitants who are not burghers, and do not wish to become such, we notify that they have the right to report themselves to the Resident as British subjects, according to Article 28 of the now settled Convention. But be it known to all, that all ordinary rights of property, trade, and usages will still be accorded to everyone, burgher or not.

We repeat solemnly that our motto is, 'Unity and reconciliation.'

Footnotes for Chapter I

{01} Written in 1896.

{02} Several of the letters and despatches given in this volume are quoted from Mr. Martineau's excellent 'Life of Sir Bartle Frere,' a portion of which book was lately published in cheaper form, under the title of 'The Transvaal Trouble and How it Arose.'

{03} It is only fair to state that at that time the Home Government believed the prestige of the Imperial authority to be sufficient for all purposes.

In 1882 Sir Bartle Frere wrote, 'I have never been able to discover any principle in our policy in South Africa except that of giving way whenever any difficulty or opposition is encountered.' The remark is still as true as when it was penned, and South Africa-the 'Grave of Reputations,'{04} as it has long been called-must by this time be regarded with doubtful emotions by successive Colonial Secretaries.

What is it about South Africa, one asks, that has upset so many men of capacity and experience? Who can say? Often-most often-it is the neglect to thoroughly study and know what are called the 'local conditions,' and to pay due heed to local experience. Sometimes it is the subordination of State policy to party considerations which has ruined the Proconsul: witness Sir Bartle Frere, whose decisive action, firm character, and wise and statesmanlike policy are now-now that he is dead-recognised universally, as they have always been in South Africa. Perhaps there is something in Africa itself which makes it a huge exception to the rules of other lands; the something which is suggested in the 'rivers without water, flowers without scent, and birds without song'; a contrariness which puts the alluvial gold on the top of mountain ranges and leaves the valleys barren; which mocked the experience of the world, and showed the waterworn gravel deposit to be the biggest, richest, deepest, and most reliable gold reef ever known; which placed diamonds in such conditions that the greatest living authority, who had undertaken a huge journey to report on the occurrence, could only say, in the face of a successful wash-up, 'Well, there may be diamonds here, but all I can say is they've no right to be'; the something which many, many centuries ago prompted the old Roman to write, 'Ex Africa semper aliquid novi affert,' and which is in the mind of the South African to-day when he says, 'The impossible is always happening in Africa.'

There is this to be said for the Gladstone Ministry in 1881: that, having decided on a policy of scuttle and abandonment, they did it thoroughly, as though they enjoyed it. A feeble vote-catching provision, with no security attached, was inserted in the Pretoria Convention relative to the treatment of natives, but no thought or care was given to the unfortunate British subject who happened to be a white man, and to have fought for his Queen and country.{05} The abandonment was complete, without scruple, without shame. It has been written that 'the care and forethought which would be lavished on a favourite horse or dog on changing masters were denied to British subjects by the British Government.' The intensity and bitterness of the resentment, the wrath and hatred-so much deeper because so impotent-at the betrayal and desertion have left their traces on South African feeling; and the opinion of the might and honour of England, as it may be gleaned in many parts of the Colonies as well as everywhere in the Republics, would be an unpleasant revelation to those who live in undisturbed portions of the Empire, comfortable in the belief that to be a British subject carries the old-time magic of 'Civis Romanus sum.'

The Transvaal State, as it was now to be called, was re-established, having had its trade restored, its enemies crushed-for Secocoeni and Cetewayo were both defeated and broken-and its debts paid or consolidated in the form of a debt to England, repayable when possible. For some time not even the interest on this debt was paid.

Numbers of British subjects left the country in disgust and despair. Ruined in pocket and broken in spirit, they took what little they could realize of their once considerable possessions, and left the country where they could no longer live and enjoy the rights of free men. For some years the life of a Britisher among the Boers was far from happy. It is not surprising-indeed, not unnatural-that people unsoftened by education and the conditions of civilization, moved by fierce race prejudice, and intoxicated by unbroken and unexpected success, should in many cases make the vanquished feel the conqueror's heel. The position of men of British name or sympathies in the country districts was very serious, and the injustice done to those who had settled since the annexation, believing that they were to live under the laws and protection of their own Government was grave indeed.

The Government of the country was vested in a Triumvirate with Mr. Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger as Vice-President during the period immediately following the war; but in 1882 the old form was restored and Mr. Kruger was elected President, an office which he is now holding for the third successive term.{06}

Prior to the war the population of the country was reckoned by both Dutch and English authorities to be about 40,000 souls, the great majority of whom were Dutch. The memorial addressed to Lord Carnarvon, dated January 7, 1878, praying for repeal of the annexation, was 'signed by 6,591 qualified electors out of a possible 8,000,' as is explained in the letter of the Transvaal delegates to Sir M. Hicks-Beach dated July 10, 1878. The fact, already mentioned, that 3,000 electors had petitioned for the annexation only means that some of them changed their minds under pressure or conviction, and helped to swell the number of those who later on petitioned for repeal. The signatories to the above memorial would include practically all the Dutch electors in the country, and the remaining 1,400 or so would probably be the non-Boer party who preferred British rule, and could not be coerced into signing memorials against it. These figures are useful as a check upon those now put forward by the Transvaal Government to combat the assertion that the Uitlanders outnumber the Boers. Recognizing the fact that the Boers are a singularly domestic and prolific people, one may allow that they numbered 35,000 out of the total population, an estimate that will be seen to be extremely liberal. At the time that the above figures were quoted by the Transvaal delegates every Boer youth over the age of twenty-one was a qualified voter, so that it would seem that the qualified Boer voter had an average of one wife and 4.3 children, a fair enough allowance in all conscience. These figures should be borne in mind, for the present Boer population consists of what remains of these 35,000 souls and their natural increase during eighteen years. There are other Dutch immigrants from the Cape Colony and Free State: these are aliens, who have the invaluable qualification of hating England and her sons and her ways and her works; but, as will be made clear when the Franchise Law is explained, the present Boer electorate consists-or, without fraud or favouritism, should consist-of the 'possible 8,000' and their sons.

Many a champion of liberty has lived to earn the stigma of tyrant, and the Boers who in 1835 had trekked for liberty and freedom from oppressive rule, and who had fought for it in 1880, began now themselves to put in force the principles which they had so stoutly resisted. In the Volksraad Session of 1882 the first of the measures of exclusion was passed. The Franchise, which until then-in accordance with Law No. 1 of 1876-had been granted to anyone holding property or residing in the State, or, failing the property qualification, to anyone who had qualified by one year's residence, was now altered, and Law No. 7 of 1882 was passed which provided that aliens could become naturalized and enfranchised after five years' residence, thus attaining the status of the oldest Voortrekker. The feeling was now very strong against the Annexation Party, as they had been called, that is to say, the men who had had the courage of their convictions, and had openly advocated annexation; and as usual the bitterest persecutors and vilifiers were found in the ranks of those who, having secretly supported them before, had become suspect, and had now need to prove their loyalty by their zeal. The intention was avowed to keep the party pure and undiluted, as it was maintained by many of the Boers that former proselytes had used their newly-acquired privileges to vote away the independence of the country. The view was not unnatural under the circumstances, and this measure, had it not been a violation of pledges, might have found defenders among impartial persons; but unfortunately it proved to be not so much a stringently defensive measure which time and circumstances might induce them to modify, as the first step in a policy of absolute and perpetual exclusion. It was the first deliberate violation of the spirit of the settlement, and, although there is no clause in the Pretoria Convention which it can be said to contravene, it was, as Mr. Chamberlain has since styled it, 'a violation of the status quo as it was present to the minds of her Majesty's Ministers at the time the Convention was negotiated.' But the Gladstone Ministry, which had paid so heavily to get rid of the Transvaal question, was certainly not going to re-open it for the sake of holding the Boers to the spirit of the settlement.

Another precaution was taken to keep all the power in the hands of the Boers. The various towns which had formerly been entitled to representation in Parliament were deprived of this right, and have remained disfranchised ever since. Mr. Kruger feared that the enlightened thought of the towns would hinder the growth of his 'national policy.'

It was not too late even at this time to have bloodlessly settled the Transvaal question for ever by a fair but thoroughly firm attitude towards the restored Republic. No doubt British Ministers, conscious of an act of supreme self-restraint and magnanimity, believed that some reciprocal justice would be evoked. At any rate, it is possible that this was the reason which guided them, and not continued callous indifference to the fate of British subjects and the future of South Africa. In such case, however, they must have forgotten 'the fault of the Dutch'-which Andrew Marvell's couplet has recorded-of 'giving too little and asking too much.' The Transvaal Boers are very practical people, and no matter what they may receive or how they get it, whether by way of diplomacy or barter or the accident of good luck or deed of gift, they never neglect to press and scheme for more. It is an unpleasant feature in the Boer character, prominent alike in personal and general relations, begotten, mayhap, of hard life, constant struggle, and lack of education and its softening and elevating influence. It is a feature which is common to all uneducated peoples who have suffered great hardships, and it will no doubt disappear in time; but it is one which has to be reckoned with at the present day, and one which, when recognized at its true value, sustains the contention that the Boers, in dealing with those whom they regard as not of them, will recognise no right and do no justice unless compelled to do so. The considerations of a narrow and selfish policy are stronger than the sense of right and wrong.

British Ministers and the British people when glowing with a mildly enthusiastic satisfaction at their tolerant and even generous attitude towards a weaker opponent may imagine that they have sown good seed which in time will bear ample fruit; but it is not so. Nothing but firmness and strict justice will avert a bloody day of reckoning. Nothing but prompt and effective veto on every attempt to break or stretch the spirit of past undertakings will bring it home to the Transvaal Government that all the give cannot be on the one side and all the take on the other; that they cannot trade for ever on the embarrassment of a big Power in dealing with a little one; and that they must comport themselves with due regard to their responsibilities.

Almost the first use made by the Transvaal Government of their recovered power was one which has wrought much mischief to the State. The Triumvirate who ruled the country in 1882 granted numbers of concessions, ostensibly for the purpose of opening up industries or developing mining areas. The real reasons are generally considered to have been personal, and the result was the crushing of budding activities, and the severe discouragement of those who were willing to expend capital and energies in legitimate work. Favouritism pure and simple dictated these grants. It is hardly too much to say that the system and spirit then introduced rule to this day, for although the Volksraad has taken definite resolution condemning the principle of monopolies and contracts conferring preferential rights of any sort, the spirit of this resolution is violated whenever the President and Executive deem it fit to do so-witness, for instance, the monopoly granted in December, 1895, for the free importation of produce, which is disguised as a Government agency with a 'commission' to the agent; but it is really a monopoly and nothing else!

The Boers were not satisfied with the Convention of 1881. They desired the removal of the Suzerainty, the cancellation of the clauses referring to natives, and the restoration of the title of the South African Republic in lieu of that of the Transvaal State. They also desired (but did not expect to obtain) complete freedom in regard to their external relations, and they lost no time in trying how far they would be allowed to go in the direction of stretching the spirit of the Convention. Nothing in that ineffectual and miserable document is clearer than the definition of certain boundaries, and the provision that no extension shall be allowed. This hemming of them in-or shutting them up in a kraal, as President Kruger has expressively put it-was intensely repugnant to them. It cut into one of the most deeply-rooted habits of the Boer. His method of trek and expansion has been, to begin by making small hunting excursions into adjacent native territories, to follow up with grazing his cattle there until he created in his own mind a right by prescription, and then to establish it either by force or else by written agreement, too often imperfectly translated. This was oftentimes varied or supplemented by helping the weaker of two rival chiefs, and so demolishing the power of a tribe. The expulsion of the native followed as a natural result.

In the Transvaal itself there was, and still is, an immense quantity of unoccupied land, and the Boers were quite unable to properly control, utilize, and administer their own immense territory, but 'land hunger' is theirs as a birth curse. The individual cannot bear to see the smoke of his neighbour's chimney; he will not cultivate 50 acres, but wants 50,000; the 'nation' wants Africa-no less. They coveted Swaziland, Zululand, Bechuanaland, Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and Tongaland, and set to work by devious methods to establish claims to these countries.

In Bechuanaland they took sides; that is to say, parties of freebooters from the Transvaal took up the cause of certain native chiefs against certain others. The London Convention in 1884 disposed of this quarrel by fixing the south-western boundaries of the Republic, and placing two of the disputing chiefs under the Transvaal, and the other two under British protection. Notwithstanding this, however, the new Convention was no sooner signed than the scheming was resumed, and before a year had passed a party of Transvaal Boers, several of them now holding high official positions under the Republic, raided the territory of the chiefs in the British Protectorate, and even attacked the chief town Mafeking. This was followed by a proclamation by President Kruger placing the territory under the protection of the Republic. Mr. Rhodes, who had already made himself conspicuous by his advocacy of holding the highway to the interior open, was instrumental in inducing the Imperial Government to make a determined stand against this. An ultimatum moved the Transvaal Government to withdraw the proclamation and forced the Boers to leave the country-only, however, when and because the demand was backed by the Warren expedition at a cost of over a million and a half to the British taxpayer! This expedition was sent by Mr. Gladstone, the Boer benefactor-notwithstanding all his anxiety to prove the Transvaal settlement a good one! The action of the Transvaal, and the most brutal murder of Mr. Bethell by the individuals above referred to as holding high official positions under the Republic, gave indications of the bent of the Boer authorities which people in South Africa did not fail to take note of. Bethell had been wounded in the invasion of the territory by the Boers, and as he lay helpless the 'prominent Transvaal official' came up and, seeing a repeating rifle lying beside him, asked him to show them how it worked. He did so, and the 'prominent official' taking it up under pretext of examining it shot Bethell dead with his own weapon.

In Zululand similar tactics were resorted to by the Republic. Transvaal Boers invaded Zululand and (1884) took up the cause of Dinizulu, a son of the dead Cetewayo, and established him as king, upsetting Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement. They then proceeded to seize the country, but the British Government intervening at this point, rescued some two-thirds for the Zulus. A glance at the map will show that the intention of the Boers was to get to the sea, and also that the unlucky Zulus, who had been broken by the British Government-and very rightly too-because they were a menace to the Transvaal, even more than to Natal, were now deprived of the pick of their country, plundered and harried by the very people who had been at their mercy until the Imperial Government stepped in. It is very noteworthy that, with the splendid exception of the lion-hearted Piet Uys and his sons, who fought and died (father and one son) in the Zulu war side by side with the Britishers whom he was keenly opposing on the annexation question, none of the Boers came forward to help in the Secocoeni or Zulu wars, although these wars were undertaken, the one entirely, and the other mainly, on their account. But a great many were ready to raid and annex as soon as the Zulu power was broken.

Swaziland became in turn the object of the Boer Government's attentions. First, grazing concessions were obtained; and next, other concessions for the collection of Customs and Revenue dues, for telegraphs, railways, banking, surveying, and goodness only knows what. One individual applied for and obtained a concession for the balance of ungranted concessions, and another applied for a grant of the Chief Justiceship. What chance the unfortunate native had in such a condition of things can be imagined. The Transvaal bought up all the concessions necessary to make government of the country absolutely impossible, except with their cooperation. The secret service fund of the Republic provided means for making the representatives of the Swazi nation see things in a reasonable light, so that when the time came to investigate the title to concessions and to arrange for the future administration of the country the result was a foregone conclusion. The judge appointed by the Imperial Government on the Special Joint Commission to inquire into the concessions and matters in general let some light on the manner in which these concessions were acquired and granted, by pertinent questions to the concessionaires and interpreters. He asked, for instance, 'Do you swear that you interpreted this document verbatim to the king?'-'Yes.' 'Will you kindly tell to the Court what is the Kaffir for "ad valorem duties" and "et cetera, et cetera, et cetera," or how you interpreted and explained the significance of the "survey," "mint," "revenue," and "townships" concessions?'

The picture of the obese and drunken chief surrounded by fawning harpies was a shameful and disgusting one. One example is sufficient to show how the thing was done. A concession for gambling was applied for. The man who interpreted knew a smattering of 'kitchen' Kaffir, and his rendering of the 'monopoly for billiards, card playing, lotteries, and games of chance' was that he alone should be allowed to 'tchia ma-ball (hit the balls), hlala ma-paper (play the papers), and tata zonki mali (and take all the money).' The poor drunken king nodded sleepily to the first two clauses, but to the bald proposition of taking all the money, which he could understand, he violently objected. The concession was, however, subsequently granted on the representations of a more tactful interpreter.

A very flagrant breach of the spirit of the London Convention, and a very daring attempt at land-grabbing, was the proposed last will and testament of the Swazi King Umbandine, which provided that the governing powers should be assigned to Mr. Kruger as executor of the King and trustee and administrator of the country. His project was defeated; but the aim of the Boer Government was ultimately achieved, nevertheless, and Swaziland has now been handed over to the control of the Republic in spite of the prayers and protestations of the Swazis themselves, who had proved in the past with very practical results to be useful, ready, and loyal allies of the British Government.

While Swaziland was being entoiled the Transvaal Government were not idle elsewhere. Matabeleland was looked upon as the heritage of the Boer, because of the 'old friendship' with the Matabele,-whom they had driven out of their country, now the Transvaal; and Mashonaland was theirs because it was their ancient hunting-ground. That the Boers did not abandon their old schemes merely because they had agreed by treaty to do so is shown by a letter which was found at Lo Bengula's kraal by Mr. F. Thompson when he went up to negotiate for Mr. Rhodes. The stealthy grovelling of the Commandant-General before a savage native chief, the unctuous phraseology, the hypocritical assurances of an undying friendship between Boer and Matabele so long as there are living one of each race, throw a lurid light upon the conduct of Boer diplomacy with native tribes, and explain much of the ineradicable fear and distrust which are felt on the native side in all dealings with the aggressive Boer. The letter reads:

MARICO,

THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC,

March 9, 1882.

To the great ruler the Chief Lo Bengula, the son of Umzilikatse, the great King of the Matabili nation.

GREAT RULER,

When this letter reaches you, then you will know that it comes from a man who very much desires to visit you, but who, being a man of the people, cannot get loose to make such a long journey. Therefore he must now be satisfied with writing a letter to carry his regards to the son of the late King of the Matabele, our old friend Umzilikatse. When I say that I desire to see you, it is not to ask for anything, but to talk of something, and to tell Lo Bengula of the affairs and things of the world, because I know that there are many people who talk and tell about these matters, whilst there are but few who tell the truth. Now, when a man hears a thing wrong, it is worse than if he had never heard it at all. Now, I know that Lo Bengula has heard some things wrongly, and for this reason would I tell him the real truth. Now, you must have heard that the English-or as they are better known the Englishmen-took away our country, the Transvaal, or, as they say, annexed it. We then talked nicely for four years, and begged for our country. But no; when an Englishman once has your property in his hand, then is he like a monkey that has its hands full of pumpkin-seeds-if you don't beat him to death, he will never let go-and then all our nice talk for four years did not help us at all. Then the English commenced to arrest us because we were dissatisfied, and that caused the shooting and fighting. Then the English first found that it would be better to give us back our country. Now they are gone, and our country is free, and we will now once more live in friendship with Lo Bengula, as we lived in friendship with Umzilikatse, and such must be our friendship, that so long as there is one Boer and one Matabele living these two must remain friends. On this account do I wish to see Lo Bengula, and if I may live so long, and the country here become altogether settled, and the stink which the English brought is first blown away altogether, then I will still ride so far to reach Lo Bengula, and if he still has this letter then he will hear the words from the mouth of the man who now must speak with the pen upon paper, and who, therefore, cannot so easily tell him everything. The man is a brother's child of the three brothers that formerly-now thirty-two years ago-were at Umzilikatse's, and then made the peace with him which holds to this day. He still remembers well when the first Boers, Franz Joubert, Jann Joubert, and Pieter Joubert, came there, and when they made the peace whereby Umzilikatse could live at peace and the Boers also, and the peace which is so strong that the vile evil-doers were never able to destroy it, and never shall be able to destroy it as long as there shall be one Boer that lives and Lo Bengula also lives.

Now I wish to send something to give Lo Bengula a present as a token of our friendship. I send for Lo Bengula with the gentleman who will bring him this letter a blanket and a handkerchief for his great wife, who is the mother of all the Matabele nation. I will one day come to see their friendship. The gentleman who brings the letter will tell you about all the work which I have to do here. Some bad people have incited Kolahing, and so he thought he would make fortifications and fight with us, but he got frightened, and saw that he would be killed, therefore I made him break down the fortifications and pack all the stones in one heap, and he had then to pay 5,000 cattle and 4,000 sheep and goats for his wickedness. Now there is another chief, Gatsizibe-he came upon our land and killed three people and plundered them-he must also pay a fine, or else we will punish him or shoot him, because we will have peace in our country. Now greetings, great Chief Lo Bengula, from the Commandant-General of the South African Republic for the Government and Administration.

P.J. JOUBERT.

A big trek (the Banjailand trek) was organized in 1890 and 1891 by General Joubert and his relatives and supporters to occupy a portion of the territory already proclaimed as under British protection and the administration of the Chartered Company. The trekkers were turned back at Rhodes's Drift, stopped by the firmness and courage and tact of Dr. Jameson, who met them alone and unarmed; and also by the proclamation of President Kruger, to whom it had been plainly intimated that the invasion would be forcibly resisted and would inevitably provoke war. The matter had gone so far that the offices of the Republic of Banjai had already been allotted. The President's proclamation instead of being regarded as the barest fulfilment of his obligations-very grudgingly done under pressure of threats-was vaunted as an act of supreme magnanimity and generosity, and was used in the bargaining for the cession of Swaziland.

In Tongaland Boer emissaries were not idle; but they failed, owing to the fact that the Tonga Queen Regent, Zambili, a really fine specimen of the savage ruler, would have nothing to do with any power but England, whose suzerainty she accepted in 1887. Being shut off here, the Boer Government made another bid for seaward extension, and, through their emissaries, obtained certain rights from two petty chiefs, Zambaan and Umbegesa, whom they represented as independent kings; but Lord Rosebery annexed their territories in 1894, and so put a final stop to the Transvaal schemes to evade the Convention by intrigue with neighbouring native tribes.

Nothing can better illustrate the Boers' deliberate evasion of their treaty obligations than their conduct in these matters. The Pretoria Convention defined the Transvaal boundaries and acknowledged the independence of the Swazis, and yet the British Government's delay in consenting to the annexation of Swaziland by the Republic was regarded for years as an intolerable grievance, and was proclaimed as such so insistently that nearly all South Africa came at last to so regard it.

The Boers' consent to the Chartered Company's occupation of Mashonaland was looked upon as something calling for a quid pro quo, and the annexation of Zambaan's land is now regarded as an infamous act of piracy by England, and an infringement of the Republic's rights, which the Dutch papers denounce most vehemently. The Boer Government made it clear, not less in their purely internal policy than in these matters of extensions of territory, that they intended pursuing a line of their own.

In 1882, the property known as 'Moodies,' consisting of a number of farms bearing indications of gold, was thrown open to prospectors. The farms had been allotted to Mr. G. Piggott Moodie when he was Surveyor-General, in lieu of salary which the Republic was unable to pay. This was the beginning of the prospecting era which opened up De Kaap, Witwatersrand, and other fields; but it was a small beginning, and for some time nothing worth mentioning was discovered. The Republic was again in a bad way, and drifting backwards after its first spurt. The greatest uncertainty prevailed amongst prospectors as to their titles, for in Lydenburg, at Pilgrim's Rest, and on the Devil's Kantoor, concessions had been granted over the heads of the miners at work on their claims, and they had been turned off for the benefit of men who contributed in no way to the welfare and prosperity of the State. It has been stated in the Volksraad that not one of those concessionaires has even paid the dues and rents, or complied with the other conditions stipulated in the contracts. Many of the miners left the country in disgust. The Lydenburg district was practically locked up for fourteen years owing to the concession policy, and has only lately been partly released from the bonds of monopoly.

In 1884 Messrs. Kruger and Smit proceeded to Europe to endeavour to raise funds, which were badly needed, and also to obtain some modifications of the Convention. The attempt to raise funds through the parties in Holland to whom the railway concession had just been granted failed, but the delegates were more fortunate in their other negotiations. They negotiated the London Convention which fixed certain hitherto undefined boundaries; and in that document no reference was made to the suzerainty of Great Britain. They also secured the consent of the British Government to the alteration of the title of the country. Instead of Transvaal State it became once more the 'South African Republic.'{07} During this visit there occurred an incident which provides the answer to Mr. Kruger's oft-too oft-repeated remark that 'the Uitlanders were never asked to settle in the Transvaal, and are not wanted there.' Messrs. Kruger and Smit were staying at the Albemarle Hotel, where they found themselves, after some weeks' delay, in the uncomfortable position of being unable to pay their hotel bill. In their extremity they applied to one Baron Grant, at that time a bright particular star in the Stock Exchange firmament. Baron Grant was largely interested in the gold concessions of Lydenburg, and he was willing to assist, but on terms. And the quid pro quo which he asked was some public assurance of goodwill, protection, and encouragement to British settlers in the Transvaal. Mr. Kruger responded on behalf of the Republic by publishing in the London press the cordial invitation and welcome and the promise of rights and protection to all who would come, so frequently quoted against him of late.

By this time Moodies had attracted a fair number of people, and the prospects of the country began, for the first time with some show of reason, to look brighter. No results were felt, however, and the condition of the Government officials was deplorable. Smuggling was carried on systematically; in many cases officials 'stood in' with smugglers. They were obliged either to do that or to enforce the laws properly and get what they could by seizing contraband goods. There were two objections to the latter course, however. One was that the country was large and detection difficult with men who were both daring and resourceful; and the other was that the officials were not sure of receiving their share of the spoil from a Government so hard pressed as this one was, and whose higher officials also had difficulties about payment of salaries. In many cases salaries were six months in arrear; and other cases could be quoted of officials whose house-rent alone amounted to more than their nominal remuneration. Yet they continued to live, and it was not difficult to surmise how. Another significant fact was that goods subject to heavy duties-such as spirits, hams, etc.-could be bought at any store at a price which was less than original cost plus carriage and duty. Smuggling was a very palpable fact, and-quoth the public and the officials-a very convenient and even necessary evil.

The principle on which the Customs officials conducted the business of their office was observed by other officials of the Republic, and in one department, at least, the abuses have had a very far-reaching and serious effect. The Field-cornets-district officials who act as petty justices, registering, and pass officers, collectors of personal taxes, captains of the burgher forces, etc., etc.-are the officers with whom each newcomer has to register. This is an important matter, because the period of residence for the purpose of naturalization and enfranchisement is reckoned from the date of registration in the Field-cornet's books. As these officials were practically turned loose on the public to make a living the best way they could, many of them, notwithstanding that they collected the taxes imposed by law, omitted to enter the names of new arrivals in their books, thus securing themselves against having to make good these amounts in event of an inspection of the books. Many of the Field-cornets were barely able to write; they had no 'offices,' and would accept taxes and registrations at any time and in any place. The chances of correct entry were therefore remote. The result of this is very serious. The records are either 'lost' when they might prove embarrassing, or so incorrectly or imperfectly kept as to be of no use whatever; and settlers in the Transvaal from 1882 to 1890 are in most cases unable to prove their registration as the law requires, and this through no fault of their own.

In the country districts justice was not a commodity intended for the Britisher. Many cases of gross abuse, and several of actual murder occurred; and in 1885 the case of Mr. Jas. Donaldson, then residing on a farm in Lydenburg-lately one of the Reform prisoners-was mentioned in the House of Commons, and became the subject of a demand by the Imperial Government for reparation and punishment. He had been ordered by two Boers (one of whom was in the habit of boasting that he had shot an unarmed Englishman in Lydenburg since the war, and would shoot others) to abstain from collecting hut taxes on his own farm; and on refusing had been attacked by them. After beating them off single-handed, he was later on again attacked by his former assailants, reinforced by three others. They bound him with reims (thongs), kicked and beat him with sjamboks (raw-hide whips) and clubs, stoned him, and left him unconscious and so disfigured that he was thought to be dead when found some hours later. On receipt of the Imperial Government's representations, the men were arrested, tried and fined. The fines were stated to have been remitted at once by Government, but in the civil action which followed Mr. Donaldson obtained ￡500 damages. The incident had a distinctly beneficial effect, and nothing more was heard of the maltreatment of defenceless men simply because they were Britishers. Moreover, with the improvement in trade which followed the gold discoveries of 1885 and 1886 at Moodies and Barberton, the relations between the two races also improved. Frequent intercourse and commercial relations begot a better knowledge of each other, and the fierce hatred of the Britisher began to disappear in the neighbourhood of the towns and the goldfields.

In 1886 the wonderful richness of the Sheba Mine in Barberton attracted a good deal of attention, and drew a large number of persons-prospectors, speculators, traders, etc.-to the Transvaal. Before the end of 1887 ten or twelve thousand must have poured into the country. The effect was magical. The revenue which had already increased by 50 per cent. in 1886, doubled itself in 1887, and then there came unto the Boer Government that which they had least expected-ample means to pursue their greater ambitions. But unmixed good comes to few, and with the blessings of plenty came the cares of Government, the problem of dealing with people whose habits, thoughts, ambitions, methods, language, and logic differed utterly from their own. Father Abraham on the London Stock Exchange would not be much more 'at sea' than the peasant farmers of the Volksraad were in dealing with the requirements of the new settlers.

Agitations for reforms commenced early in Barberton. At first it was only roads and bridges that were wanted, or the remission of certain taxes, or security of title for stands and claims. Later on a political association named the Transvaal Republican Union was formed in Barberton, having a constitution and programme much the same as those of the Transvaal National Union, formed some five years later in Johannesburg. The work of this body was looked on with much disfavour by the Government, and it was intimated to some of the prominent members that if they did not cease to concern themselves with politics they would suffer in their business relations, and might even be called upon to leave the country. Many reforms were specified as desirable, and the franchise question was raised, with the object of getting the Government to make some reasonable provision in lieu of the registration clause, which was found in most cases to be an absolute bar.

The discovery of the Witwatersrand conglomerate formation soon helped to swell the flowing tide of prosperity. In the middle of 1887 the regular output of gold commenced, and the fields have never 'looked back' since. Johannesburg-named after Mr. Johannes Rissik, the Surveyor-General of the Transvaal-was soon a far greater problem than Barberton had been. The shareholders in the mines soon found it necessary to have some organization to protect their interests and give unison to their policy, and to preserve the records and collect information for the industry. The Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines was then formed, a voluntary business association of unique interest and efficiency. The organization includes all the representative and influential men, and every company of any consequence connected with the mining industry; and it has, through its committee and officials, for eight years represented to the Volksraad the existence of abuses and grievances, the remedies that are required, and the measures which are felt to be necessary or conducive to the progress of the industry in particular, or the welfare of the State in general. The President, Executive and Volksraad, by neglect of their obvious duties, by their ignorance of ordinary public affairs, by their wilful disregard of the requirements of the Uitlanders, have given cohesion to a people about as heterogeneous as any community under the sun, and have trained them to act and to care for themselves. The refusal year after year to give a charter of incorporation to the Chamber, on the grounds that it would be creating an imperium in imperio, and the comments of Volksraad members on the petition, have made it clear that the Government view the Chamber with no friendly eye. The facts that in order to get a workable pass law at all the Chamber had to prepare it in every detail, together with plans for the creation and working of a Government department; and that in order to diminish the litigation under the gold law, and to make that fearful and wonderful agglomeration of erratic, experimental, crude, involved, contradictory and truly incomprehensible enactments at all understandable, the Chamber had to codify it at its own expense and on its own initiative, illustrate both the indispensable character of the organization, and the ignorance and ineptitude of the Government.

The records of the Volksraad for the last ten years may be searched in vain for any measure calculated constructively to advance the country, or to better the conditions of the workers in it, with the few-very few-exceptions of those proposed by the Chamber of Mines. The country has, in fact, run the Government, and the Government has been unable to ruin it.

Shortly after the discovery of the Rand conglomerates, it became clear that a railway would have to be built between the coalfields and the mines-some forty miles. But it was a fixed principle of the Boers that no railways (with the exception of the Delagoa Bay line, which, as the means of diverting trade from British channels, was regarded as a necessary evil) should be built, since they could compete successfully with the ox-waggon, and thus deprive the 'poor burgher' of his legitimate trade spoil; and great difficulty was experienced in getting the consent of the Raad. As a matter of fact, the permission to build it was only obtained by subterfuge; for it was explained to the worthy law-makers that it was not a railway at all-only a steam tram. And the Rand Steam Tram it is called to this day.

The Delagoa Railway-the darling scheme of Presidents Burgers and Kruger in turn-was taken seriously in hand as soon as it was possible to raise money on almost any terms. The concession for all railways in the State was granted on April 16, 1884, to a group of Hollander and German capitalists, and confirmed by the Volksraad on August 23 following. The President's excuse for granting and preserving this iniquitous bond on the prosperity of the State is, that when the country was poor and its credit bad, friends in Holland came forward and generously helped it, and this must not be forgotten to them. As a matter of fact, friends accepted the concession when the State was poor and its credit bad, but did nothing until the State's credit improved to such an extent as to be mortgageable. Then the friends granted certain favourable terms under their concession to other friends, who built the first section of the line at preposterous rates, and repaid themselves out of moneys raised on the State's credit.

A well-known South African politician, distinguished alike for his ability and integrity, who visited the Transvaal during the progress of the reformers' trial, and was anxious in the interests of all South Africa to find a solution of the differences, put the position thus to some of the leading men of the Rand: 'You can see for yourselves that this is no time to ask for the franchise; for the time being, Jameson's invasion has made such a suggestion impossible. Now, tell me in a word, Is there any one thing that you require more than anything else, which we can help you to get?' The answer was: 'The one thing which we must have-not for its own sake, but for the security it offers for obtaining and retaining other reforms-is the franchise. No promise of reform, no reform itself, will be worth an hour's purchase unless we have the status of voters to make our influence felt. But, if you want the chief economic grievances, they are: the Netherlands Railway Concession, the dynamite monopoly, the liquor traffic, and native labour, which, together, constitute an unwarrantable burden of indirect taxation on the industry of over two and a half millions sterling annually. We petitioned until we were jeered at; we agitated until we-well-came here [Pretoria Gaol]; and we know that we shall get no remedy until we have the vote to enforce it. We are not a political but a working community, and if we were honestly and capably governed the majority of us would be content to wait for the franchise for a considerable time yet in recognition of the peculiar circumstances, and of the feelings of the older inhabitants. That is the position in a nutshell.'

Netherlands Railway Company.

The Netherlands Railway Company is then a very important factor. It is unnecessary to go very fully into its history and the details of its administration. As the holder of an absolute monopoly, as the enterprise which has involved the State in its National Debt, and as the sole channel through which such money has been expended, the Company has gradually worked itself into the position of being the financial department of the State; and the functions which are elsewhere exercised by the heads of the Government belong here, in practice, entirely to this foreign corporation. Petitions for the cancellation of this concession were presented in 1888, when the progressive element in the first Volksraad consisted of one man-Mr. Loveday, one of the loyalists in the war. The agitation begun and carried on by him was taken up by others, but without further result than that of compelling the President to show his hand and step forward as the champion of the monopoly on every occasion on which it was assailed. During the years 1893-96 the President stoutly defended the Company in the Volksraad, and by his influence and the solid vote of his ignorant Dopper Party completely blocked all legislation tending to control the Company. Indeed at the end of the Session of 1895, on receiving representations from the business communities of the Republic as to the desirability of removing this incubus from the overtaxed people, the President stated plainly that the Netherlands Railway Concession was a matter of high politics and did not concern any but the burghers of the State, and that he would receive no representations from the Uitlanders on the subject nor would he permit them to discuss it.

Very shortly after the granting of this railway concession came the appointment of Dr. Leyds as State Attorney for the Republic, he having been recommended and pushed forward by the gentlemen in Holland to whom the concession had been granted. It is stated that he was sent out as the agent of the concessionaires in order to protect and advance their interests, although at the same time in the service of the Republic. It is only necessary to add that Mr. Beelaerts van Blokland, the Consul-General for the Republic in Holland, is the agent of the concessionaires in that country, and the accord with which these two gentlemen, as railway commissioners at their respective ends, have always acted becomes intelligible. Several of the vital conditions of the concession have been freely violated, the first being that a certain section of the line (Nelspruit) should be completed within four years. It was not completed for eight. The concession really became void several times during the years prior to 1890, but always found a stalwart champion in the President, who continued to defend the concessionaires for some two years after they had failed to get their capital subscribed. The Company was floated on June 21 1887 on the most peculiar terms, the capital of ￡166,666 being in 2,000 shares of 1,000 guilders, or ￡83 6s. 8d. each. The shares were subscribed for by the following groups:

German 819 shares, carrying 30 votes.

Hollander 581 " " 76 "

The Republic 600 " " 6 "

The trust-deed, which limited the Republic to 6 out of 112 votes, although it subscribed about one-third of the capital, and gave to the smallest holders, the Hollanders, twice as many votes as all the others put together, was passed by Dr. Leyds, in his capacity of legal adviser of the Government, having previously been prepared by him in his other capacity. The sum of ￡124,000 appears to have been expended on construction ten months before any contract was given out for the same or any work begun, and fifteen months before any material was shipped.

The contract for the construction of the first sixty miles compels admiration, if only for its impudence. In the first place the contractors, Van Hattum and Co., were to build the line at a cost to be mutually agreed upon by them and the railway company, and they were to receive as remuneration 11 per cent. upon the amount of the specification. But should they exceed the contract price then the 11 per cent. was to be proportionately decreased by an arranged sliding scale, provided, however, that Van Hattum and Co. did not exceed the specification by more than 100 per cent., in which latter case the Company would have the right to cancel the contract. By this provision Messrs. Van Hattum and Co. could increase the cost by 100 per cent, provided they were willing to lose the 11 per cent. profit, leaving them a net gain of 89 per cent. They did not neglect the opportunity. Whole sections of earthworks cost ￡23,500 per mile, which should not have cost ￡8,000. Close upon a thousand Hollanders were brought out from Holland to work for a few months in each year on the line and then be sent back to Holland again at the expense of the Republic. In a country which abounded in stone the Komati Bridge was built of dressed stone which had been quarried and worked in Holland and exported some 7,000 miles by ship and rail.

These are a few instances out of many. The loss to the country through the financing was of course far greater than any manipulation of the construction could bring about. In the creating of overdrafts and the raising of loans very large sums indeed were handled. Three-quarters of a million in one case and a million in another offered opportunities which the Hollander-German gentlemen who were doing business for the country out of love for it (as was frequently urged on their behalf in the Volksraad) were quick to perceive. The 5 per cent. debentures issued to raise the latter sum were sold at ￡95 15s.; but the financiers deducted ￡5 commission from even this, so that the State has only benefited to the extent of ￡90 15s. This transaction was effected at a time when the State loan known as the Transvaal Fives-raised on exactly the same interest and precisely the same guarantee-was quoted at over par. What, however, was felt to be worse than any detail of finance was that this corporation of foreigners had gradually obtained complete control of the finances of the State, and through the railway system it practically dictated the relations with the other Governments in South Africa, by such measures for instance as the imposition of a charge of 8-1/2d. per ton per mile on goods travelling over their lines coming from the Cape Colony, whilst the other lines are favoured by a charge of less than half that. The burdens placed upon the mining industry by the excessive charges imposed for political purposes were, in the case of the poorer mines, ruinous. The right which the Company had to collect the Customs dues for account of the State, to retain them as security for the payment of interest on their shares and debentures, and to impose a charge for collection quite disproportionate to the cost, was another serious grievance. It was hopeless, however, to deal with the whole question. The Government had set its face against any reform in this quarter. It was not possible to obtain even ordinary working facilities such as any business corporation unprotected by an absolute monopoly would be bound to concede of its own accord, in order to catch a measure of trade.

The Government have the right, under the agreement with the Company, to take over the railway on certain conditions, of which the following are the most important:

(a) The Company shall receive one year's notice of the intention to take over.

(b) The Company shall receive twenty times the amount of the average of the last three years' dividends.

(c) The Company shall receive as a solatium for the unexpired period of the concession an amount equal to one per cent. of its nominal capital for each year up to the year of expiring (1915).

The Government can take over the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg-Boksburg Tramway against payment of the cost of construction.

If the Volksraad should not during this Session{08} decide to nationalize the railway no change can take place before 1898, so that the three years 1895 to 1897 would have to be taken as a basis and therefore the 6 per cent. for 1894, the only low dividend, would not come into the calculation. This would of course considerably increase the purchase price-e.g.,

1895 9 per cent.

1896 14 " (estimate),

1897 14 " "

--

Total 37 "

That is to say an average distribution of 12.33 per cent. for the three years. The purchase price would thus be:

12.33 X 20 = 246.66 per cent.

17 years' premium 17 "

------

Total 263.66 "

This has been clearly explained to the Volksraad but without avail, the President's influence on the other side being too strong. During the Session of 1895 it was made clear that agitation against the Company was as futile as beating the air. When the Hollander clique found that they could no longer convince the Boers as a whole of the soundness of their business and the genuineness of their aims, and when they failed to combat the arguments and exposures of their critics, they resorted to other tactics, and promulgated voluminous reports and statements of explanations which left the unfortunate Volksraad members absolutely stupefied where they had formerly only been confused.{09}

The following is taken from an article in the Johannesburg Mining Journal, dealing with the burdens imposed by the railway company upon the industry:

RAILWAY MONOPOLY.

This is another carefully designed burden upon the mines and country. The issued capital and loans of the Netherlands Company now total about ￡7,000,000, upon which an average interest of about 5-1/3 per cent.-guaranteed by the State-is paid, equal to ￡370,000 per annum. Naturally the bonds are at a high premium. The Company and its liabilities can be taken over by the State at a year's notice, and the necessary funds for this purpose can be raised at 3 per cent. An offer was recently made to the Government to consolidate this and other liabilities, but the National Bank, which is another concession, has the monopoly of all State loan business, and this circumstance effectually disposed of the proposal. At 3 per cent. a saving of ￡160,000 per annum would be made in this monopoly in interest alone. The value represented by the Custom dues on the Portuguese border we are not in a position to estimate, but roughly these collections and the 15 per cent. of the profits paid to the management and shareholders must, with other leakages, represent at least another ￡100,000 per annum, which should be saved the country. As the revenue of the corporation now exceeds ￡2,000,000 a year, of which only half is expended in working costs, the estimate we have taken does not err upon the side of extravagance. By its neglect of its duties towards the commercial and mining community enormous losses are involved. Thus, in the coal traffic, the rate-which is now to be somewhat reduced-has been 3d. per ton per mile. According to the returns of the Chamber of Mines, the coal production of the Transvaal for 1895 was 1,045,121 tons. This is carried an average distance of nearly thirty miles, but taking the distance at twenty-four miles the charges are 6s. per ton. At 1-1/2d. per ton per mile-three times as much as the Cape railways charge-a saving upon the coal rates of 3s. per ton would follow, equal to ￡150,000 per annum. Again, by the 'bagging' system, an additional cost of 2s. 3d. per ton is incurred-details of this item have been recently published in this paper-and if this monopoly were run upon ordinary business lines, a further saving of ￡110,000 would be made by carrying coal in bulk. The interest upon the amount required to construct the necessary sidings for handling the coal, and the tram-lines required to transport it to the mines, would be a mere fraction upon this amount; and as the coal trade in the course of a short time is likely to see a 50 per cent. increase, the estimate may be allowed to stand at this figure without deduction. No data are available to fix the amount of the tax laid upon the people generally by the vexatious delays and losses following upon inefficient railway administration, but the monthly meetings of the local Chamber of Commerce throw some light upon these phases of a monopolistic management. The savings to be made in dealing with the coal traffic must not be taken as exhausting all possible reforms; the particulars given as to this traffic only indicate and suggest the wide area covered by this monopoly, which hitherto has made but halting and feeble efforts to keep pace with the requirements of the public. Dealing as it does with the imports of the whole country, which now amount in value to ￡10,000,000, the figures we have given must serve merely to illustrate its invertebrate methods of handling traffic, as well as its grasping greed in enforcing the rates fixed by the terms of its concession. Its forty miles of Rand steam tram-line and thirty-five miles of railway from the Vaal River, with some little assistance from the Delagoa line and Customs, brought in a revenue of about ￡1,250,000 in 1895. Now that the Natal line is opened the receipts will probably amount to nearly ￡3,000,000 per annum, all of which should swell the ordinary revenue of the country, instead of remaining in the hands of foreigners as a reservoir of wealth for indigent Hollanders to exploit. The total railway earnings of the Cape and Natal together over all their lines amounted to ￡3,916,566 in 1895, and the capital expenditure on railways by these colonies amounts to ￡26,000,000. The greater portion of these receipts come from the Rand trade, which is compelled to pay an additional ￡2,500,000, carrying charges to the Netherlands Company, which has ￡7,000,000 of capital. Thus, railway receipts in South Africa amount now to ￡7,000,000 per annum, of which the Rand contributes at least ￡5,000,000.

The revenue of the company is now considerably over ￡3,000,000 per annum. The management claim that their expenses amount to but 40 per cent. of revenue, and this is regarded by them as a matter for general congratulation. The Uitlanders contend that the concern is grossly mismanaged, and that the low cost of working is a fiction. It only appears low by contrast with a revenue swollen by preposterously heavy rates and protected by a monopoly. The tariff could be reduced by one-half; that is to say, a remission of taxation to the tune of one and a half million annually could be effected without depriving the Company of a legitimate and indeed very handsome profit.

Selati Railway.

The Selati Railway Scheme! 'Conceived in iniquity, delivered in shame, died in disgrace!' might be its history, but for the fact that it is not quite dead yet. But very nearly! The concession was obtained during the Session of 1890 by a member of the First Volksraad, Mr. Barend J. Vorster, jun., who himself took part in and guided the tone of the debate which decided the granting of the concession. The Raad resolved to endeavour to obtain the favourable opinions of their constituents, but before doing so the generous Mr. Vorster made what he was pleased to call 'presents' to the members-American spiders, Cape carts, gold watches, shares in the Company to be floated, and sums in cash-were the trifles by which Mr. Vorster won his way to favour. He placated the President by presenting to the Volksraad a portrait of his Honour, executed by the late Mr. Schroeder, South Africa's one artist. The picture cost ￡600. The affair was a notorious and shameless matter of bribery and the only profit which the country gained from it was a candid confession of personal principles on the part of Mr. Kruger himself, who when the exposure took place stated that he saw no harm in members receiving presents. Debentures to the amount of ￡500,000 were issued, bearing Government guarantee of 4 per cent. The Company received ￡70 for each ￡100 debenture. Comment is superfluous. A second issue of a million was made, nominally at ￡93 10s., but the Company only received ￡86-a commission to the brokers or agents of 8-3/4 per cent., at a time when the Company's previous issue of 4 per cents. were standing at ￡97 in the market. The costs of flotation were charged at upwards of ￡32,000; the expenses of one gentleman's travelling, etc., ￡6,000.

But these are 'trifles light as air.' This Selati Railway Company, which being guaranteed by Government is really a Government liability, arranged with a contractor to build the line at the maximum cost allowed in the concession, ￡9,600 per mile. Two days later this contractor sub-let the contract for ￡7,002 per mile. As the distance is 200 miles, the Republic was robbed by a stroke of the pen of ￡519,600-one of the biggest 'steals' even in the Transvaal. During the two years for which Dr. Leyds was responsible as the representative of the Republic for the management of this affair, none of these peculiar transactions were detected-at any rate none were reported or exposed; but on the accession to office of an ignorant old Boer the nest of swindles appears to have been discovered without any difficulty. And it is generally admitted that Dr. Leyds is not a fool. This exposure took place at the end of the Session of 1894, and, inured as the Uitlanders had become to jobs, this was an eyeopener even for them, and the startled community began wondering what more might be in store for them-the unfortunate tax-payers-who had to bear the brunt of it all.

Revenue.

Turning to the finances of the country, the following tables are as instructive as anything can be:

REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC.{10}

Fiscal period. Revenue. Expenditure. Remarks.

￡ ￡

Aug. 1, 1871 to July 31, 1872 ... 40,988 ... 35,714

" 1, 1872 " Jan. 31, 1873 ... 43,239 ... 41,813

Feb. 1, 1873 " " 31, 1874 ... 49,318 ... 45,482 Gold discovered

in Lydenburg.

" 1, 1874 " " 31, 1875 ... 58,553 ... 61,785

" 1, 1875 " " 31, 1876 ... 64,582 ... 69,394

" 1, 1876 " " 31, 1877 ... 62,762 ... 64,505

" 1, 1877 " April 12, 1877 ... 25,752 ... 17,235

April 12, 1877 " Dec. 31, 1877 ... 54,127 ... 70,003

Jan. 1, 1878 " " 31, 1878 ... 76,774 ... 89,063

" 1, 1879 " " 31, 1879 ... 93,409 ... 177,596

" 1, 1880 " " 31, 1880 ... 174,069 ... 144,943

" 1, 1881 " Oct. 14, 1881 ... 25,326 ... 186,707 British Govt.

Aug. 8, 1881 " Dec. 31, 1881 ... 37,908 ... 33,442 Boer Govt.

Jan. 1, 1882 " " 31, 1882 ... 177,407 ... 114,476

" 1, 1883 " " 31, 1883 ... 143,324 ... 184,344

" 1, 1884 " Mar. 31, 1884 ... 44,557 ... 18,922

April 1, 1884 " " 31, 1885 ... 161,596 ... 184,820

" 1, 1885 " " 31, 1886 ... 177,877 ... 162,709 Sheba floated.

" 1, 1886 " Dec. 31, 1886 ... 196,236 ... 154,636 Rand proclaimed

Sept. 8, 1886.

Jan. 1, 1887 " " 31, 1887 ... 637,749 ... 594,834 Shares quoted

Johannesburg

Stock Exchange.

Telegraph

opened

Johannesburg

April 26, 1887.

" 1, 1888 " " 31, 1888 ... 884,440 ... 720,492 Boom, Nov. 1888

" 1, 1889 " " 31, 1889 ...1,577,445 ...1,201,135 to Jan. 1889.

Slump, Mar. 1889.

" 1, 1890 " " 31, 1890 ...1,229,061 ...1,386,461

" 1, 1891 " " 31, 1891 ... 967,192 ...1,350,074 Baring Crisis.

" 1, 1892 " " 31, 1892 ...1,255,830 ...1,187,766 Railway reached

Johannesburg

Sept. 15.

" 1, 1893 " " 31, 1893 ...1,702,685 ...1,302,054

" 1, 1894 " " 31, 1894 ...2,247,728 ...1,734,728

" 1, 1895 " " 31, 1895 ...2,923,648 ...1,948,249

" 1, 1896 " " 31, 1896 ...3,912,095 ...3,732,492

" 1, 1897 " " 31, 1897 ...3,956,402 ...3,898,816

" 1, 1898 " " 31, 1898 ...3,329,958 ...3,476,844

" 1, 1899 " " 31, 1899 ...4,087,852 ...3,951,234 (Budget).

The figures for the period from 1871 to the end of 1887 are taken from Jeppe's Transvaal Almanac for 1889. They represent the ordinary Revenue and Expenditure arrived at after the deduction of the items 'Special Receipts,' 'Special Deposits,' 'Deposits Withdrawn,' 'Advance Refunded,' 'Advances made' and 'Fixed Deposits' from the totals given in the Official Government Returns.

The figures for the years 1888 to 1899 are those of the published Government Returns after the deduction of-

Fixed deposits from 1888 to 1893 inclusive.

The sale and purchase of explosives from 1895 to 1898 inclusive.

The owner's share of claim licenses from 1895 to 1899 inclusive.

Delagoa Bay Customs Dues paid to the Netherlands Railway for 1898 and 1899.

Dynamite Monopoly.

The dynamite monopoly has always been a Monopoly very burning question with the Uitlanders. This concession was granted shortly after the Barberton Fields were discovered, when the prospects of an industry in the manufacture of explosives were not really very great. The concessionaire himself has admitted that had he foreseen to what proportions this monopoly would eventually grow he would not have had the audacity to apply for it. This, of course, is merely a personal question. The fact which concerned the industry was that the right was granted to one man to manufacture explosives and to sell them at a price nearly 200 per cent. over that at which they could be imported. It was found upon investigation after some years of agitation that the factory at which this 'manufacture' took place was in reality merely a depot in which the already manufactured article was manipulated to a moderate extent so as to lend colour to the President's statement that a local industry was being fostered. An investigation held by order of the Volksraad exposed the imposition. The President himself stated that he found he had been deceived and that the terms of the concession had been broken, and he urged the Raad to cancel it-which the Raad did. The triumph was considerable for the mining industry and it was the more appreciated in that it was the solitary success to which the Uitlanders could point in their long series of agitations for reform. But the triumph was not destined to be a lasting one. Within a few months the monopoly was revived in an infinitely more obnoxious form. It was now called a Government monopoly, but 'the agency' was bestowed upon a partner of the gentleman who had formerly owned the concession, the President himself vigorously defending this course and ignoring his own judgment on the case uttered a few months previously. Land en Volk, the Pretoria Dutch newspaper, exposed the whole of this transaction, including the system of bribery by which the concessionaries secured their renewal, and among other things made the charge which it has continued to repeat ever since that Mr. J.M.A. Wolmarans, member of the Executive, received a commission of one shilling per case on every case sold during the continuance of the agency as a consideration for his support in the Executive Council, and that he continues to enjoy this remuneration, which is estimated now to be not far short of ￡10,000 a year. Mr. Wolmarans, for reasons of pride or discretion, has declined to take any notice of the charge, although frequently pressed to take action in the matter. It is calculated that the burden imposed upon the Witwatersrand Mines alone amounts to ￡600,000 per annum, and is, of course, daily increasing.

The Franchise Laws.

The question of the franchise, which has achieved the greatest prominence in the Uitlander agitation, is one with which few people even in the Transvaal are familiar, so many and peculiar have been the changes effected in the law. Lawyers differ as to whether certain laws revoke or merely supplement previous ones, and the President himself-to the grim amusement of the Uitlanders-frequently goes astray when he speaks on franchise. The first law on burgher and electoral rights is No. 1 of 1876, which remained in force until 1882. By it the possession of landed property or else residence for one year qualified the settler for full burgher privileges. Law No. 7 of 1882 was the first attempt of the restored Republic to deal with the question. It was then enacted that an alien could be naturalized and enfranchised after five years' residence, such residence to be proved by the Field-cornet's books of registration. It has already been explained that these records in nine cases out of ten were either improperly kept or non-existent.

In 1890 Law No. 4 was passed, creating the Second Volksraad and altering the Grondwet (or constitution) accordingly. By this law the franchise was indirectly altered without repealing those portions which may be at variance with or repugnant to the implied alterations, and this was done by simply defining what class of electors should vote for members of the First Raad, and what class for members of the Second. Thus, 'the members of the First Volksraad shall be elected by those enfranchised burghers who have obtained the right of voting before this law comes in force, or thereafter by birth in the State, and on having attained the age of sixteen years.' Secondly, all those who became naturalized and enfranchised after this law was passed could not vote for members of the First Volksraad, but a subsequent article in the law provides that the higher rights can be obtained by those who shall have been eligible for ten years for election to the Second Volksraad; and it is then explained that, in order to be eligible for the Second Volksraad, it is necessary to be thirty years of age, to be a member of the Protestant Church, to live and have landed property in the Republic, and to have been a naturalized subject for two years. Thus the full electoral privileges were only obtainable after fourteen years' residence in the State, and the possession of the other qualifications of religion, property, etc.

Next came Law No. 13 of 1891, which was rather a codification than an alteration of previous laws. In 1892 another law was passed again explaining, but not materially altering the franchise. In 1893 Law No. 14 was passed as an amendment of previous laws: further juggling the position-further hedging in the sacred preserve. As the law was superseded in the following year it is unnecessary to go into details; but note how the measure became law! It was not published in the Staats Courant for three months as required by law; it was not published at all; nor was any special resolution taken affirming that it was a matter of extreme urgency and therefore to be held exempt from that rule of procedure; so that the High Court ought to be able to declare it null and void. The circumstances of its introduction could not be considered to warrant the plea of urgency. On the 29th and 30th June, 1893, memorials upon the franchise question were laid before the Raad. From Johannesburg came one memorial bearing 4,507 signatures out of the grand total of 6,665 memorialists. It was in favour of extension of the franchise. Another memorial from 103 Free State burghers was in favour of extension, another from Barberton from 40 burghers also for extension. Seven memorials, bearing 444 signatures, were against extension. All the others concerned minor alterations in Law 13 of 1891, and did not affect the franchise. The Raad appointed a commission and on the 8th of September received its report, together with a draft law which had not before seen the light of day. After a discussion lasting part of one morning the law was passed provisionally; and to be of full force and effect until confirmed by the Raad in the following year. Thus again were the fundamental political conditions entirely altered by the passing of a law which two hours before had not been heard of.

Law No. 3 of 1894 purports to supersede all other laws. Therein it is laid down that all persons born in the State, or who may have established their domicile therein before May 29, 1876, are entitled to full political privileges. Those who have settled in the country since then can become naturalized after two years' residence dating from the time at which their names were registered in the Field-cornet's books. This naturalization confers the privilege of voting for local officials, Field-cornets, landdrosts,{11} and for members of the Second Raad. It is however stipulated that children born in the country shall take the status of their fathers. The naturalized subject after having been qualified to vote in this manner for two years becomes eligible for a seat in the Second Volksraad-i.e., four years after the registration of his name in the Field-cornet's books. After he shall have been qualified to sit in the Second Volksraad for ten years (one of the conditions for which is that he must be thirty years of age) he may obtain the full burgher rights or political privileges, provided the majority of burghers in his Ward will signify in writing their desire that he should obtain them and provided the President and Executive shall see no objection to granting the same. It is thus clear that, assuming the Field-cornet's records to be honestly and properly compiled and to be available for reference (which they are not), the immigrant, after fourteen years' probation during which he shall have given up his own country and have been politically emasculated, and having attained the age of at least forty years, would have the privilege of obtaining burgher rights should he be willing and able to induce the majority of a hostile clique to petition in writing on his behalf and should he then escape the veto of the President and Executive.

This was the coping-stone to Mr. Kruger's Chinese wall. The Uitlanders and their children were disfranchised for ever, and as far as legislation could make it sure the country was preserved by entail to the families of the Voortrekkers. The measure was only carried because of the strenuous support given by the President both within the Raad and at those private meetings which practically decide the important business of the country. The President threw off all disguise when it came to proposing this measure of protection. For many years he had been posing as the one progressive factor in the State and had induced the great majority of people to believe that while he personally was willing and even anxious to accede to the reasonable requests of the new population his burghers were restraining him. He had for a time succeeded in quelling all agitation by representing that demonstrations made by the tax-bearing section only embarrassed him in his endeavour to relieve them and aggravated the position by raising the suspicions and opposition of his Conservative faction.

In 1893 a petition signed by upwards of 13,000 aliens in favour of granting the extension of the franchise was received by the Raad with great laughter. But notwithstanding this discouragement, during the following year a monster petition was got up by the National Union. It was signed by 35,483 Uitlanders-men of an age and of sufficient education to qualify them for a vote in any country. The discussion which took place on this petition was so important, and the decision so pregnant with results, that copious notes of the Volksraad debate are published in this volume (Appendix). The only response made to this appeal was a firmer riveting of the bonds. It is but just to say that the President encountered determined opposition in his attempt to force his measure through the Raad. The progressive section (progressive being a purely relative term which the peculiar circumstances of the country alone can justify) made a stand, but the law was carried nevertheless. Eye-witnesses of the scene state that two or three of the intelligent and liberal-minded farmers belonging to this progressive party, men who were earnestly desirous of doing justice to all and furthering the interests of the State, declared at the close of the debate that this meant the loss of independence. 'Now,' said one old Boer, 'our country is gone. Nothing can settle this but righting, and there is only one end to the fight. Kruger and his Hollanders have taken our independence more surely than ever Shepstone did.' The passing of this measure was a revelation not only to the Uitlanders, who still believed that reasonable representations would prevail, but to a section of the voters of the country who had failed to realize Mr. Kruger's policy, and who honestly believed that he would carry some conciliatory measures tending to relieve the strain, and satisfy the large and ever-increasing industrial population of aliens. The measure was accepted on all hands as an ultimatum-a declaration of war to the knife. There was only one redeeming feature about it: from that time forward there could be no possibility of misunderstanding the position, and no reason to place any credence in the assurances of the President. When remonstrated with on this subject of the refusal of the franchise, and when urged by a prominent man whose sympathies are wholly with the Boer to consider the advisability of 'opening the door a little,' the President, who was in his own house, stood up, and leading his adviser by the arm, walked into the middle of the street, and pointed to the Transvaal flag flying over the Government buildings, saying, 'You see that flag. If I grant the franchise I may as well pull it down.'

It is seldom possible to indicate the precise period at which a permanent change in the feeling of a people may be considered to have been effected, but the case of the Uitlanders undoubtedly presents one instance in which this is possible. Up to the passing of this law quite a considerable section of the people believed that the President and the Volksraad would listen to reason, and would even in the near future make considerable concessions. A larger section, it is true, believed nothing of the sort, but at the same time were so far from thinking that it would be necessary to resort to extreme measures that they were content to remain passive, and allow their more sanguine comrades to put their convictions to the test. It is not too much to say that not one person in a hundred seriously contemplated that an appeal to force would be necessary to obtain the concessions which were being asked. It might be said that within an hour the scales dropped from the eyes of the too credulous community, and the gravity of the position was instantly realized. The passage of the Bill and the birth of the revolutionary idea were synchronous.

In a brief sketch of events, such as this is, it is not possible with due regard to simplicity to deal with matters in chronological order, and for this reason such questions as the franchise, the railway, dynamite, and others have been explained separately, regardless of the fact that it has thereby become necessary to allude to incidents in the general history for which no explanation or context is supplied at the moment. This is particularly the case in the matter of the franchise, and for the purpose of throwing light on the policy of which the franchise enactments and the Netherlands Railway affairs and other matters formed a portion, some explanation should be given of President Kruger's own part and history in the period under review.

Mr. Kruger was elected President in 1882, and re-elected in 1888 without serious opposition, his one rival, General Joubert, receiving an insignificant number of votes. The period for which he was now elected proved to be one of unexpected, unexampled prosperity, furnishing him with the means of completing plans which must have seemed more or less visionary at their inception; but it was also a period of considerable trial. The development of the Barberton Goldfields was a revelation to the peasant mind of what the power of gold is. The influx of prospectors was very considerable, the increase of the revenue of the State appeared simply colossal; and no sooner did the Boer rulers begin to realize the significance of the Barberton boom than they were confronted with the incomparably greater discoveries of the Witwatersrand. The President did not like the Uitlanders. He made no concealment of the fact. He could never be induced to listen to the petitions of that community, nor to do anything in the way of roads and bridges in return for the very heavy contributions which the little community sent to the Republic's treasury. In those days he used to plead that the distance was great, and the time required for coach-travelling was too considerable; but the development of the Witwatersrand and the growth of Johannesburg within thirty-two miles of the capital, while disposing of the pretexts which held good in the case of Barberton, found Mr. Kruger no more inclined to make the acquaintance of the newcomers than he had been before. Notwithstanding that the law prescribes that the President shall visit all the districts and towns of the State at least once during the year, notwithstanding, also, the proximity of Johannesburg, the President has only visited the industrial capital of the Republic three times in nine years. The first occasion was in the early days-a visit now remembered only as the occasion of the banquet at which Mr. Cecil Rhodes, then one of the pioneers of the Rand, in proposing the President's health, appealed to him to make friends with the newcomers, and to extend the privileges of the older residents to 'his young burghers-like myself.' That was before Mr. Rhodes had secured his concession, and long before the Charter was thought of.

There is an unreported incident which occurred a year or two later, concerning the two strong men of Africa-it was a 'meeting' which didn't take place, and only Mr. Rhodes can say how it might have affected the future of South Africa had it come off. The latter arrived by coach in Pretoria one Saturday morning, and, desiring to see the President, asked Mr. Ewald Esselen to accompany him and interpret for him. Mr. Rhodes, knowing the peculiar ways of Mr. Kruger, waited at the gate a few yards from the house while Mr. Esselen went in to inquire if the President would see him. Mr. Kruger's reply was that he would see Mr. Rhodes on Monday. Mr. Esselen urged that as Mr. Rhodes was obliged to leave on Sunday night the reply was tantamount to a refusal. The President answered that this was 'Nachtmaal' time and the town was full of his burghers, and that he made it a rule, which he would violate for no one, to reserve the Saturdays of the Nachtmaal week for his burghers so as to hear what they had to say if any wished to speak to him, as his burghers were more to him than anyone else in the world. 'I do no business on Sunday,' he concluded, 'so Rhodes can wait or go!' Mr. Rhodes did not wait. When he heard the answer he remarked to Mr. Esselen, 'The old devil! I meant to work with him, but I'm not going on my knees to him. I've got my concession however and he can do nothing.'

The second visit of Mr. Kruger to Johannesburg was the famous one of 1890, when the collapse of the share market and the apparent failure of many of the mines left a thriftless and gambling community wholly ruined and half starving, unable to bear the burden which the State imposed, almost wholly unappreciative of the possibilities of the Main Reef, and ignorant of what to do to create an industry and restore prosperity. This, at least, the community did understand, that they were horribly overtaxed; that those things which might be their salvation, and are necessary conditions for industrial prosperity-railways, cheap living, consistent and fair government-were not theirs. The President visited Johannesburg with the object of giving the assurance that railways would be built. He addressed a crowd of many thousands of people from a platform at the Wanderers' Club pavilion. He did not conceal his suspicions of the people, and his attempts to conceal his dislike were transparent and instantly detected, the result being that there was no harmony between his Honour and the people of Johannesburg. Later in the evening the crowd, which had hourly become larger and more and more excited and dissatisfied, surrounded the house which the President was occupying, and, without desire to effect any violence, but by simple pressure of numbers, swept in the railings and pillars which enclosed the house. Most fortunately the Chief of Police had withdrawn all the Boer members of the force, and the crowd, to their surprise, were held back by Colonial, English, and Irish 'bobbies.' This was probably the only thing that prevented a very serious culmination. As it was, some excited individuals pulled down the Transvaal flag from the Government buildings, tore it in shreds and trampled it under foot. The incident should have been ignored under the exceptionally trying conditions of the time, but the Government determined to make much of it. Some arrests were effected, and men thrown into prison. Bail was refused; in fact, 'martyrs' were made, and the incident became indelibly stamped on the memory of both Boer and Uitlander. The President vowed that he would never visit the place again, and without doubt made use of his experience to consolidate the feeling of his burghers against the Uitlanders.

At a meeting of burghers several months after this incident, he referred to the agitation and constant complaining of the Uitlanders, and stated that they had only themselves to thank for all their troubles, and yet they would blame the Government. He then proceeded to entertain his hearers with one of the inevitable illustrations from life in the lower animal kingdom. 'They remind me,' said his Honour, 'of the old baboon that is chained up in my yard. When he burnt his tail in the Kaffir's fire the other day, he jumped round and bit me, and that just after I had been feeding him.' For five years Mr. Kruger was as good as his word. He would not even pass through Johannesburg when convenience suggested his doing so, but made circuits by road to avoid the place of detestation. It was on one of these visits to Krugersdorp, a township within the Witwatersrand Fields, twenty miles from Johannesburg, that the President, appreciating the fact that besides his beloved burghers there might, owing to the proximity of the fields, be some unregenerate aliens present, commenced his address as follows: 'Burghers, friends, thieves, murderers, newcomers, and others.' This was not ill-judged and laborious humour; it was said in absolute earnest. The references were repeated at various intervals in the address and here explained by allusions to the Scriptures and to the all-merciful God through Whom even the worst might hope to be redeemed, the inference clearly being that even the Uitlander, by the grace of God (and, no doubt, Mr. Kruger), might hope in time to approach the fitness of the burgher.

In the meantime another affair occurred, which revived much of the old feeling expressed at the time of the flag affair. War was declared against Malaboch, a native chief with a following of a few hundreds, who had, it was alleged, refused to pay his taxes. Such wars are of frequent occurrence in the Transvaal, the reasons assigned being usually some failure to pay taxes or to submit to the discipline of the native Commissioners. In this case British subjects were commandeered-that is, requisitioned to fight or to find in money or in kind some contribution to the carrying on of the war. It was felt that the position of the Republic did not warrant at that time a resort to commandeering, a measure which no doubt was necessary in the early days when the Republic had no cash; but with a declared surplus of about ￡1,000,000 in the Treasury, it was deemed to be an uncivilized and wholly unnecessary measure, and one capable of the grossest abuse, to permit men of inferior intelligence and training, and of no education, such as the Field-cornets are, to use their discretion in levying contributions upon individuals. The Uitlanders were especially sensible of the injustice done to them. They had been definitely refused all voice in the affairs of the State, and they already contributed nine-tenths of the revenue. They received in return an infinitesimal portion in the shape of civil administration and public works, and they were distinctly not in the humour to be placed at the mercy of Boer officials, who would undoubtedly mulct them and spare the burghers. Protests were made; and five of the men commandeered in Pretoria, having point-blank refused to comply with the orders, were placed under arrest. The High Commissioner, Sir Henry (now Lord) Loch, was appealed to, and, acting on instructions from the Imperial Government, immediately proceeded to Pretoria. The excitement was intense. In Johannesburg a number of men were prepared to make a dash on Pretoria to effect the forcible release of the prisoners, and had any steps been taken to enforce the commandeering law within the Witwatersrand district, without doubt a collision would have taken place. The supply of arms in the town was, it is true, wholly inadequate for any resistance to the Boers, but in the excitement of the time this was not considered.

Sir Henry Loch's visit had the effect of suspending all action; but the opinion in Pretoria was that should the High Commissioner proceed to Johannesburg there would be such an outburst of feeling that no one could foresee the results. Every effort was made to prevent him from going. Among other steps taken by the President was that of sending over for the President of the Chamber of Mines, Mr. Lionel Phillips, and requesting him, if he had the interests of the State and the welfare of the community at heart, to use his influence to dissuade the High Commissioner from visiting the town in its then excited state. Sir Henry Loch, in deference to the opinion expressed on all sides, agreed not to visit Johannesburg, but to receive deputations from Johannesburg people at his hotel in Pretoria. The High Commissioner's visit was successful. The Government agreed to absolve British subjects from the operation of the Commando Law; but the men who had been arrested and already sent under guard to the front were allowed to proceed and receive their discharge at the scene of war, and were compelled to find their own way back, receiving no consideration or compensation for the treatment to which they had been subjected. In this respect it is difficult to say that Sir Henry Loch achieved all that might have been expected from him. Possibly, to insist on more than he did would have left President Kruger no alternative but to refuse at all risks. The Volksraad being then in session, there may have been some diplomatic reasons for not pressing matters too hard.

A trivial incident occurred which once more excited bad party feeling. The High Commissioner was met at the railway-station by the President in his carriage. The enthusiastic crowd of British subjects shouldered aside the escorts provided by the Government, took the horses from the carriage, and drew it down to the hotel. In the course of the journey an individual mounted the box-seat of the carriage with the Union Jack fastened on a bamboo, and in the excitement of the moment allowed the folds of England's flag to gather round the President. His Honour rose very excitedly and struck at the flag with his walking-stick; but in blissful ignorance of what was going on behind him the standard-bearer continued to flip his Honour with the flag until the hotel was reached. There it was understood that the President would leave the carriage with the High Commissioner, and under this misapprehension those who had drawn the carriage down left their posts and joined the cheering crowd thronging round the hotel. The President was unfortunately left in the carriage with neither horses nor men to move him, and there he was obliged to wait until a number of burghers were called up, who drew his Honour off to his own house. The affair was wholly unpremeditated and almost unobserved at the time, but it was unfortunately construed by the President as a deliberate insult, and it increased, if possible, his dislike for the Uitlander.

The difficulty of dealing with a man of Mr. Kruger's nature and training was further illustrated by another occurrence in these negotiations. During a meeting between the President and the High Commissioner in the presence of their respective staffs the former became very excited and proceeded to speak his mind very openly to his friends, referring freely to certain matters which it was undesirable to mention in the presence of the British party. Mr. Ewald Esselen, the late State Attorney, wrote in Dutch in a very large round schoolboy hand, 'Be careful! There is an interpreter present,' and handed the slip of paper to the President. The latter stopped abruptly, looked at the slip of paper, first one way and then another, and after a long pause threw it on the table saying, 'Ewald, what does this mean? What do you write things to me for? Why don't you speak so that one can understand?'

Early in 1895 efforts were made by the Dutch officials in Johannesburg and a number of private individuals to induce the President to visit the place again, when it was thought that a better reception would be accorded him than that which he had experienced on his visit in 1890. Mr. Kruger steadily refused for some time, but was eventually persuaded to open in person the first agricultural show held on the Witwatersrand. Every precaution was taken to insure him a good welcome, or, at least, to avoid any of those signs which would indicate that Johannesburg likes President Kruger no more than he likes Johannesburg; and even those who were most conscious of the President's malign influence did all in their power to make the visit a success, believing themselves to be in duty bound to make any effort, even at the sacrifice of personal sympathies and opinions, to turn the current of feeling and to work for a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which unfortunately seemed to be thickening all round. The event passed off without a hitch. It would be too much to say that great enthusiasm prevailed; but, at least, a respectful, and at times even cordial, greeting was accorded to the President, and his address in the agricultural show grounds was particularly well received. The President returned to Pretoria that night and was asked what he thought of the affair: 'Did he not consider it an amende for what had happened five years before? And was he not convinced from personal observation that the people of Johannesburg were loyal, law-abiding, and respectful to the head of the Government under which they lived?' Mr. Kruger's reply in the vernacular is unprintable; but the polite equivalent is, 'Ugh! A pack of lick-spittles.' In spite of a subsequent promulgation it seems clear that there is no 'forget and forgive' in his Honour's attitude towards Johannesburg. The result of this interview became known and naturally created a very bad impression.

During his second term of office Mr. Kruger lost much of his personal popularity and influence with the Boers, and incurred bitter opposition on account of his policy of favouring members of his own clique, of granting concessions, and of cultivating the Hollander faction and allowing it to dominate the State.

Outside the Transvaal Mr. Kruger has the reputation of being free from the taint of corruption from which so many of his colleagues suffer. Yet within the Republic and among his own people one of the gravest of the charges levelled against him is that by his example and connivance he has made himself responsible for much of the plundering that goes on. There are numbers of cases in which the President's nearest relatives have been proved to be concerned in the most flagrant jobs, only to be screened by his influence; such cases, for instance, as that of the Vaal River Water Supply Concession, in which Mr. Kruger's son-in-law 'hawked' about for the highest bid the vote of the Executive Council on a matter which had not yet come before it, and, moreover, sold and duly delivered the aforesaid vote. There is the famous libel case in which Mr. Eugene Marais, the editor of the Dutch paper Land en Volk, successfully sustained his allegation that the President had defrauded the State by charging heavy travelling expenses for a certain trip on which he was actually the guest of the Cape Colonial Government.{12}

The party in opposition to President Kruger, with General Joubert at its head, might, for purposes of nomenclature, be called the Progressive Party. It was really led by Mr. Ewald Esselen, a highly-educated South African, born in the Cape Colony of German parentage, educated in Edinburgh, and practising as a barrister at the Pretoria Bar. Mr. Esselen was a medical student at the time of the Boer War of Independence, and having then as he still has enthusiastic Boer sympathies, volunteered for medical service during the war. He subsequently became attached to the President's staff, and finally, on completing his legal education, was appointed Judge of the High Court in the Transvaal. Relinquishing his seat on the Bench after some years of honourable service he returned to the Bar, and became an active factor in politics. Mr. Esselen, from being the closest personal adherent of Mr. Kruger, became for a time his most formidable opponent and his most dreaded critic. A campaign was organized for the presidential election and feeling ran extremely high. To such lengths, indeed, did the Boer partisans go that for some months the possibility of a resort to arms for the settlement of their differences was freely discussed by both parties. The election took place in 1893, and at the same time elections of members for the First Volksraad were in progress. Mr. Kruger made masterly use of his position in office and of his authority over the officials appointed during his régime, and for the time being he converted the Civil Service of the country into an election organization. Not even the enemies of the President will deny that he is both a practised diplomat and a determined fighter. By his energy, intrigue, personal influence, and intense determination, he not only compelled his party to the highest effort, but to a large extent broke the spirit of the opposition before the real struggle began. There are two stages in the Presidential election at which a fight can under certain circumstances be made. There were certainly two stages in this election. The first is at the polls; the second is in the Volksraad, when objections have to be lodged against candidates and a commission of investigation appointed, and the steps necessary for the installation of the new President have to be discussed. Mr. Kruger and his party took ample precautions. It has been stated openly and without contradiction, and is accepted in the Transvaal as an unquestionable fact, that at least three properly elected members of the Volksraad were 'jockeyed' out of their seats because they were known to have leanings towards General Joubert. A number of his supporters among the prominent officials of the Civil Service were disfranchised by the action of President Kruger because they had favoured his rival. In a country where the matters of Government have been so loosely conducted it is no doubt fairly easy to find flaws, and the President experienced no difficulty in establishing sufficient case against General Joubert's supporters to satisfy the persons appointed by him to investigate matters. On various pretexts newly-elected members were debarred from taking their seats. In one case, a strong supporter of General Joubert, who was returned by a majority of something like six to one, was kept out of his seat by the mere lodging of an objection by his opponent, the former representative of the constituency; there being a provision in the law that objections with regard to elections shall be heard by the Volksraad, and that, pending the return of a new member, the member last elected for the constituency shall continue to represent it. That the objection lodged in this case was ridiculous in the extreme had no bearing on the immediate result. The President, with admirable gravity, said, 'The law provides that all objections must be heard by the Volksraad, and that pending the decision the old member (a strenuous supporter of his Honour) shall retain his seat; and before all things we must support the law.' In the case of Mr. Esselen, who was elected member for Potchefstroom, the most flagrant abuses were proved to have been committed by the polling officer, the landdrost, dead and absent men having (according to him) rolled up freely to vote for the Krugerite candidate. Numbers of Mr. Esselen's supporters were disqualified on various pretexts, and the voting being conducted openly the moral suasion and close supervision of the official (Krugerite) party were very effective. Mr. Esselen was declared to have lost his seat by seven votes. Scrutinies were demanded and objections lodged, but without avail. The tactics above indicated were pursued in every case. The old Volksraad having been filled with Mr. Kruger's creatures, it was, of course, his interest to support the return of old members. He was thus enabled by the law above quoted to retain an old member in the Volksraad pending the decision in a case of dispute. Mr. Esselen's defeat was a crushing blow to the Joubert party, as the want of a leader in the House itself completely demoralized the General's followers. The election for President proceeded, and General Joubert was, without any doubt whatever, elected by a very considerable majority. The tactics already described were again followed, and the result was announced as: Kruger, 7,881; Joubert, 7,009. Objections were lodged by General Joubert, but, deprived of the services of Mr. Esselen in the First Raad, and overawed by the fierce determination of his opponent, the General, finding himself in for a struggle, lost heart as usual and collapsed.

The difference between the two men is remarkable. Mr. Kruger, to his credit be it said, has not the remotest conception of the meaning of fear, and would not know how to begin to give in. Mr. Joubert, 'Slim (sly) Piet,' as he is called, possessing a considerable share of the real Africander cunning, is yet no match for his rival in diplomacy, and has none of his grit and courage. In later years this has been proved a score of times, and it is, therefore, the more interesting to recall that at the time of the annexation General Joubert refused to compromise his principles by taking office under Shepstone, whilst Mr. Kruger was not so staunch; and both before and during the war General Joubert refused to accept less than what he considered to be his rights, and steadily and frequently proclaimed his readiness to fight whilst Mr. Kruger was diplomatizing.

The Commission appointed by the Raad to investigate matters was constituted chiefly of Mr. Kruger's supporters, and the result was a foregone conclusion. They confirmed the result of the election as declared; and Mr. Kruger, with the grim humour which upon occasions distinguishes him, seeing an opportunity for inexpensive magnanimity which would gratify himself and be approved by everyone-except the recipients-appointed the most prominent supporters of his rival in the Volksraad to be the official deputation to welcome the new President.

The President did not neglect those who had stood by him in his hour of need. Mr. Kock, landdrost and polling-officer of Potchefstroom, who had deserved well of his patron, if for nothing more than the overthrow of Mr. Esselen, was appointed member of the Executive to fill a position created purposely for him. The membership of the Executive is expressly defined by the Grondwet; but his Honour is not trammelled by such considerations. He created the position of Minute Keeper to the Executive with a handsome salary and a right to vote, and bestowed this upon his worthy henchman.

The Executive Council thus constituted consisted of six members; and here again the President contrived to kill two birds with one stone, the expression of his gratitude being by no means unprofitable. After so bitter a struggle and the resort to such extreme measures as he had been obliged to use, he anticipated no little opposition even within the inner circle, and, in any case, he as usual deemed it wise to provide against all contingencies. Dr. Leyds' vote he knew he could count on, the interests of the party which the State Secretary represents being such that they are obliged to work with Mr. Kruger. The appointment, therefore, of Mr. Kock gave his Honour one half of the Executive, and the casting-vote which pertains to his office turned the scale in his favour. Whatever, therefore, might be his troubles with the Volksraad when, by process of justice, reform, or death his adherents should be gradually removed from that Chamber, his position was, humanly speaking, assured in the Executive Council for the term of his office.

The opposition to Mr. Kock's appointment was extremely strong, culminating in the formulation of charges of theft against him by Mr. Eugene Marais, the spirited editor of the leading Dutch paper, Land en Volk. The charge alleged against Mr. Kock was that during his term of office as landdrost at Potchefstroom he had appropriated the telegraph-wires in order to fence his own farm. Feeling ran so high that it became necessary to hold an investigation. A trial in the ordinary courts was not permitted, but a Special Commissioner, one not qualified by legal experience or official position to preside in such a case, was selected. By a positively ludicrous exercise of discretion in the matter of admission of evidence Mr. Kock was cleared. Mr. Marais, nothing daunted, continued his exposures, challenging that action should be taken against himself for libel, and finally producing photographs taken by competent witnesses showing the corpus delicti in situ. The President and Mr. Kock were not to be drawn, however, and, secure in their newly-acquired positions, they declined the offer of battle and rested on their laurels.

For some time the Opposition, now called the Progressive Party, was completely demoralized, and it was not until the following year that individuals again endeavoured to give cohesion to the party. Appeals were made by them to prominent individuals and firms associated with the mining industry for financial support in the manner in which it is contributed in England for electioneering purposes. A determined and well-sustained effort was made to educate Boer opinion to better things, and to bring such influence to bear on the electorate as would result in the return of a better class of men to the Volksraad. Newspapers conducted with this end in view were circulated throughout the country, and when the elections for the Volksraad took place, specially qualified agents were sent to ascertain the feeling of the districts, and to work up an opposition to the existing methods of Government. In every case endeavours were made to select a popular resident within a district of more enlightened views and higher character than his fellows. A good many thousand pounds were contributed and expended for this purpose. Absolutely no stipulation was made by the contributors to this fund, except that the aim should be for honest and decent government. The funds were placed unreservedly in the hands of well-known and highly respected men who were themselves burghers of the State, and the Uitlanders laid themselves out for one more effort to effect the reforms by peaceful means and pressure from within the State. The elections came off and were regarded as a triumph for the Progressive Party, which it was alleged had secured some sixteen out of twenty-six seats in the First Volksraad, and a similar majority in the Second. Hope revived and confidence was restored among the Uitlanders, but old residents in the country who knew the Boer character warned the alien community not to expect too much, as it was a question yet to be decided how many of those who were Progressives at the time of the election would stand by their professions when brought face to face with the President and his party in battle array.

The warning was too well warranted. The Volksraad so constituted was the one which rejected with sullen incivility (to apply no harsher term) the petition of 40,000 Uitlanders for some measure of franchise reform. This Progressive Raad was also the one which passed the Bills curtailing the liberty of the press, and prohibiting the holding of public meetings and the organization of election committees, and which distinguished itself by an attempt to wrest from the High Court the decision of a matter still sub judice-the cyanide case.

In this case the mining industry had combined to test the validity of certain patents.{13} In spite of attempts at reasonable compromise on behalf of the mines, and these failing, in spite of every effort made to expedite the hearing of the case, the question continued to hang for some years, and in the meantime efforts were being made during two successive sessions of the Volksraad to obtain the passage of some measure which would practically secure to the holders of the patents a monopoly for the use of cyanide, or an indefeasible title to the patents, whether valid in law and properly acquired or not. These attempts to evade the issue were in themselves a disgrace to a civilized nation. Failing the obtaining of an absolute monopoly, an endeavour was made to pass a law that all patents held without dispute for a certain period should be unassailable on any grounds. There was a thin attempt at disguising the purpose of this measure, but so thin, that not even the originators could keep up the pretence, and the struggle was acknowledged to be one between the supporters of an independent court of justice and honest government on the one side, and a party of would-be concessionaires-one might say 'pirates'-on the other. The judges made no secret of their intention to tender their resignations should the measure pass; the President made no secret of his desire that it should pass. His party voted as one man in favour of it, and the coffee meetings on the Presidential stoep were unanimously for it. The Raad was exactly divided on the measure, and it was eventually lost by the casting-vote of the chairman. No absolute harm was done, but the revelation of the shameful conditions of affairs in a Raad of which so much good was expected did as much as anything could do to destroy all hope. It was a painful exhibition, and the sordid details which came to light, the unblushing attempts to levy blackmail on those who were threatened with pillage by would-be concessionaires, the shameless conduct of Raad members fighting as hirelings to impose a fresh burden on their own country, sickened the overburdened community.

The Bewaarplaatsen question also excited much discussion, but was not a subject of such close interest to the Uitlander community as others, for the reason that but few companies were directly concerned. Bewaarplaatsen is a name given to areas granted for the purpose of conservation of water, for depositing residues of crushed ore, etc.-in fact, they are grants of the surface rights of certain areas at a lower rate of license than that paid upon claim or mineral areas. This variation in the licensed areas was a wholly unnecessary complication of the gold law, the difference in cost being inconsiderable, and the difference in title affording untold possibilities of lawsuits. In some cases companies had taken out originally the more expensive claim-licenses for ground the surface only of which it was intended to use. They had been compelled, by order of the Government, to convert these claims at a later period into bewaarplaatsen. They were almost invariably situated on the south side of the Witwatersrand Main Reef, for the reason that, as the ground sloped to the south, the water was found there, the mills would naturally be erected there, and the inclination of the ground offered tempting facilities for the disposal of residues. After some years of development on the Main Reef it became clear that the banket beds, which were known to dip towards the south, became gradually flatter at the lower levels, and, consequently, it was clear that bodies of reef would be accessible vertically from areas south of the reef which had formerly been regarded as quite worthless as gold-bearing claims. The companies which owned these bewaarplaatsen now contended that they should be allowed to convert them into claims, as, by their enterprise, they had exploited the upper levels and revealed the conditions which made the bewaarplaatsen valuable. The companies had endeavoured to convert these bewaarplaatsen into claims when they first discovered that there was a possibility of their becoming valuable, and that at a time when the areas themselves were of extremely little market value to any except the holders of the surface rights. They were unsuccessful in this through some lack of provision in the law, and year after year the subject was fought out and postponed, the disputed ground all the time becoming more and more valuable, and consequently a greater prize for the concessionaire and pirate, and a greater incentive to bribery on all hands, until it came to be regarded by the worthy members of the Volksraad as something very like a special dispensation of Providence, intended to provide annuities for Volksraad members at the expense of the unfortunate owners. After a particularly fierce struggle, the Volksraad went so far as to decide that those companies which had been obliged to convert their original claim-holdings into bewaarplaatsen should be allowed to re-convert them to claims and to retain them. Even this was only gained after the Minister of Mines had, on his own responsibility, issued the claim licenses, and so forced the Volksraad to face the issue of confirming or reversing his action!

In this matter the President again fought tooth and nail against the industry, and most strenuous efforts were made by him and his party to obtain a reversal of the decision, but without effect. This, however, only disposed of a small portion of the ground at stake. With regard to those areas which had never been held as claims, the issue lay between two parties known respectively as the companies, who were the surface-owners, and the applicants. The applicants, according to the polite fiction, were those who, having no claim superior to that of any other individual member of the public, had happened to have priority in order of application. As a matter of fact, they were Government officials, political supporters and relatives of the President, financed and guided by two or three of the professional concession-hunters and hangers-on of Mr. Kruger's Government. Notwithstanding the existence of a law specifically prohibiting Government servants from concerning themselves in other business and speculations, the parties to this arrangement entered into notarial contracts determining the apportionment of the plunder, and undertaking to use their influence in every way with the President and his party and with members of the Volksraad to secure the granting of the rights in dispute to themselves. With them was associated the originator and holder of another infamous monopoly, and it was stated by him in the Chamber of Mines, that should they fail to obtain these rights for themselves they were prepared to co-operate with another party and force the Government to put them up for public auction, so that at any rate the mines should not have them. The object of this threat was to compel the mining companies to come to terms with him and compromise matters.

One of the notarial contracts referred to has been made public, and it contains the names of Mr. 'Koos' Smit, the Government Railway Commissioner, and one of the highest officials in the State; Landdrost Schutte, Chief Magistrate of Pretoria, and Mr. Hendrik Schoeman, one of the most prominent commandants in the Transvaal and a near relation of the President. Needless to say, all are members of the Kruger family party, and were most prominent supporters of his Honour at the time of the 1893 election. They claim that they were definitely promised a concession for the bewaarplaatsen as a reward for their services in this election. The precedent quoted on behalf of the companies in support of their claim is that of the brickmaker's license under the Gold Law. Brickmakers have privileges under their license similar to those granted with bewaarplaatsen, but in their case it is provided that should gold be discovered or be believed to exist in the areas granted under their licenses, the holder of the license shall have the right to convert his area into mining claims on complying with the ordinary provisions of the Gold Law. The companies urged that this reveals the intention of the law, and that such a condition was omitted in connection with bewaarplaatsen simply and solely through oversight, and because at that time it never occurred to anyone to suppose that the gold-bearing deposits would shelve off and be accessible at such great distances from the outcrop as where the bewaarplaatsen are located. The companies moreover pointed out that these areas were in every case located in the middle of property held under mining licenses, that they themselves owned the surface of the property and therefore no one else could work on them, that the areas were in themselves too small and too irregular in shape to be worked independently of the surrounding ground, and that the granting of them to others could not be justified by any right on the part of applicants, and would merely be placing in their hands the means of imposing on the owners of the surfaces and the adjacent claims an excessive purchase price or the alternative of being blocked in the development of their own ground. After the Second Raad had decided in principle in favour of the surface-holders, action was taken by the First Raad, and a change of front was effected by a measure alteration, which hung the question up for another year. Everyone realized that this was secured by the influence of the President in the first place and by the pliability of Raad members in the second, on the ground that the matter was too profitable to them personally to be disposed of until it became absolutely compulsory.{14}

One of the first concessions granted by the Boer Government after the restoration of the country to them was the liquor monopoly. Under this grant a factory established within a few miles of Pretoria has the sole right to distil spirits. Time and very considerable experience are in all countries necessary for the manufacture of good liquor, and the natural conditions are not more favourable to the industry in the Transvaal than elsewhere, consequently the product is not regarded with great favour. The enterprise, however, is a very prosperous one, being dependent almost entirely upon the sale of liquor to natives. For a number of years representations were made by the Chamber of Mines on behalf of the industry, by individuals and by public petitions, with the object of controlling the liquor trade and properly enforcing the laws which already existed. The following terse summary of the evils resulting from this sale of liquor is taken from the report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895. Unfortunately the remarks apply equally well to-day:

There is, indeed, no doubt that one of the greatest difficulties with which local employers have to deal is the question of the liquor trade. In very many cases the liquor supplied to the natives is of the vilest quality, quickly inflaming those who take it to madness, and causing the faction fights which sometimes have fatal results, and always lead to the, at any rate, temporary disablement of some of the combatants, and the damaging of property. Accidents, too, are often attributable to the effects of drink, and altogether, as stated in the resolutions, a large percentage of the deaths among the natives here is directly due to drink. In its bearing on the labour question, drink also plays an important part. The shortness in the supply, as compared with the demand for labour, has been accentuated by it. Where possible more natives are kept in the compounds than are actually required for the work to be done, to make allowance for those who are disabled by drink.

The granting of licenses to liquor houses was carried to such an extreme that at last the entire community rose against it, and the expression of opinion was so strong that the Government was compelled to make a show of deferring to it. Involved in the liquor question was the matter of police, and arising out of this, again, was the question of dealing with crime in general, including the gold and amalgam stealing that was known to be carried on on a considerable scale at the expense of the companies.

The Attorney-General, or State Attorney, as he is called in the Transvaal, is the responsible head of the Law Department, and until lately was the departmental head of the police. The gentleman then occupying the position of State Attorney was peculiarly unfit-in the midst of that world of unfitness-for the duties which he was supposed to perform. He was removed from office, and after considerable negotiation Mr. Esselen was prevailed upon at a great monetary sacrifice to accept the position of State Attorney, he stipulating that he should have a free hand in reorganizing the detective and police forces. During the months in which Mr. Esselen continued in office admirable reforms were introduced, and a very appreciable influence was exercised on the condition of affairs in Johannesburg. It is inadvisable to state explicitly the nature of the objections which existed against some of the officials employed under the former régime; it is sufficient that they were proved to be participators in the offences which they were specially employed to suppress. Mr. Esselen's first step was to appoint as chief detective an officer borrowed from the Cape Colonial Government, Mr. Andrew Trimble, who in a very little while showed that courage and honesty of purpose could not only effect considerable reforms, but could provoke the undisguised and fierce hostility of a very large section of the community. The canteen keepers were up in arms; the illicit gold buyers left no stone unturned; the hangers-on of the Government lost no opportunity in their campaign against Mr. Esselen and his subordinate and their reforms. The liveliest satisfaction however was expressed by all those whose interest it was to have matters conducted decently and honestly, and who had no interest in crime except so far as its suppression was concerned. Representation was secured for the Chamber of Mines upon one of the licensing bodies, and here, too, a very appreciable result followed. During Mr. Esselen's term of office all went well as far as the public were concerned, but influences were soon at work to undermine the two reforming officials. It was represented to the President that Mr. Trimble had once been in the British army; that he was even then a subject of the Queen, and entitled to a pension from the Cape Government. The canteen interest on the goldfields, playing upon the prejudices of the Boers, represented that this was unfitting the dignity of the Republic. The President, who was too shrewd to be caught with such chaff, was perfectly ready to support them for the sake of the liquor interest, which for him constitutes a very useful electioneering and political agency throughout the country. Mr. Esselen was sent for, and it was represented to him by the President that the employment of a British subject in such a responsible office as that of chief detective was repugnant to the burghers. The reply was that it was competent for the Executive to naturalize Mr. Trimble at once and so remove the objection, the Government having power in special cases to dispense with the conditions of the Naturalization Law-a power frequently exercised in the case of their Hollander friends. The President, in reply, stated that it could not be done, and he appealed to Mr. Esselen to select a man of another nationality-'a Frenchman, German, or even an American'-this last being a concession wrung from him by Mr. Esselen's soothing suggestion that the Chief of Police should be familiar with the language of the criminal classes. The hitch was maintained for some months, but finally the influences on the side of the President became too strong, and when it became clear that the many months of laborious work and self-sacrifice which had been given in the interests of reform were to be nullified by the appointment of a creature who would connive at every breach of the law, Mr. Esselen decided to stand or fall by his subordinate, the result being a triumph for the President.

In Mr. Esselen's place there was appointed as State Attorney Dr. Coster, a Hollander, who however declined to have anything to do with the organization of the police; and in Mr. Trimble's stead reappeared the individual whom he had superseded and whose services had been dispensed with.{15} The triumph of the back-door influences was again complete and the blow was a very nasty one to the mining industry.

Small wonder that at about this time the Uitlander community stopped all agitation, and that a mood of sullen opposition and discontent took its place. Hope was absolutely dead as abuse after abuse and scandal after scandal were showered upon them during the Session of 1895. Some of the acts of the Volksraad cut at the foundation of all security. In the early days of the Republic the Volksraad members had taken it upon themselves to reverse several of the decisions of the High Court, and in one case where the Government was being sued for the fulfilment of a contract the Volksraad had passed a resolution absolving the Government from certain terms of the contract. The decision of the Court, delivered by Chief Justice Kotzé, was to the effect that if the Volksraad should take a decision in conflict with an existing law, that law became ipso facto so far modified. In another case (the Dom's case) a resolution was passed disabling the aggrieved individual from taking action against the Government; in another, where the responsibility of the Government for the maintenance of roads had been indicated by a judgment for ￡1,000 damages, a law was passed in defiance of the conditions of the Grondwet, which stipulates for a period of notice and publication for proposed enactments, absolving the Government from all damages of this nature.

More than once laws were passed with retroactive effect-truly one of the grossest abuses possible for a civilized Government. But perhaps the most startling case of all was that concerning the proclamation of the farm Witfontein. This farm had been proclaimed a public digging open for pegging on a certain hour of a certain day. An unprecedented rush of peggers took place. The Government, fearing a riot and ignoring their obvious duty in the matter of police protection and the maintenance of order, issued an illegal notice withdrawing the proclamation, and decided to give out the claims by means of lottery. Numbers of prospectors pegged out claims notwithstanding this, and the prospect of legal difficulties being imminent the Government submitted a measure to the Volksraad, passed also in defiance of Grondwet provisions, which was broadly to the effect that all persons who considered that they had claims for damages against the Government in regard to the farm Witfontein and the proclamation thereof, had none, and that the Government was absolved from all liability in this respect. This enactment was only passed after several persons had signified their intention to sue the Government. The Raad was in fact becoming familiar with the process of tampering with the Grondwet and members appeared ready to act on the dictates of their own sweet will without regard to consequences or laws.

On several occasions the President and Executive had treated with contempt the decisions of the High Court, and had practically and publicly reversed them. There are many instances which it is not necessary to quote but among the best-known and most instructive ones are the two cases known as the 'Rachmann' and 'April' cases. Rachmann was an Indian and a British subject, well educated, far better educated indeed than the Boer of the country. In following a strayed horse he had trespassed on the farm of one of the members of the First Raad. He was arrested and charged with intent to steal, tried by the owner's brother, who was a Field-cornet (district justice), and sentenced to receive twenty-five lashes and to pay a fine, the same sentence being meted out to his Hottentot servant who accompanied him. Rachmann protested and noted an appeal, stating (which was the fact) that it was not within the power of a Field-cornet to inflict lashes, and at the same time he offered security to the value of ￡40 pending the appeal. His protests were disregarded and he was flogged. Not being a native in the sense in which the law uses the term-i.e., a member of the aboriginal races-he could plead that he was not within the jurisdiction of a Field-cornet, and there is no doubt that the punishment was inflicted with full knowledge of its illegality. Rachmann sued Mr. George Meyer, the Field-cornet in question, in the Circuit Court and obtained judgment and a considerable sum in damages, the presiding judge, Dr. Jorissen, animadverting with severity upon the conduct of the official. Meyer shortly afterwards obtained from Government the amount of his pecuniary loss through the affair, the President stating that he had acted in his official capacity and that they should protect him.

The 'April' case was one in which an unfortunate native named April, having worked for a number of years for a farmer on promise of certain payment in cattle and having completed his term, applied for payment and a permit to travel through the district. On some trivial pretext this was refused him, his cattle were seized, and himself and his wives and children forcibly retained in the service of the Boer. He appealed to the nearest official, Field-cornet Prinsloo, who acted in a particularly barbarous and unjustifiable manner, so that the Chief Justice before whom the case was heard (when April having enlisted the sympathy of some white people was enabled to make an appeal) characterized Prinsloo's conduct as brutal in the extreme and a flagrant abuse of power perpetrated with the aim of establishing slavery. Judgment was given against Prinsloo with all costs. Within a few days of this decision being arrived at the President addressing a meeting of burghers publicly announced that the Government had reimbursed Prinsloo, adding, 'Notwithstanding the judgment of the High Court, we consider Prinsloo to have been right.'

Actions of this kind have a distinct and very evil influence upon the supply of native labour. No attempt is made to supply the industry with natives, or to protect the natives whilst on their way to and from the mines. The position became so bad that the Chamber of Mines instituted a department with a highly-paid official at its head to organize supply. It would inadequately describe the position to say that the Government have rendered the Chamber of Mines no assistance. Indeed, it appears as though the officials in the country had of set purpose hindered in every way possible the work so necessary to the working of the industry on profitable lines. Agencies were established in all the neighbouring territories. Some of the tribes declined to work in the Transvaal on account of the risks of highway-robbery and personal violence which they ran en route. In one case an effort was made by certain mine-owners to meet the difficulty by importing a whole tribe-men, women, and children-from Basutoland and locating them upon an adjacent farm. There is however a law known as the Plakkerswet, or Squatters' Law, which, framed with that peculiar cunning for which the Transvaal Government have achieved a reputation, has the appearance of aiming at the improvement of the native labour supply whilst in effect it does the opposite. It provides that not more than five families may reside upon one farm, the 'family' being an adult male with or without women and children. Ostensibly the law purports to prevent the squatting together of natives in large numbers and in idleness. As a matter of fact however the law is not applied in the cases of Boer farmers. From the President downwards the Boers own farms on which hundreds of families are allowed to remain, paying their hut-taxes and contributing largely to the prosperity of the land-owner. In the case of the Uitlander however there seems to be a principle at stake, as the mine-owners above referred to found to their cost. No sooner had they located their tribe and provided them with all the conditions necessary to comfort than an official came down to them, Plakkerswet in hand, and removed all except the five allowed by law and distributed them among his friends and relations. The experiment has not been repeated.

Early in 1894 the Chamber of Mines received assurances from the Government that if they would prepare a Pass Law which would include provisions for the protection of natives, for the regulation of their relations with employers, and for their right to travel within the country, the Government would give their support to the measure and would endeavour to have it adopted by the Volksraad. The Commissioner for Native Affairs, General Joubert, admitted his inability to deal with so complex an affair, and gratefully accepted the aid of the Chamber. Such a concession on the part of the Government was regarded as highly satisfactory; the law was prepared, everything was explained and agreed to, the support of the Government was promised to the draft law, and it was anticipated that it would come into force during the Session of 1894. Such was not the case. It remained pigeon-holed throughout 1894 and 1895, and in the last days of the latter Session the law was passed; but an important omission occurred. The Government forgot to create the department to carry out the law, so that by the end of 1895 the men were no nearer having a workable law than ever. But reforms when introduced by the Transvaal Government, are not usually without an object, although not necessarily the declared one. An opportunity was here presented to the President to recognize past services, and he appointed to an office which required the highest intelligence experience character and zeal an individual who had been implicated in two disgraceful charges and who, having failed to clear himself had been dismissed his office by the Boer Government not two years previously. There was but one explanation forthcoming. The individual in question was a political supporter of the President and brother of a member of the Executive Council. No department has yet been created; but a chief has been appointed at a good salary, and the Pass Law has been proclaimed in one district of the Witwatersrand out of several; so that a measure which was designed to effect an immense saving in expense and convenience to the mining industry was by the appointment of an improper man and the neglect to organize a department rendered quite useless, and by partial promulgation it was made even detrimental.{16}

It has been aptly said of the Boers-and the present instance illustrates the truth of the remark-that reform with them seems to be impossible; because, in the first place, they do not know what to do; in the second place, if they did, they have not got the men to do it; and, in the third place, if they had the men, they show no conception of a duty higher than that of utilizing every opportunity for personal advantage.{17} To the uninitiated it may well be a puzzle that President Kruger should encourage a system aiming so directly at the strangling of an industry which is the mainstay of the country; but in order to appreciate his motives it is necessary to see things from his point of view. He and his party are not desirous of cheapening the cost of production. He does not aim at enabling the ever-increasing alien population to work lower-grade mines, and so double or treble the number of immigrants, even though it should profit the revenue of the country. A proposal was once made to proclaim as a public field the town lands of Pretoria-that is to say, to enable the public to prospect, and if results warranted, to open up mines on the lands-some thousands of acres in extent-surrounding the town. The President attended the debate in the Second Raad and violently opposed the measure. The appeal at the end of his address is perhaps as instructive as anything Mr. Kruger has said. 'Stop and think what you are doing,' he exclaimed, 'before you throw fresh fields open. Look at Johannesburg. See what a trouble and expense it is to us. We have enough gold and enough gold-seekers in the country already. For all you know there may be another Witwatersrand at your very feet.'

In January, 1891, the average wage for native labourers was ￡2 2s. per head per month. In 1893 it had risen to ￡2 18s. 10d., in 1895 to ￡3 3s. 6d. In other South African States wages rule from 15s. to 30s. per month, and the failure to facilitate the introduction of natives from outside and to protect them is largely responsible for the high figures paid on the Rand. Unquestionably the ill-will of the Boer Government is to blame for the consistent neglect of this growing need of the mines. If decent protection and facilities were given, the wage could be reduced to ￡1 15s. per month. The Government has it in its power to give the mines labour at this price, but, as a matter of fact, there is no desire to see the lower-grade mines working. A reduction of ￡1 a month-that is, to ￡2 3s. 6d.-would mean an annual saving of ￡650,000, and the main reason why nothing has been done to obtain this reduction is that President Kruger holds that the gold fields are already big enough and that their further extension would be a calamity.

Early in 1895 considerable suspicion and uneasiness were aroused by indications of the growth of the German policy. The commercial section of the community was disturbed by reports of secret arrangements favouring German importers. Facilities were given, and 'through rates' quoted from Hamburg to Johannesburg at a reduction which appeared to be greater than any economies in sea transport, coupled with the complete elimination of agency charges, would warrant. The formal opening of the Delagoa Bay Railway by the President furnished him with an opportunity to express with significant emphasis his friendliness for all things German. At a banquet given in honour of the German Emperor's birthday, January 27, 1895, the President, after eulogizing the old Emperor William, the present Emperor, and the loyalty of the Germans in the Transvaal, continued:

The latter I experienced once again at the time of the Kaffir War. One day three or four Germans came to me and said: 'We are indeed not naturalized, and are still subjects of our Emperor in Germany, but we enjoy the advantages of this country, and are ready to defend it in accordance with its laws. If your Excellency requires our services, we are willing to march out.' And they marched. That is the spirit which I admire. They were under the laws, they worked under the laws, they obeyed the laws, and they fell in war under the laws. All my subjects are not so minded. The English, for instance, although they behave themselves properly and are loyal to the State, always fall back upon England when it suits their purpose. Therefore I shall ever promote the interests of Germany, though it be but with the resources of a child, such as my land is considered. This child is now being trodden upon by one great Power, and the natural consequence is that it seeks protection from another. The time has come to knit ties of the closest friendship between Germany and the South African Republic-ties such as are natural between father and child.

The very considerable increase in the number of Germans, and the positive statement that a great many men of military training were coming out for service in the Transvaal, that officers were being employed to work up the artillery and to design forts, all tended to increase the feeling of intense dissatisfaction and uneasiness which culminated in the outbreak at the close of the year. Dr. Leyds, it was well known, went on a political mission to Lisbon and to Berlin, and it was stated that large sums had been withdrawn from the Treasury and charged to the secret service fund, the handling of which was entrusted to this gentleman. Dr. Leyds' personal popularity, never very great, was at the lowest possible ebb. He was regarded as the incarnation of Hollanderism-the 'head and front' of that detested influence. It was not credited to him in the Transvaal, as it has been elsewhere, that he designed or prompted the policy against the Uitlanders. There it is fully appreciated that there is but one man in it, and that man President Kruger. Dr. Leyds and others may be and are clever and willing tools. They may lend acidity or offensiveness to a hostile despatch, they may add a twist or two to a tortuous policy, but the policy is President Kruger's own, the methods are his own, all but the minor details. Much as the Hollander-German clique may profit by their alliance with Mr. Kruger, it is not to be believed that he is deceived. He regards them as handy instruments and ready agents. If they profit by the association, they do so at the expense of the accursed Uitlander; but there is no intention on Mr. Kruger's part to allow Germany or Holland to secure a permanent hold over the Republic, any more than he would allow England to increase hers. He has played off one against another with consummate skill.

Early in his official career Dr. Leyds was guilty of an indiscretion such as few would have suspected him of. Shortly after his appointment as Attorney-General he wrote to a friend in Holland, giving his opinion of the Members of the Executive. His judgment was sound; except of one man. Unfortunately for Dr. Leyds, he quarrelled with his correspondent; and the letter was of such a nature that, when published, it made extremely unpleasant reading. Generals Joubert and Smit, who had been described with admirable truth and candour, were so enraged that they demanded the instant dismissal of the 'conceited young popinjay' who had dared to criticise his masters. The President, however, who had been described as an ignorant, narrow-minded, pig-headed, and irascible old Boer whom-with the others thrown in-the writer could play with and twist round his finger as he chose, was not disturbed by the criticism. In reply to appeals for forgiveness on the score of youth, and in spite of the opposition of his colleagues, President Kruger agreed to retain Dr. Leyds in office, remarking that he was a capable young fellow and would know better in course of time, and explaining to him personally that he would keep him there just as long as it suited his (the President's) convenience. The association has lasted for ten years, so it is to be presumed that Dr. Leyds has changed his opinion of President Kruger, and frankly realized his position.

During the early part of 1896, when the question of the release on bail of the reform prisoners seemed to be of some moment, a well-known Pretoria man, friendly to the Government, called upon President Kruger and urged the advisability of allowing the prisoners out on bail, and with considerable lack of tact explained that it was well known that the President's humane nature inclined him to be lenient, but that the malign influence of others was believed to be swaying him in this matter. The old President jumped up in a huff and said, 'Ja, ja, ja! You always say it is somebody else! First, it was Jorissen who did everything; then it was Nellmapius; and then it was Leyds. Well, Jorissen is done for; Nellmapius is dead; Leyds is in Europe-who is it now?'

The President's opinion of himself may be commended as food for reflection to those who think they know everything about the inner workings of the Transvaal.

Dr. Leyds' reputation, unfavourable as it had been, was not improved by the Selati Railway exposure. Rightly or wrongly, in this matter, as in the jobs of the Netherlands Railway and several others of considerable magnitude, he has been held responsible in the public mind for the financial loss which the Republic sustained. When he left, ostensibly on a recruiting trip, few-very few-believed that the illness was a physical one. It is alleged that a gentleman on President Faure's staff, on hearing that Dr. Leyds had gone to Berlin to consult a physician, inquired what the ailment was? 'Mal de gorge,' was the reply. 'Ah,' said the officer, 'mal de gorge-diplomatique.' And that was the opinion in the Transvaal, albeit differently expressed.

It is impossible within the limits of this volume nor is it at all necessary to review all the measures which have been passed by the Volksraad and pressed by the Government unnecessarily burdening the Uitlanders and unjustifiably assailing their rights; such for instance as the Election Law, which made it a crime to form Committees or do any of those things which are regarded everywhere as part of the legitimate business of elections-thus leaving Mr. Kruger the sole master of electioneering machinery, namely, the Government officials. The Public Meetings Act was another monstrous infringement of rights. By it a policeman has the right to disperse any gathering of more than seven persons, if in his opinion it be desirable. Imagine it! Liberty of Speech against the Discretion of a Transvaal policeman! But the list would be long, and the tale monotonous. And as long and equally monotonous would be the list of the measures proposed or threatened, but fortunately not carried. However, the review of the period prior to 1896, and the statement of the causes leading to the outbreak, may fitly be brought to a close by the recital of some of the measures under both the above headings which grace the records of the Session of 1895.

As is well known, the Grondwet (the written constitution of the country) prescribes certain formalities for the introduction of new laws. In order to evade the law, and so avoid hostile criticism of proposed measures, in order, in fact, to prevent the public and even the Volksraad members from knowing and studying or explaining and digesting the intended legislation, it has become the practice of the Government to propose and rush through the most radical and important enactments in the form of amendments or explanations of existing laws. Prior to 1895 the Transfer Law imposed a tax of 4 per cent. upon the purchase-price of fixed property; and in the case of sales for shares a valuation of the property was made by the Government district officials, and transfer duty was paid on the amount of the valuation. This was universally done in the case of claims, which must of necessity in most instances be transferred several times before they become registered in the name of the company eventually working them. It was admitted that to pay 4 per cent. of full value on every transfer, or to pay 4 per cent. on the nominal value of ground on which years of work would have to be done and large sums of money expended before shareholders could reap one pennyworth of profit would be iniquitous. In 1895, however, the Raad thought otherwise, and amended the law by the insertion of the words 'in cash or shares' after the words 'purchase-price.' The result is, that owners who have acquired claims at great cost, who have paid licenses continuously on their claims, and who have paid full transfer duty on each nominal change of ownership, necessary to consolidation into workable blocks or groups, are now required to pay again in cash 4 per cent. on the total capital allotted in respect of these claims in the company formed to work them. Members of the Raad, in supporting this measure, did not hesitate to argue that it was a good law, because the burghers did not sell their farms for shares, but for cash, and it was right to tax those people who deal in shares.

The sense of insecurity which obtains during the Sessions of the Raad is due scarcely less to the threats which are not fulfilled and attempts which do not succeed, than to what is actually compassed. A direct tax on gold has more than once been threatened; concessions for cyanide, jam, bread, biscuits, and woollen fabrics were all attempted. The revival of an obsolete provision by which the Government can claim a royalty on the gold from 'mynpachts,' or mining leases, has been promised, and it is almost as much expected as it is dreaded.

With a monotony which is wearying, but which does not diminish the unfortunate Uitlanders' interest in the subject, the burden of every measure falls on the alien. One more instance will suffice. It illustrates the Hollander-Boer genius for fulfilling the letter and breaking the spirit of a covenant. It was notified that Government were about to introduce a war tax, and that this tax was to be one of ￡20 per farm, to be levied in event of war if in the opinion of the Government it should be necessary. Much surprise was felt that anything so unfavourable to the Boers as a tax on farms should be proposed. When the measure came on for discussion it was found to contain provisions exempting the owner who personally resided on his farm, and especially and definitely taxing those farms which are owned by companies, associations, corporations, or partnerships. The Boer, it is well known, takes no shares in companies, joins no associations, and has partnership with no one. This law was shelved in 1895, but has since been passed.{18} It is of a piece with the rest. Having sold his farm to the Uitlander, the Boer now proceeds to plunder him: and 'plunder' is not too strong a word when it is realized that the tax falls, not on the really valuable farms of the high veld, which are nearly all owned by individuals, and are all occupied, but on the undeveloped outlying farms, the rentable value of which would not on the average suffice to pay the tax! Indeed, one very large land-owner stated to the Government at the time, that if this law were passed and put in force, they might take all his rentals good and bad in lieu of the tax, as it would pay him better!

These were matters which more immediately concerned persons of certain means. There is another matter, however, which very directly concerned every individual who had any intention of remaining in the country; that is, the matter of education. A dead set had always been made by the Transvaal Government against any encouragement of liberal education which would involve the use or even recognition of the English language. Indeed, some of the legislators have been known to express the opinion that education was not by any means desirable, as it taught the rising generation to look with contempt on the hardy Voortrekkers; and an interesting debate is on record, in which members pointedly opposed the granting of facilities for the education of their own women-kind, on the ground that presently the women would be found reading books and newspapers instead of doing their work, and would soon get to know more than their fathers, husbands, and brothers, and would, as a consequence, quickly get out of hand. It did not seem to occur to these worthy gentlemen that the proper course would be to educate the men. But it would not be fair to take this view as the representative one. On the point of the English language, however, and the refusal to give any facilities for the education of Uitlander children, the Boer legislature is practically unanimous. The appalling consequences of allowing the young population to grow up in absolute ignorance were realized by the people of Johannesburg, and efforts were constantly made to induce the Government to recognize the evil that was growing in the State. The efforts were so entirely unsuccessful that the Uitlanders found in this as in other cases that nothing would be done unless they did it for themselves. A fund was opened, to which very liberal donations were made. The services of a Director-General were secured, and an Educational Council was elected. A comprehensive scheme of education-in the first place for the Rand district, but intended to be extended ultimately for the benefit of the whole of the Uitlander population in the Transvaal-was devised, and it was calculated that in the course of a few years a fund of close upon half a million of money would be required, and would be raised, in order to place educational facilities within the reach of the people. Needless to say, this did not at all square with the policy of the Transvaal Government, and the scheme was looked upon with the utmost disfavour. In order to defeat it, the Superintendent-General of Education, Dr. Mansvelt, a Hollander, who for six years had degraded his high office to the level of a political engine, felt himself called upon to do something-something to trail the red herring across the too hot scent; and he intimated that more liberal measures would be introduced during the Session of 1895, and in his report proposed certain amendments to the existing law, which would (in appearance, but, alas! not in fact) improve the condition of the Uitlander. The following letter appearing in the London Times, on October 3, 1896, although dealing with a period some months later than that under review, explains the position with authority and clearness-a position which has not been materially altered, except for the worse, during Dr. Mansvelt's régime. It will be noted that the last-named gentleman coupled with his 'liberal' provisions the suggestion that all schools, except those of the State, should be suppressed. Such a suggestion reveals very clearly the aim of this 'Reform' measure.

SIR,

I trust you will allow me a little space with a view to enable me to correct, by the application of a little wholesome fact, the erroneous impression which has been created in England with reference to the education of Uitlanders in the Transvaal by recent crude and ill-considered expressions of opinion, notably by Mr. Reginald Statham and Mr. Chamberlain.

Mr. ----, in a letter addressed to one of your contemporaries, informed the British public that in view of a liberal Government grant of ￡4 per head per annum, the Transvaal Uitlander had nothing to complain of in respect to education. As Mr. ---- claims to be completely informed on Transvaal politics, he can only have been guilty of a deliberate, if not malicious suppressio veri when he omitted to say that, like most of the legislation of this country, which has for its ostensible object the amelioration of the condition of the Uitlander, this measure, which looks like munificence at first sight, has been rendered practically inoperative by the conditions which hedge it round. Take, for example, a school of 100 children. Strike out ten as being under age, ten as having been too short a time at school, twenty as suspected of being of Dutch parentage. Out of the sixty that remain suppose fifty satisfy the inspector in the Dutch language and history, and you have as your allowance for the year ￡200-a sum which is insufficient to pay the Dutch teacher employed to bring the children up to the required standard in that language. It is small wonder, then, that most teachers prefer to dispense with this Will-o'-the-wisp grant altogether, seeing that the efforts of some to earn it have resulted in pecuniary loss. The actual sum expended on Uitlander schools last year amounted to ￡650, or 1s. 10d. a head out of a total expenditure for education of ￡63,000, the expenditure per Dutch child amounting to ￡8 6s. 1d.

Mr. Chamberlain considers the new educational law for Johannesburg as a subject for gratulation. I should have thought that his recent dealings with Pretoria would have suggested to him as a statesman that felicitations upon the passing of a vague and absolutely undefined measure might possibly be a little too premature. A Volksraad, which only rejected the forcible closing of private schools by a majority of two votes, is hardly likely to give the Executive carte blanche to deal with Uitlander education without some understanding, tacit or declared, as to how this power is to be wielded. Be that as it may, nearly two months have elapsed since the passing of a measure which was to come into operation at once, and nothing has been done. In the meantime, we can learn from the inspired press and other sources that English schools which desire aid under the new law must be prepared to give instruction in Standard V. and upwards, and entirely in the Dutch language. So far, the Superintendent of Education, whether acting under instructions or on his own initiative, has been absolutely immovable on this point, and the much-vaunted law promises to be as much a dead letter as the 1s. 10d. grant. The Johannesburg Council of Education has exerted its influence to secure such an interpretation of the new law as would lead to the establishment of schools where Dutch and English children might sit side by side, and so work towards establishing a bond of sympathy and the eventual blending of the races. The Pretoria authorities however refuse to entertain the idea of meeting the Uitlander in a conciliatory spirit on anything like equal terms, but will only treat with us on the footing of master and servant. A curious and almost inexplicable feature of the situation is the fact that hundreds of Boers are clamouring for the better instruction of their children in English, but which is steadfastly refused them.

I might enlarge on what I have written, and point out the injustice and the gross system of extortion practised by the Government in making Johannesburg pay something like ￡7 per head for the education of Dutch children, whilst it has to pay from ￡5 to ￡15 per annum for the education of each child of its own, meanwhile leaving hundreds growing up in the blackest ignorance and crime. Any comment would, however, lay me open to the charge of bias and partisanship, and I therefore confine myself to the simple statement of a few facts, which I challenge anyone to controvert, leaving the reader to draw his own conclusions.

I am, sir, yours, etc.,

JOHN ROBINSON,

Director-General Johannesburg

Educational Council.

Imagine it! ￡650 used for the children of those who contributed nine-tenths of the ￡63,000 spent on education!

The succession of flagrant jobs, the revelation of abuses unsuspected, the point-blank refusal to effect any reasonable reforms had filled the Uitlanders' cup perilously full, and during the latter half of 1895 the prospect of any change for the better, except at the cost of fighting, was generally realized to be very poor indeed.

Trouble came to South Africa with the end of 1895. It very nearly came earlier. Mention has been made that the Netherlands Railway Company practically dictates the relations of the Transvaal with the other States in South Africa by means of its tariffs. The competition between the Cape, Natal and Delagoa lines having become very keen, and the Cape service by superior management and easier gradients having secured the largest share of the carrying trade, attempts were made to effect a different division of profits. Negotiations failed to bring the various parties to terms, and owing to the policy of the Netherlands Railway Company, the Cape Colony and Free State, whose interests were common, were in spirit very hostile to the Transvaal, and bitterly resentful of the policy whereby a foreign corporation was aided to profit enormously to the detriment of the sister South African States. After all that the Colonial and Free State Dutch had done for their Transvaal brethren in days of stress and adversity, it was felt to be base ingratitude to hinder their trade and tax their products.

The Cape Colony-Free State line ends at the Vaal River. Thence all goods are carried over the Netherlands Railway Company's section to Johannesburg, a distance of about fifty miles. In order to handicap the southern line, an excessive rate was imposed for carriage on this section. Even at the present time the tariff is 8-1/2d. per ton per mile, as against a rate of about 3d. with which the other two lines are favoured. Notwithstanding this, however, and the obstructions placed in the way by obnoxious regulations and deliberate blocking of the line with loaded trucks at Vereeniging, and also the blocking of Johannesburg stations by non-delivery of goods-measures which resulted sometimes in a delay of months in delivery, and sometimes in the destruction or loss of the goods-the Southern line more than held its own. The block was overcome by off-loading goods at the Vaal River and transporting them to Johannesburg by mule and ox waggons.

Mr. Kruger and his Hollander friends were almost beaten when the President played his last card. He intimated his intention to close the Vaal River drifts against over-sea goods, and, by thus preventing the use of waggons, to force all traffic on to his railways upon his terms; and as the threat did not bring the Colony and Free State to the proper frame of mind, he closed them. This was a flagrant breach of the London Convention, and as such it was reported by the High Commissioner to Mr. Chamberlain, and imperial intervention was asked. Mr. Chamberlain replied that it was a matter most closely affecting the Colony, and he required, before dealing with it, to have the assurance of the Colonial Government that, in the event of war resulting, the cost of the campaign would be borne, share and share alike, by the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and that the latter would transport troops over their lines free of charge. Such was the indignation in the Colony at the treatment accorded it that the terms were at once agreed to-a truly significant fact when it is realized that the Ministry undertaking this responsibility had been put and was maintained in office by the Dutch party, and included in its members the best and most pronounced Africander representatives. But Mr. Kruger is not easily 'cornered.' His unfailing instinct told him that business was meant when he received Mr. Chamberlain's ultimatum to open the drifts. The President 'climbed down' and opened them! He has several advantages which other leaders of men have not, and among them is that of having little or no pride. He will bluster and bluff and bully when occasion seems to warrant it; but when his judgment warns him that he has gone as far as he prudently can, he will alter his tactics as promptly and dispassionately as one changes one's coat to suit the varying conditions of the weather. Mr. Kruger climbed down! It did not worry him, nor did he take shame that he had failed. He climbed down, as he had done before in the Stellaland affair, the Banjailand trek, the commandeering incident, and as he no doubt will do in others; for he may bluff hard, but it will take a great deal to make him fight. There is one matter upon which Mr. Kruger's judgment is perfect: he can judge the 'breaking strain' to a nicety. He climbs down, but he is not beaten; for as surely as the dammed stream will seek its outlet, so surely will the old Dutchman pursue his settled aim.

War is war, and always bad; but sometimes worse; for the cause is still a mighty factor, as those may see who contrast the probable effects upon the people of South Africa of war on the drifts question with the actual results of the Jameson raid.

Footnotes for Chapter II

{04} Among the first notes which poor Colley-brave, wise, generous, and unlucky-wrote after taking office, was one containing these words: 'Whether I ... shall find that South Africa is to me, as it is said to be in general, "the grave of all good reputations," remains to be seen.'

{05} See Appendix A for the full text of the Pretoria Convention.

{06} In February, 1898, he was elected for the fourth time.

{07} For full text of London Convention, see Appendix B. (July, 1899). A very extensive correspondence has passed on the subject of the suzerainty. The Transvaal Government now construe the omission of the Preamble to the 1881 Convention as the result of an agreement to abolish the suzerainty. Mr. Chamberlain points out that the London Convention contains specific and not implied amendments of the Pretoria Convention; that the direct request for abolition of the suzerainty was refused by Lord Derby; that the preamble as the fundamental declaration must be deemed to be in force; and that if not, the same reason which is adduced against the continued existence of the suzerainty would hold good against the independence of the Transvaal, for in the preamble of the 1881 Convention alone is any mention made of either the grant or the reservation.

{08} Written August, 1896.

{09} To those who are not familiar with the conditions of the country, it will seem incredible that the legislative body could be 'fooled' on such a subject. The extracts from the newspaper reports of the Raad's proceedings, printed in Appendix D of this volume, will help them to understand and believe.

{10} The above has been brought up to date for publication, July, 1899.

{11} Except on the goldfields, where the appointments are made by Government.

{12} For Volksraad records on this subject see Appendix C.

{13} The decision of the High Court was given in November, 1896, in favour of the combined companies on all points, and the patents were thus declared to be invalid!

{14} During the session of '96 the Volksraad decided to put the bewaarplaatsen up for public auction, the proceeds of the sale to be divided equally between the Government and the original owners of the farms on which the bewaarplaatsen had been granted. The alleged reason for this decision is that the areas in question are immensely valuable, and the State and the owners should profit by them, whilst the companies should be afforded an opportunity of acquiring them at a fair price. The real reason is that the companies had refused to be blackmailed further; and the 'defence' funds not being forthcoming, the gentlemen of the back-stairs had introduced the ingenious arrangement safeguarding the original owners' rights, having previously 'arranged' with the same owners. The excuse that the areas are too valuable to be given away to the companies is as illogical and ridiculous as the excuse that the Uitlanders are too numerous to justify the granting of the franchise now. When the questions were first raised there were neither great values nor large numbers in existence. They were questions of principle and justice; and the fact that 'values' and 'numbers' have grown during the years of struggle in no way justifies the course taken, but rather shows very clearly the magnitude of the injustice done during the years of unjustifiable denial.

This decision shows with admirable clearness how the Uitlander fares at the hands of the Government. There were, in the last stage of the affair, four parties concerned: the Government, who are by law expressly debarred from selling claims (except in case of overdue licenses), and are obliged to allot them for the consideration of specified license fees only; the owners of the farms, who are similarly debarred and are compensated in other ways for the throwing open of their farms; the 'applicants,' who have been described elsewhere; and the surface-owners, the mining companies, who were in possession. Only one of these parties had the slenderest claim to compensation-namely, the companies, who must inevitably be disturbed in the possession of the surface by allowing others to work on or under it. But they get nothing; whilst the Government and the 'owner' (both of whom had years before derived the fullest profit allowed by law from these areas in the form of licenses), and the 'applicants' (who have allied themselves with the 'owners'), divide as compensation the proceeds of the auction!

{15} (July, 1899.) This individual has been again removed-this time by the present State Attorney, Mr. Smuts.

{16} (July, 1899.) Provision was made for the costs of this department by doubling the pass fee. In the early days of Johannesburg as soon as it became evident that hospital accommodation was necessary, application was made to the Government for a site (which was granted on the hill then outside the town), and for some monetary assistance. A fund was also publicly subscribed and the hospital built. For the maintenance of the hospital two plans were adopted: one, the collection of funds once a year, i.e., Hospital Saturday, a source which has yielded steadily between ￡2,000 and ￡3,000; two, having in view the immense number of native cases which required treatment and the extent to which a native is responsible for unsanitary conditions, it was proposed to impose upon them a fee of 1s. per month for their passes, the proceeds of this to be devoted entirely to the hospital. For several years this continued to yield sufficient for the purpose. The Transvaal Government, although accepting the plan proposed by the Uitlanders and for a considerable time carrying it out faithfully, did not establish the right permanently but adopted the formality of voting the proceeds of the pass-fee year by year. There came a year when the Raad in its wisdom decided that this source of revenue was too precarious for so worthy an object as the hospital, and they decided to vote instead an annual subsidy of ￡30,000. It was then known that the fees of the past year had amounted to over ￡40,000 and there was every prospect of steady annual increase. This explains why a seemingly generous subsidy by the Government does not meet with that hearty recognition to which it is apparently entitled. When a Pass Department was proposed, the Government inquired how it was suggested to maintain it. The Chamber of Mines proposed to raise the pass fee from 1s. to 2s. per month, the extra shilling to be devoted entirely to the administration of the Pass Law. With the experience of the hospital shilling in mind particular care was taken to have the agreement minuted and confirmed in writing. Nevertheless, it transpired in the evidence given at the Industrial Commission that the department was being run at a cost of slightly over ￡12,000 a year, whilst the proceeds of the shilling reached the respectable total of ￡150,000 a year. The Government, therefore, by a breach of agreement, make ￡138,000 a year out of the pass fund, and ￡120,000 a year out of the hospital fund; and the mining industry suffers in the meantime through maladministration in the department, and are doubly taxed in the sense that the companies have been obliged to establish and maintain at their own cost other hospitals all along the reef. It is not suggested that the companies should not provide hospitals, the point is that having established a fund, which although nominally paid by the natives really has to be made up to them in wages, they were entitled to the benefit of that fund.

{17} The story is told of two up-country Boers who applied to the President for appointments, and received the reply, 'What can I do for you? All the important offices are filled, and you are not educated enough to be clerks!'

{18} (July, 1899.) The law has been declared by the law officers of the Crown to be a breach of the London Convention.

Having failed in their constitutional attempts to secure a reasonable voice in the government, or any redress of their grievances, there came the time when men's thoughts naturally turned to the last expedient-force. Up to and so late as the Volksraad Session of 1895 a constitutional agitation for rights had been carried on by the Transvaal National Union, a body representing the unenfranchised portion of the population.

Of its members but few belonged to the class of wealthy mine and land owners: they had so far abstained from taking any part in a political organization which was viewed with dislike and suspicion by the Government and the great majority of the Boers. It has been asserted by a few Progressive members of the Raad that many of the Boers were themselves opposed to the policy adopted towards the newcomers; but, whilst this may be to some extent true, it is more than questionable whether any of the burghers were willing to concede a share in the power of government, although it is certain that great numbers would not have taken active steps against the Uitlanders but for the invasion by a foreign force. Any extending of the franchise means to the great majority of the Boers a proportionate loss of independence.

When the matter of the Independence of the Republic is discussed it must not be forgotten that independence conveys something to the Boers which is radically different from what it means to anyone else. That the State should continue for ever to be independent and prosperous-a true republic-would be mockery heaped on injury if the absolute domination by the Boer party should cease; and when the parrot-like cry of 'The Independence of the State is threatened' is raised again and again à propos of the most trivial measures and incidents, this idea is the one that prompts it. Instances innumerable could be quoted seemingly illustrating the Boer legislators' inability to distinguish between simple measures of reform and justice, and measures aimed at undermining the State's stability and independence. It is not stupidity! It is that the Boer realizes at least one of the inevitable consequences of reform-that the ignorant and incapable must go under. Reform is the death-knell of his oligarchy, and therefore a danger to the independence of the State-as he sees it. Until the European people who have lately become so deeply concerned in Transvaal affairs realize how widely divergent are the two interpretations of 'Independence,' they will not have begun to understand the Transvaal Question.

The National Union did not represent any particular class in the Uitlander community. It was formed of men drawn from all classes who felt that the conditions of life were becoming intolerable, and that something would have to be done by the community to bring about reforms which the legislature showed no signs of voluntarily introducing.

When it is said that it consisted of men drawn from all classes, the qualification should be made that the richer classes, that is to say, the capitalists of the country, were very meagrely if at all represented. Many efforts had been made to enlist the sympathies of the capitalists, and to draw them into the movement, but the 'big firms,' as they were styled, for a very long time refused to take any part whatever, preferring to abstain entirely rather than associate themselves with a definite agitation. They pleaded, and no doubt fairly, that in case of failure they with their vested interests would be the ones to suffer, while in the event of success they would not benefit in a greater degree than the individuals who had little or no material stake. One by one however they were drawn into the political movement to the extent of supplying funds for carrying on the reform agitation, or of giving monetary support to those who were stimulating and organizing the Progressive party among the Boers. There can be no doubt that prior to 1895 the wealthier men without exception refused to consider the possibility of violent measures. It was only when they realized that the Boer party were determinedly hostile-organizing very large encroachments upon the privileges of the Uitlanders and designing fresh burdens to be borne by them-and when it became clear that the dangers threatening as a result of their own supine attitude were worse than any disfavour with which they might be viewed on account of political action, that they began to take an active part with others in the agitation for reform. It was not until the Volksraad in the Session of 1895 revealed their real policy and their fixed determination to effect no reform that men began to talk of the possibility of revolutionary measures becoming necessary. The subject once mooted was frequently discussed, and once discussed became familiar; and the thing which a few months before had been regarded as out of the bounds of possibility came to be looked upon as a very probable contingency. The extraordinary boom in shares, land, and all kinds of property, which lasted throughout the year, no doubt operated against the maturing of this feeling, but it nevertheless continued to grow. The most dissatisfied section of the Rand was, naturally enough, that one which included the South African Uitlander. These men, born in South Africa, or having spent the best years of their lives there, felt extremely bitter against the Boer Government, and were moved by feelings which were not in any way connected with considerations of material gain. With them were closely associated men of all nationalities who had determined to make their homes in the Transvaal, and these formed the class which has been disparagingly referred to as 'the political element,' but which the experience of every country shows to be the backbone of a nation. They were in fact the men who meant to have a hand in the future of South Africa. After them came the much larger class whose interest in the reforms was based mainly upon the fact that they suffered from the abuses and over-taxation of the Government.

For several years a very strong feeling against the capitalists had ruled in Johannesburg. Men who thoroughly knew the Boer had prophesied and continued throughout to prophesy that absolutely nothing would be done to improve the conditions, and that the capitalists might as well throw in their lot with the general public early in the day as be forced to do so later, after spending their thousands in fruitless efforts for reform, and after committing themselves to a policy which would be regarded as selfish, pusillanimous, and foolish. The moneyed men no doubt occupied a very prominent and powerful position. They were constantly besought by the Reform leaders to side with them; they were looked to by the Progressive Party in the Boer camp to aid reform by peaceful measures only, to exercise all their influence towards preventing rash or violent measures being taken by the more excited party, and to trust to time and patience to achieve those results which they were all honestly desirous of bringing about; and they were approached, as has been stated, by the President and his party when moments of danger arrived, and when it was felt that their influence could be used towards the preservation of peace,-as witness the Loch incident.

'It is no crime to be a capitalist,' said one commentator on the late events, and neither is it necessary to attribute to this section of the community motives of patriotism to justify their association with the Reform movement. It is not intended to suggest that the men who did associate themselves eventually with it were not moved by any higher consideration than that of protecting their interests-in many cases a far larger view than this was taken; but it may be asked,-assuming that the capitalists were not moved by higher considerations,-What is there in their position which should debar them from endeavouring to introduce the reforms which would benefit them only equally with every other honest man in the community?

Most of the wealthy houses in the Transvaal are either offshoots of or have supporting connections with firms in England or on the Continent. Between them and their principals much correspondence had taken place on the political situation. As far as these houses were concerned, it was impossible for them to enter upon any movement without the consent of their European associates. For this reason the Reform movement, as it eventually took place, has in some ways the appearance of and has very frequently been stigmatized as an organization planned and promoted outside the Transvaal. The fact is that Mr. Alfred Beit, of the firm of Wernher, Beit and Co., London, and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, managing director of the Consolidated Goldfields, may be regarded as the chiefs to whom the ultimate decision as to whether it was necessary from the capitalistic point of view to resort to extreme measures was necessarily left. Each of these gentlemen controls in person and through his business associates many millions of money invested in the Transvaal; each of them was, of course, a heavy sufferer under the existing conditions affecting the mining industry, and each, as a business man, must have been desirous of reform in the administration. Mr. Beit acted in concert with Mr. Lionel Phillips, of H. Eckstein and Co., the Johannesburg representatives of Wernher, Beit and Co. Mr. Rhodes was represented by his brother, Colonel Francis Rhodes, and Mr. J.H. Hammond, of the Consolidated Goldfields Company in Johannesburg. Mr. George Farrar, another very large mine-owner, who joined a little later than the others, with the gentlemen above named, may be considered to have represented the capitalist element in the earlier stages of the Reform movement. The other elements were represented by Mr. Charles Leonard, the chairman of the National Union, and one or two other prominent members of that body.

It is impossible to say with whom the idea of the movement, including the arrangement with Dr. Jameson, originated. Perhaps it germinated when Dr. Jameson read the life of Clive! Probably it was the result of discussion, and no one man's idea. At any rate arms and ammunition were purchased, and arrangements were made by which they should be smuggled into the country concealed in machinery or gold-mining appliances. During the month of November Messrs. Leonard and Phillips went to Capetown to see Mr. Rhodes, in order to assure themselves finally as to the course which was to be pursued. The position of Mr. Rhodes in the matter was recognised by them to be a difficult one. Whilst as the managing director of the Consolidated Goldfields he had as much right as any other man interested in the Transvaal would have to concern himself in a movement of this nature, his right to act in his capacity of managing director of the Chartered Company would depend entirely on the nature of the part which he professed to play; but his position as Prime Minister of the Colony made the already difficult position much more complicated. Realizing this, Messrs. Leonard and Phillips acting on behalf of the others determined to have a perfectly clear understanding and to ascertain from Mr. Rhodes definitely what were his objects in associating himself with the movement. The matter was discussed at Mr. Rhodes' house, and the report given by the two deputies to their colleagues on their return was that Mr. Rhodes frankly admitted that he had two objects in view: one was to obtain an amelioration of the conditions such as he was entitled to claim as representing an enormous amount of capital invested in the Transvaal; the other object is best described by Mr. Leonard. 'We read to him,' said that gentleman when reporting to his comrades the result of his visit, 'the draft of our declaration of rights. He was leaning against the mantelpiece smoking a cigarette, and when it came to that part of the document in which we refer to Free Trade in South African products he turned round suddenly, and said: "That is what I want. That is all I ask of you. The rest will come in time. We must have a beginning, and that will be the beginning. If you people get your rights, the Customs Union, Railway Convention, and other things will all come in time." He then added that we must take our own time about this movement, and that he would keep Jameson on the frontier as long as it was necessary as a moral support, and also to come to our assistance should we get ourselves into a tight place. We asked him how he hoped to recoup himself for his share of the expense in keeping Jameson's force on the border, which should be borne by us jointly. He said that seeing the extent of his interests in the country, he would be amply repaid by the improvement in the conditions which it was intended to effect.'

It has since been suggested that the object of the movement was to 'steal the country' and to annex it to Rhodesia, in order to rehabilitate the Chartered Company. The suggestion is too ludicrous for serious discussion. It must be obvious to anyone that the persons most concerned in the movement, and whose interests lay in the Rand, would be the very last to consent to any such scheme. There appears to be no conceivable basis upon which such an arrangement could have been entered into, and it is quite clear that no sensible business man having interests in a rich country in a comparatively advanced state of development would consent to share that certainty with a new country such as Rhodesia, the value of which, however promising, has still to be proved. Notwithstanding the ludicrous nature of the charge, it is quite certain that the Boers have a deep-rooted conviction of its truth.

The arrangements with Dr. Jameson were made with him in person. During the month of September he visited Johannesburg, and it was then agreed that he should maintain a force of some 1,500 mounted men fully equipped, a number of Maxims, and some field artillery; that he was, in addition to this, to have with him 1,500 spare rifles and a quantity of spare ammunition; and that about 5,000 rifles, three Maxim guns, and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition were to be smuggled into Johannesburg. It was calculated that in the town itself there would be, perhaps, 1,000 rifles privately owned. Thus, in the event of a junction of forces being effected, Johannesburg would be able to command about 9,000 armed men, with a fair equipment of machine-guns and cannon. Nor was this all, for on the original plan it was intended to seize the fort and magazines at Pretoria. And circumstances favoured the plans of the Johannesburg men. The surrounding wall of the fort, a mere barrack, had been removed on one side in order to effect some additions; there were only about 100 men stationed there, and all except half a dozen could be counted on as being asleep after 9 p.m. There never was a simpler sensational task in the world than that of seizing the Pretoria fort-fifty men could have done it. But there was more to be done than the mere taking. In the fort there were known to be some 10,000 rifles, ten or twelve field-pieces, and 12,000,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition; and it was designed to seize the fort and the railway on the night of the outbreak and, by means of one or two trains, to carry off as much of the material as possible and destroy the rest.

Association with Dr. Jameson as the leader of an invading force is the one portion of their programme which the Reform leaders find it extremely difficult to justify. As long as the movement was confined to the Uitlanders resident in the Transvaal the sympathy of South Africa and indeed of the world was with them. It was the alliance with the foreign invader which forfeited that sympathy. That the eventual intention of the Reformers was only to call upon Dr. Jameson in case they found themselves attacked by and unable to cope with the Boers is a fact, but it is only fair to Dr. Jameson to note that this was a modification of the original arrangement by which both forces were to act simultaneously and in concert,-when the signal should be given from Johannesburg.

On the occasion of Dr. Jameson's second visit to Johannesburg, towards the end of November, the following letter of invitation was written and handed to him:

To Dr. Jameson.

JOHANNESBURG.{19}

DEAR SIR,

The position of matters in this State has become so critical that we are assured that at no distant period there will be a conflict between the Government and the Uitlander population. It is scarcely necessary for us to recapitulate what is now matter of history; suffice it to say that the position of thousands of Englishmen and others is rapidly becoming intolerable. Not satisfied with making the Uitlander population pay virtually the whole of the revenue of the country while denying them representation, the policy of the Government has been steadily to encroach upon the liberty of the subject, and to undermine the security for property to such an extent as to cause a very deep-seated sense of discontent and danger. A foreign corporation of Hollanders is to a considerable extent controlling our destinies, and in conjunction with the Boer leaders endeavouring to cast them in a mould which is wholly foreign to the genius of the people. Every public act betrays the most positive hostility, not only to everything English, but to the neighbouring States.

Well in short the internal policy of the Government is such as to have roused into antagonism to it, not only practically the whole body of Uitlanders but a large number of the Boers; while its external policy has exasperated the neighbouring States, causing the possibility of great danger to the peace and independence of this Republic. Public feeling is in a condition of smouldering discontent. All the petitions of the people have been refused with a greater or less degree of contempt; and in the debate on the Franchise petition, signed by nearly 40,000 people, one member challenged the Uitlanders to fight for the rights they asked for, and not a single member spoke against him. Not to go into details, we may say that the Government has called into existence all the elements necessary for armed conflict. The one desire of the people here is for fair play, the maintenance of their independence, and the preservation of those public liberties without which life is not worth living. The Government denies these things, and violates the national sense of Englishmen at every turn.

What we have to consider is, What will be the condition of things here in the event of a conflict? Thousands of unarmed men, women and children of our race will be at the mercy of well-armed Boers, while property of enormous value will be in the greatest peril. We cannot contemplate the future without the gravest apprehensions. All feel that we are justified in taking any steps to prevent the shedding of blood, and to insure the protection of our rights.

It is under these circumstances that we feel constrained to call upon you to come to our aid,{20} should a disturbance arise here. The circumstances are so extreme that we cannot but believe that you and the men under you will not fail to come to the rescue of people who will be so situated. We guarantee any expense that may reasonably be incurred by you in helping us, and ask you to believe that nothing but the sternest necessity has prompted this appeal.

CHARLES LEONARD.

LIONEL PHILLIPS.

FRANCIS RHODES.

JOHN HAYS HAMMOND.

GEORGE FARRAR.

The letter was drafted by Mr. Charles Leonard, and was signed then by four out of the five signatories, the fifth signature being added some weeks later in Cape Town. It was not dated, and was to be used only privately and in case of necessity for the purpose of excusing Dr. Jameson to the directors of the Chartered Company and the Imperial authorities in the course which it was intended to take.

Various plans were discussed, and even dates were provisionally arranged. The first arrangement agreed to was that Dr. Jameson should start two days before the intended outbreak in Johannesburg. This was agreed to for the time being, but subsequent discussion convinced the leaders that there were the gravest objections to such a course, and it was therefore decided that Dr. Jameson should be notified to start from his camp on the same night as the outbreak in Johannesburg. The dates of December 28 and January 4 were in turn provisionally decided upon, but the primary condition of these arrangements was that under no circumstances should Dr. Jameson move without receiving the word from the Johannesburg party.

With reference to the question of going out to meet Dr. Jameson or giving him assistance, the only thing that was discussed was that an officers' patrol should be sent out to meet him, to escort him to his camp. There was no doubt entertained as to the ability of Dr. Jameson and the force which it was believed he would command to come in without assistance or the arrangement would never have been made. The idea of the association with him was, of course, that he should assist the Reformers-not they assist him; and the proposal regarding the officers' patrol was one to which he only consented after scouting the notion of any co-operation.

During the weeks which followed the conclusion of the arrangement considerable dissatisfaction was felt at the very slow progress made in obtaining arms. The number originally agreed to was deemed to be sufficient but no more; and when it was first found that it would not be possible to obtain this number but that a few hundreds less would have to be accepted, doubts were freely expressed as to the wisdom of proceeding until a sufficient supply had been obtained. When on two subsequent occasions it was again notified that still a few hundred less would have to be accepted, some members of the Reform Party were very emphatic in their objections to proceeding any further until they should be satisfied that the undertakings upon the strength of which they had entered upon the arrangement would be faithfully adhered to. On the occasion of Dr. Jameson's last visit it had been extracted from him that instead of 1,500 men he would probably start with from 800 to 1,000. These discrepancies and alterations caused the liveliest dissatisfaction in the minds of those who realized that they were entering upon a very serious undertaking; but although the equipment seemed poor, reliance was always placed on the taking of Pretoria Fort. That at any rate was a certainty, and it would settle the whole thing without a blow; for Johannesburg would have everything, and the Boers would have rifles, but neither ammunition nor field-guns. Without doubt the Pretoria arsenal was the key of the position, and it is admitted by Boer and alien alike that it lay there unguarded, ready to be picked up, and that nothing in the world could have saved it-except what did!

On or about December 19, Messrs. Woolls-Sampson and A. Bailey, two Johannesburg men concerned in the movement, who had been in communication with Mr. Rhodes and others in Cape Town, arrived in Johannesburg, and indicated clearly that the question as to which flag was to be raised was either deemed to be a relatively unimportant one or one concerning which some of the parties had not clearly and honestly expressed their intentions. In simple truth, it appeared to be the case that Dr. Jameson either thought that the Johannesburg reformers were quite indifferent on the subject of the flag, or assumed that the provisions for the maintenance of the Transvaal flag were merely talk, and that the Union Jack would be hoisted at once. Nothing was further from the truth. The Reform Party in Johannesburg included men to whom the Union Jack is as dear as their own heart's blood, but it also included many others to whom that flag does not appeal-men of other nationalities and other associations and other sympathies. It included-perhaps the strongest element of all-those men whose sympathies were naturally and most strongly all for British rule, which they believed to be the best in the world, but whose judgment showed them that to proclaim that rule would be to defeat the very objects they honestly had in view, and who would have regarded the change of flag at the last moment as an unprincipled deception of those comrades who had been induced to co-operate for reform and not for annexation. It had been repeatedly and emphatically stated that the object was not to deprive the Boer of his independence or the State of its autonomy, but to alter the system of government in such a way as, first to obtain betterment of the economic conditions which affect everyone, and afterwards to induce a policy more in accordance with the general South African sentiment-in fact to get the Transvaal into line with the other South African States, in the same way for instance as the Free State had shown itself disposed to go. It is but poor work explaining failure, yet it must surely be permissible that something should be said for those who alone have had no hearing yet. And it is in the minds of the Reformers that the professions of their 'real intentions' regarding the flag made by Dr. Jameson and Mr. Rhodes might appropriately have been made before the raid, instead of afterwards when all was over. The regard for definite pledges, which in the Reformers was described as merely an excuse for backing out, would, if it had been observed by all, have made a sickening fiasco impossible.

No sooner had a doubt been raised on the subject of the flag than a trusted emissary was despatched to inquire from Mr. Rhodes the meaning of this tampering with one of the fundamental conditions of the agreement. The messenger returned on Christmas morning, and at a largely-attended meeting of the ringleaders stated that he had seen Mr. Rhodes, and had received from him the assurance that it was all right about the flag: no question or doubt had been raised on the subject. In returning to Capetown however in company with Dr. Rutherfoord Harris, he learned from that gentleman that it was by no means all right, and gathered that it was assumed that the provision about maintaining the Transvaal flag was so much talk necessary to secure the adhesion of some doubtful people. The announcement was received with the gravest dissatisfaction. Several of the leading men stated emphatically that nothing would induce them to take part in the movement unless the original arrangement was loyally adhered to. In consequence of this it was resolved to despatch Messrs. Charles Leonard and F.H. Hamilton to see Mr. Rhodes and to obtain from him a definite guarantee that in the event of their availing themselves of Dr. Jameson's help under any conditions the latter would abide by the arrangements agreed upon.

It was then thought that a week would be sufficient time in which to clear up the flag question and complete preparations. It was decided to call a big public meeting for the night of Monday, January 6, not with the intention of holding the meeting, but as a blind to cover the simultaneous rising in Johannesburg and seizing of the arsenal in Pretoria on the night of Saturday, January 4. With this in mind it was arranged to publish, in the form of a manifesto,{21} the address which Mr. Charles Leonard had prepared for the meeting.

Among the Reformers there had always been a considerable section who regarded the alliance or arrangement with Dr. Jameson as a very doubtful advantage. It was this section which strongly and successfully opposed the suggestion that he should start before an actual outbreak. The difference of opinion was not such as to cause division in the ranks, but yet sufficient to keep alive discussion as to how the common aim could be achieved without risk of the complications which external aid in the initial stages would be sure to cause. To this feeling of doubt was added a sense of distrust when Dr. Jameson's importunity and impatience became known; and when the question of the flag was raised there were few, if any, among those concerned in the movement who did not feel that the tail was trying to wag the dog. The feeling was so strong that many were prepared to abandon the whole scheme and start de novo rather than continue an undertaking in which it looked as though they were being fooled. Hence the despatch of Messrs. Leonard and Hamilton on Christmas Day.

Confidence in their power to control Dr. Jameson and direct the movement, as they considered they had the right and ability to do, had been so shaken in the reformers that as soon as Messrs. Leonard and Hamilton had been sent they began to discuss a complete change of plans, and awaited only the reply from Capetown before taking the first steps in the prosecution of the new programme. The plan most favoured was that the importation and distribution of arms should be continued as speedily and as secretly as possible, that, instead of an invading force, as many armed and trained men as could be obtained should be brought in, nominally as mechanics or men seeking employment on the mines, that the public meeting called for January 6 should be held and made as large and demonstrative as possible, and a demand made to the Volksraad to grant the redress of the grievances complained of, and, failing reasonable concessions, that they should rise in arms and at the same time appeal to England, as the paramount Power, or to the other South African Governments, to mediate and so avert civil war. It was believed, and with much reason, that the Boers, knowing, as they then inevitably would, that a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition had been smuggled in, and knowing also that the sentiment of South Africa, including the Free State, was all in favour of considerable concessions to the Uitlanders, would have hesitated to take the initiative against Johannesburg, and would either have yielded to the pressure of the general South African opinion and have accepted the mediation of the High Commissioner, or would have offered considerable reforms. The Kruger party, it was well known, would proceed to any extreme rather than concede anything to the Uitlanders; but at that time the majority of the Boers were opposed to the Kruger policy of favouring the Hollanders and Germans to the exclusion of all other Uitlanders, and this majority would not have consented to measures calculated to embroil them with the people who had made their country prosperous, and even to imperil the very existence of the State, whilst an alternative course so easy as the one presented lay open to them.

On the day following the despatch of Messrs. Leonard and Hamilton to Capetown it was decided to send messengers to Dr. Jameson to emphatically prohibit any movement on his part, also to explain to him the position of affairs in Johannesburg with reference to the flag, and above all to impress upon him the condition of unpreparedness. Major Heany was sent by train via Kimberley, and in order to facilitate his travelling a telegram was sent to Mr. Rhodes in Capetown asking him to arrange for a special train, and acquainting him with the purpose of the trip. Captain Holden was sent on horseback across country to Pitsani. Both gentlemen carried the most definite instructions to Dr. Jameson on no account to move. Both gentlemen have since stated that they delivered the messages in word and in spirit absolutely as they were given to them in Johannesburg, and that they carried no private messages whatever from any individual member of the Committee in any way conflicting with the purport of the official message with which they were charged.

On the Thursday, Friday, and Saturday telegrams and messages were received from Dr. Jameson, all revealing impatience and a desire if not an intention to disregard the wishes of the Johannesburg people. Replies were sent to him and to the Capetown agents protesting against the tone adopted, urging him to desist from the endeavour to rush the Johannesburg people as they were pushing matters on to the best of their ability and hoped for a successful issue without recourse to violent measures, and stating emphatically that the decision must be left entirely in the hands of Johannesburg as agreed, otherwise there would be certain disaster. Besides what would be regarded as the official expressions and messages of the Johannesburg people, several individual members of the party telegraphed to Dr. Jameson informing him of the position and adding their personal advice and testimony. The probability of achieving success without firing a shot was referred to in the sense of a most satisfactory prospect. It did not occur to any one among the Johannesburg party that it was this prospect that moved Dr. Jameson to start. That idea is of later birth.

On Sunday morning, at about ten o'clock, two telegrams of importance were received. The first was from Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard, to the following effect: 'We have received perfectly satisfactory assurance from Cecil Rhodes, but a misunderstanding undoubtedly exists elsewhere. In our opinion, continue preparations, but carefully, and without any sort of hurry, as entirely fresh departure will be necessary. In view of changed condition Jameson has been advised accordingly.' Portions of this message were in code. It left Capetown at 2.20 p.m. on Saturday, the 28th, and was received on Sunday at about ten o'clock. The second telegram was one from Dr. Jameson to his brother, Mr. S.W. Jameson, and had been despatched at about the same time. It was in the Bedford-McNeil Code, and was much mutilated-so much so that it was thought to have been purposely done in the telegraph office in order to obscure the meaning. One expression was clear, however, and that was: 'I shall start without fail to-morrow night.' It concluded with the words: 'Inform Dr. Wolff-distant cutting. He will understand.'

The words 'distant cutting' did not occur in any code-book. Dr. Jameson states that they were words privately agreed upon between him and Dr. Wolff. The telegram was shown to Dr. Wolff as soon as he could be found, but he declared himself unable to throw any light whatever upon it. It was however clear from the message that on Saturday afternoon it had been Dr. Jameson's intention to disregard the wishes of the Committee, and to start on Sunday night, and the telegram impressed the recipients more than ever with the wisdom of their action in sending the messengers to Capetown and to Pitsani to insist upon no further steps being taken. It is of little consequence what the words 'distant cutting' really meant, or whether they were, or should have been, understood by any of the parties. Major Heany and Captain Holden, it was known, could not have reached Dr. Jameson at the time the message was despatched, and therefore no more importance was attached to this than to the other impatient telegrams.

It was assumed that, on receiving the emphatic messages sent through Major Heany and Captain Holden, Dr. Jameson would realize the seriousness of the position, and would, in fact, abide by the arrangements made with him. Nor was this all. It was also clear that the telegram of Mr. Rhodes to which it was inferred reference was made in the concluding words of Messrs. Hamilton's and Leonard's wire-'Jameson has been advised accordingly'-could not have reached Dr. Jameson at the time his telegram to his brother was despatched. It was part of the instructions to Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard that any communications which they might desire to make to Dr. Jameson should pass through Mr. Cecil Rhodes in order to ensure due regard being paid to them. There was therefore no doubt in the minds of the Johannesburg men that during Saturday afternoon-that is to say, more than twenty-four hours before he proposed moving-he must have received a wire forbidding him to move.

The facts here given were sufficient to warrant the belief that all that was necessary had been done to prevent any movement. But more reassuring than all precautions was the conviction that Dr. Jameson, no matter how much he might 'bluff' in order to force immediate action, would never be guilty of so gross a breach of faith as to start in defiance of the wishes of the Johannesburg people. Extreme dissatisfaction of course prevailed in the minds of a good many when they learned of the efforts made by him to force their hands, and this feeling was intensified by the report brought in by Dr. Wolff, who had just returned from seeing Dr. Jameson at Pitsani. Dr. Wolff had arrived at Pitsani on the previous Tuesday, and was then greeted by Dr. Jameson with the remark that he had 'as nearly as possible started for Pretoria last night.' It was felt that this might appear to be a very fine and dashing thing for a party of men well armed and trained and able to take care of themselves, but that it betrayed great indifference to his pledges, as well as to the fate of his associates, who as he knew perfectly well had not even the arms to defend themselves from the consequences of any precipitate action on his part, and who had moreover the responsibility for the control and protection of unarmed Johannesburg.

The feeling among the Reformers on Sunday, the 29th, was one of considerable relief at having found out in time the intention of their reckless colleague, and at having taken the necessary steps to control him. Secure in the belief that the messages from Capetown had duly reached Dr. Jameson, and that either Major Heany or Captain Holden had by that time also reached him, and that in the future the management of their affairs would be left in their own hands, they continued during Sunday and Monday, the 29th and 30th, to arrange plans on the basis before indicated, awaiting in the meantime further communications from Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard.

In the meanwhile it became generally known in Johannesburg that some movement was afoot, and suppressed excitement and expectancy became everywhere manifest. On Saturday, December 28, the President returned from his annual tour through certain of the outlying districts. On his journey he was met by a number of burghers at Bronkhorst Spruit, the scene of the battle in the War of Independence, about twenty miles from Pretoria. One of the burghers, an old Boer named Hans Botha, who was the opponent of Mr. Woolls-Sampson in the 'duel' at the battle of Zwartkoppies, in addressing the President, said that he had heard that there was some talk of a rising in Johannesburg, and added that although he had many bullets in him (It is stated that he still has five!), he could find room for more if it was a question of tackling the Britishers. The President replied that he had heard of the threatened rising, and did not believe it: he could not say what was likely to happen, but they must remember this-if they wanted to kill a tortoise they must wait until he put his head out of the shell.

In an interview with a representative of the press immediately after this the President said that the position was full of gravity and might lead to disagreeable consequences, especially to the mining industry and commercial enterprise generally; but he was still confident that common-sense would prevail in Johannesburg, and expressed the conviction that the law-abiding portion of the community, which included the greater part of the English and other nationalities, would support all measures for the preservation of law and order. He said that his endeavours hitherto to secure concessions for the Uitlander population had been frustrated by the public utterances and actions of irresponsible and unscrupulous agitators whose methods had often a detrimental effect on the Volksraad and on the burghers throughout the Republic. The first commotion created was by the flag incident some years before (1890), which caused a great shock to confidence; another sinister incident was the refusal of a portion of the British community to serve their adopted country in the Malaboch War, when the union of Boer and Briton against the common enemy was nearly brought about. 'If wiser counsels unfortunately should not prevail,' the President continued, 'then let the storm arise, and the wind thereof will separate the chaff from the grain. The Government will give every opportunity for free speech and free ventilation of grievances, but it is fully prepared to put a stop to any movement made for the upsetting of law and order.'

On the same day the President was interviewed by a deputation of Americans from Johannesburg. They were men of the highest position and influence in the community and were earnestly desirous of securing reforms, but they were impressed with the idea that peaceful means had not yet been exhausted and that the President and his Executive would listen to reason if they were convinced that serious consequences would follow the neglect to reform. The President received them civilly, as he often does when he has a strong hand to play: it is generally when his cards are poor that he gives way to the paroxysms of rage and indulges in the personal abuse and violent behaviour which have earned for him so unenviable a reputation. He listened to all that had been advanced by the deputation, and then said that 'it was no time to talk when danger was at hand. That was the time for action.' The deputation represented to him that there was no danger at hand unless the President by his own act precipitated matters and caused the trouble himself, that matters were completely in his hands, and that if he would deal with the people in a liberal and statesmanlike way and grant the reforms which were universally acknowledged to be necessary there would not be anywhere in the world a more law-abiding and loyal community than that of Johannesburg. The President answered merely by the question: 'If a crisis should occur, on which side shall I find the Americans?' The answer was, 'On the side of liberty and good government.' The President replied, 'You are all alike, tarred with the same brush; you are British in your hearts.'

In reply to another deputation, representing a section of the community which was not by any means at one with the reformers, but the leading members of which still urged the necessity for reforms, the President said, 'Either you are with me in the last extremity or you are with the enemy; choose which course you will adopt. Call a meeting to repudiate the Manifesto in its entirety, or there is final rupture between us.' The gentlemen addressed declared emphatically that on the Manifesto there could be no retreat. On that Johannesburg was absolutely at one. The President replied, 'Then, I shall know how to deal with Johannesburg,' and left the room.

The various business associations of Johannesburg and Pretoria approached the President at different hours in these threatening times, and did all that was possible to induce him to make reasonable concessions. Although numbers of his followers and counsellors were strongly in favour of doing something to avert the coming storm, the President himself seemed inclined to fight until the last ditch was reached rather than concede anything. In reply to the Mercantile Association he said that he was quite willing to give the franchise, but that it would be to those who were really worthy of it-those for instance who rallied round the Government in this crisis and took no part in the mischievous agitation and clamouring for so-called reforms: all malcontents should be excluded. In fact he made it perfectly plain that the franchise would be treated as a huge bribery fund; and he himself was introducing the thin end of the wedge in the suggestion made to the Association with a view to splitting up the Reform Party in Johannesburg. He however added that the special duties on food-stuffs would be immediately removed pending confirmation by the Volksraad, that equal subsidies would be granted to Dutch and English schools alike, and that the Netherlands Railway Company would be approached with a view to having the tariffs reduced. The effect of this was however slightly marred by the concluding sentence in which he stated that 'as he had kept his former promises, so he would do his best to keep this.'

In reply to a second deputation of Americans, the President in a moment of irritation said that it was impossible to grant the franchise to the Uitlander-American, British, or other; he would lose his power if he did; the Government would no longer be his. A member of the deputation said, 'Surely, if we take the oath of allegiance, you will trust us?' The President hesitated for a moment, and then said, 'This is no time to talk about these things; I can promise you nothing.'

Footnotes for Chapter III

{19} The date of 20th December, 1895, was filled in by Dr. Jameson when he decided to start and to publish the letter.

{20} When this letter was published by Dr. Jameson and cabled to the London Times the sense of it was very gravely-but doubtless unintentionally-altered by terminating this sentence with the word 'aid' and carrying the remaining words into the next sentence.

(July, 1899.) At the Westminster inquiry it transpired that on December 20 Mr. Rhodes instructed Dr. Harris to wire for a copy of the letter. Dr. Jameson forwarded it after filling in that day's date. On December 30, Dr. Harris, again acting on Mr. Rhodes' instructions, telegraphed the letter to the Times, having altered the date to 28th, and prefaced it with the statement that the letter had been 'sent on Saturday (28) to Dr. Jameson, Mafeking.'

{21} See Appendix I. for the full text of Manifesto.