New York Times Current History: The European War from the Beginning to March 1915, Vol 1, No. 2

In a public speech, delivered Sept. 19, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lloyd George, according to the report of The Westminster Gazette, which may be considered as his organ, characterized the quarrel between Germany and Russia in the picturesque manner which this statesman prefers, as follows:

GERMANY-I insist that you stand aside with crossed arms while Austria strangles your little brother, (Servia.)

RUSSIA-Just you touch this little fellow and I will tear your ramshackle empire limb from limb.

We will not waste words in considering the flippant form here used in a discussion of an unspeakably bloody and world-historic conflict. But this expression in very pregnant form makes Russia appear in the light in which the London powers-that-be desire to show the empire of the Czar to the British people, viz., in the role of the noble-hearted protector of persecuted innocence, while Germany, supporting and egging on Austria-Hungary, is shown as morally responsible for the war.

Cites English Documents.

This, also, is the chain of thought in the speech of the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons on Aug. 4. Translations of this speech have been spread by the British Government in neutral countries in hundreds of thousands of copies under the title: "The Power Responsible for War Is Germany."

Now, we claim that the British "White Paper" itself furnishes irrefutable proof that not Germany, which up to the last moment offered the hand of mediation, but Russia is responsible for the war, and that the Foreign Office at London was fully cognizant of this fact.

Furthermore, the "White Paper" shows that England's claim that she entered this war solely as a protector of the small nations is a fable.

STATE COUNCILLOR SAZONOF

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Photo (C) by American Press Assn.)

The documents reproduced in the "White Paper" do not begin until July 20, and only a few introductory dispatches before the 24th are given. The first of the very important reports of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, to the Secretary of State, Grey, is dated on that day; on the same day the note addressed by Austria-Hungary to the Servian Government had been brought to the knowledge of the European Cabinets, and the British Ambassador conferred with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof, over this matter. The French Minister also took part in this conference. When the latter and M. Sazonof, in the most insistent way, tried to prove to Buchanan that England, together with Russia and France, must assume a threatening attitude toward Austria-Hungary and Germany, the British Ambassador replied:

I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.-(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

The British Ambassador thereupon asked the question whether Russia was thinking of eventually declaring war on Austria. The following was the answer:

M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question....

The dispatch continues:

French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continue to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of his Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments.... (British "White Paper" No. 6.)

This shows plainly that the Russian mobilization must have been planned even before July 24, for otherwise M. Sazonof could not have spoken of the necessity of carrying it through.

It is furthermore very remarkable that the Russian Minister on this early day spoke of the mobilization in general and not of the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary.

Finally we find that the British Government was fully informed at the very latest on July 24-it may have had before it previous documents, but they are not contained in the "White Paper"-concerning Russian mobilization and thereby the development of Russian and French politics that had to be anticipated.

Russian Aggression.

Had there been any doubts concerning these matters on the part of the British Government, the continual urging of Russian and French diplomatists must have made things plain. Russia's aggressive policy, and not the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, which did not come until five days later, led to the European war. Servia meant so little to England, although England traditionally poses as a protector of small nations, that the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg was able to describe England's interest in the kingdom on the Save as "nil." Only later, after the beginning of the war, England warmed up to Servia, and in the aforementioned speech Mr. Lloyd George found the most hearty tones in speaking of the heroic fight of this "little nation," although he was obliged to admit simultaneously that its' history is not untainted.

On the day following that conversation, on July 25, the British Ambassador had another talk with M. Sasonof, during the course of which he felt obliged to express to the Russian Government a serious warning concerning its mobilization.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your influence in favor of peace his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions and she would take no action until it was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now rivers of blood would flow and we would in the end be dragged into war....

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs and warned him that if Russia mobilized Germany would not be content with mere mobilization or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once! His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.-(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

A more convincing contradiction of the claim that Germany fell upon unexpectant Russia can hardly be imagined. Sazonof's conversation with the British Ambassador shows that Russia had decided from the beginning to bring about the war, unless Austria would subject itself to Russia's dictation.

Now, Russia was not alone concerned about Servia, but from its viewpoint Austria-Hungary must not maintain the preponderant position in the Balkans.

Sure of French help, Russia was determined to work against this. The reports of the British representative do not suggest with a word that Germany was responsible for the war; on the contrary, Sir Buchanan again, on his own account, warned the Russian Government to keep aloof from military measures, in his conversation with M. Sazonof on July 27, although the "White Paper" does not show that he had received any instructions by Sir Edward Grey.

His Excellency must not, if our efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.-(British "White Paper," No, 44.)

Just as its own Ambassador in Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor:

... but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the South, he thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia would be entirely responsible.-(British "White Paper" No. 71.)

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated:

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France.-(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

The British Government has added a few further publications to its "White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated Sept. 1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg. In this report it is stated:

(Retranslated.) M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna] on July 28th attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying on with M. Sazonof and which appeared very promising. Count Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30th, although Russia then had already started partial mobilization against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most courteous manner and gave his consent to continuation of the pour parleurs.... On Aug. 1st M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Servia which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of Servia.... Unfortunately these pour parleurs in St. Petersburg and Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany on July 31 stepped between the two with its double ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris.... A delay of a few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the greatest wars in history.

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence. These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear. The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna Fremdenblatt of Sept. 25, 1914. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, are mentioned, as follows:

As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature of the steps undertaken by the dual monarchy in Belgrade, this would have been entirely inconceivable.

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communiqué, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured the German Military Attaché upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German "White Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.

In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland,-(British "White Paper" No. 97.)

Proofs Lacking.

On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White Paper" No. 113) states:

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.-(British "White Paper" No. 113.)

So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof.

The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:

He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia and the German Foreign Office, had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussion-and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature-but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.-(British "White Paper" No. 121.)

Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the Reichstag, stated with full justification:

The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at mediation on the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the eve of success, by the mobilization, endangering the safety of the empire. The measures for a mobilization, about whose seriousness the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, in connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia wanted war.

To this is to be added that the English Government also was made fully cognizant of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a witness that could not be suspected, namely, its own representative in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear full responsibility.

* * *

We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London was informed at the very latest on July 24 by his Ambassador in St. Petersburg of the plan of the Russian mobilization and consequently of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his own documents.

From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:

The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of Europe-let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany-were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.-(British "White Paper" No. 3.)

Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note-meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:

The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government....

I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.-(British "White Paper" No. 5.)

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London:

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late for any mediation.-(British "White Paper" No. 10.)

Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:

I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.-(British "White Paper" No. 11.)

From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25:

Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling [this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincaré and Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views.-(British "White Paper" No. 25.)

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.

That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as it was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by the assurance of the Chancellor; he declares:

In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late] we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the monarchy.-(German "White Paper," Page 17, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint.)

Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna. He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue Book," Page 67):

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.-(British "White Paper" No. 67.)[02]

Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31 the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:

The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.-(British "White Paper" No. 108.)

England and Russia.

How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be found. The French Government thus far has not published any series of documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.

On the contrary, the latter power, wherever she puts in an appearance-as for instance in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sazonof, as mentioned above-appears as fully identical with Russia.

It is also stated on July 24:

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in all diplomatic negotiations.... It seems to me from the language held, by French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.-(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a weak and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective advice to postpone mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.

The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British documents themselves. De Bunsen on July 26 telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th inst.-(British "White Paper" No. 40.)

Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid efforts to maintain peace by the London Secretary of State, even where these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria.

Another proof: Sazonof on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which concerns itself with the much mentioned proposition of the latter to have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great powers not immediately concerned.

Russian Sincerity Questioned.

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really want the conference? Minister Sazonof declares:

I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.-(British "White Paper" No. 53.)

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be done immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have been no more time for this.[03]

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27, (British "White Paper" No. 55,) shows how this conference was expected to be conducted in St. Petersburg:

His Excellency [Sazonof] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.-(British "White Paper" No. 55.)

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman. The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy. Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:

... and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence.... In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points....-(British "White Paper" No. 72.)

Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador there:

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He said that Russia had no intention to attack Austria.-(British "White Paper" No. 141.)

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:

I entirely approve what you said ... and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.-(British "White Paper" No. 24.)

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally join Russia and France:

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their [the German] attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.-(British "White Paper" No. 44.)

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.-(British "White Paper" No. 47.)

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London:

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the great powers' united action, [des actions conformes,] we count that England will not delay placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.-(Russian "Orange Paper" No. 17.)

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Sawe was the only consideration, although the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government:

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.-(British "White Paper" No. 54.)

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows:

In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button in the interests of peace."-(British "White Paper" No. 84.)

Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war. On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his softhearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it.... Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.-(British "White Paper" No. 78.)

Naivete or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the na?veté of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.

This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.

On July 30 the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist writes:

It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to forestall a general conflict....

And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia-what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied-was mobilizing its own army, he continues:

Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have even received assurances in that direction, that England and France will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.

On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen:

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave.... But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him, that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action.... But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought that British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid.-(British "White Paper" No. 89.)

But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England:

I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise....-(British "White Paper" No. 87.)

Stirring Up Trouble.

On the German side Grey's open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow:

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.-(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports:

He [Poincaré] is convinced that peace between the powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany ... there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.-(British "White Paper" No. 99.)

Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments?

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British "White Paper" No. 85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From a material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country could never recover.-(British "White Paper" No. 101.)

With this telegram the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded. If France-the question of French colonies is of very minor importance in this connection-must not be defeated by Germany, then England forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great power, even if she had backed down before such a challenge.

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Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.

In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations to other large powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech in the House of Commons on Aug, 3, 1914, which meant the war with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with France in any European crisis.

The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:

London Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My Dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

Was Parliament Deceived?

A few members of the English Parliament who on Aug. 3 dared to gingerly protest against the war may have had reason to complain about the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then-so far as England is concerned-the supervision of the Government, theoretically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction.

Veiled Defensive Alliance.

As a matter of fact, Grey does not desire to have accepted as political obligations the conversations of the French and English Army and Navy General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this agreement, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to immediately enter with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in every critical situation; it means in realty nothing less than a veiled defensive alliance which by clever diplomatic manipulations can be changed without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English Government promises to consult and work together with France, and consequently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investigation of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent position.

How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations lasting through years?

Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the basis of documentary proof.

If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied-in the year 1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence which in a case of war between European powers would interfere with or limit free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to whether or not Britain should take part at a war-then certain reports making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1914, concerning an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light.

Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attaché in London, Capt. Wolkow. As a matter of fact Wolkow during June went to St. Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.

Grey's "Twisty" Answer.

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations would be entered into later on.

The big Liberal newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was not at all satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European war. In the light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies' interest as far as England is concerned.

A German "Attack."

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things would France admit.-(British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England to come to the aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the Frenchman:

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider.... We were free from engagements and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.-(British "White Paper" No. 87.)

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon:

Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved.... M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.... I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.-(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.

At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the way by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by Grey's conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador:

He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be.... The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise.... (British "White Paper" No. 123.)

Belgium Not the Cause.

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave on Aug. 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London:

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the Geman fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.-(British "White Paper" No. 148.)

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality.

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