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§ 1. With what care the subject is to be approached. 1
§ 2. And of what importance considered. 2
§ 3. The doubtful force of the term "utility". 3
§ 4. Its proper sense. 4
§ 5. How falsely applied in these times. 4
§ 6. The evil consequences of such interpretation. How connected with national power. 5
§ 7. How to be averted. 6
§ 8. Division of the pursuits of men into subservient and objective. 8
§ 9. Their relative dignities. 10
§ 10. How reversed through erring notions of the contemplative and imaginative faculties. 10
§ 11. Object of the present section. 11
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§ 1. Explanation of the term "theoretic". 12
§ 2. Of the differences of rank in pleasures of sense. 12
§ 3. Use of the terms Temperate and Intemperate. 13
§ 4. Right use of the term "intemperate". 13
§ 5. Grounds of inferiority in the pleasures which are subjects of intemperance. 14
§ 6. Evidence of higher rank in pleasures of sight and hearing. 15
§ 7. How the lower pleasures may be elevated in rank. 16
§ 8. Ideas of beauty how essentially moral. 17
§ 9. How degraded by heartless reception. 17
§ 10. How exalted by affection. 18
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§ 1. By what test is the health of the perceptive faculty to be determined? 19
§ 2. And in what sense may the terms Right and Wrong be attached to its conclusions? 20
§ 3. What power we have over impressions of sense. 21
§ 4. Depends on acuteness of attention. 21
§ 5. Ultimate conclusions universal. 22
§ 6. What duty is attached to this power over impressions of sense. 22
§ 7. How rewarded. 23
§ 8. Especially with respect to ideas of beauty. 23
§ 9. Errors induced by the power of habit. 24
§ 10. The necessity of submission in early stages of judgment. 24
§ 11. The large scope of matured judgment. 25
§ 12. How distinguishable from false taste. 25
§ 13. The danger of a spirit of choice. 26
§ 14. And criminality. 27
§ 15. How certain conclusions respecting beauty are by reason demonstrable. 27
§ 16. With what liabilities to error. 28
§ 17. The term "beauty" how limitable in the outset. Divided into typical and vital. 28
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