Memoirs of the Duchesse de Dino v.2/3, 1836-1840

Message from President Jackson of the United States

Since the last session of the Congress the validity of our claims upon France, as arranged by the treaty of 1831, has been recognised by both branches of the Legislature, and the money has been voted for their satisfaction, but I regret to be obliged to inform you that payment has not yet been made.

A short summary of the most important incidents in this lengthy controversy will show how far the motives, by which attempts are made to justify this delay, are absolutely indefensible.

When I took office I found the United States applying in vain to the justice of France for the satisfaction of claims the validity of which has never been doubted, and has now been admitted by France herself in the most solemn manner. The long-standing nature of these claims, their entire justice, and the aggravating circumstances from which they sprang, are too well known to the American people for a further description of them to be necessary. It is enough to say that for a period of ten years and more, with the exception of a few intervals, our commerce has been the object of constant aggression on the part of France, which usually took the form of condemning ships and cargo in virtue of arbitrary decrees, contravening both international law and the stipulations of the treaties, while ships were burnt on the high seas, and seizures and confiscations took place under special Imperial rescripts in the harbours of other nations then in French occupation or under French control.

Such, as is admitted, has been the nature of our grievances, grievances in many cases so flagrant that even the authors of them never denied our right to satisfaction. Some idea of the extent of our losses may be gained by considering the fact that the burning of vessels at sea and the seizure and sacrifice in forced sales of American property, apart from awards to privateers before condemnation was pronounced, or without such formality, have brought the French Treasury a sum of twenty-four millions of francs, apart from considerable customs dues.

For twenty years this business has been the subject of negotiations, which were interrupted only during the short period when France was overwhelmed by the united forces of Europe. During this period, when other nations were extorting their claims at the bayonet's point, the United States suspended their demands in consideration of the disasters that had overpowered the brave people to whom they felt themselves bound, and in consideration of the brotherly help which they had received from France in their own times of suffering and danger. The effect of this prolonged and fruitless discussion, disastrous both to our relations with France and to our national character, was obvious, and my own course of duty was perfectly clear to me. I was bound either to insist upon the satisfaction of our claims within a reasonable period or to abandon them entirely. I could not doubt that this course was most conformable to the interests and honour of the two countries.

Instructions were therefore given from this point of view to the Minister who was once more sent to demand satisfaction. When Congress met on October 10, 1829, I considered it my duty to refer to these claims and to the dilatory attitude of France, in terms sufficiently strong to draw the serious attention of both countries to the matter. The French Minister then in power took offence at the message, under the idea that it contained a threat, upon which basis the French Government did not care to negotiate. The American Minister refuted the interpretation which the French authorities attempted to place upon the message, and reminded the French Minister that the President's message was a communication addressed not to foreign governments, but to the Congress of the United States, and that in this message it was his duty under the Constitution to provide this body with information upon the state of the Union with reference both to foreign as well as to domestic affairs. That if, again, in the performance of this task he deemed it his duty to call the attention of the Congress to the consequences which might result from strained relations with another Government, one might reasonably suppose that he acted under a sense of duty in thus frankly communicating with another branch of his own Government, and not that he acted with the object of threatening a foreign Power. The French Government was satisfied and negotiations were continued. These were concluded by the treaty of July 4, 1831, which partially recognised the justice of our claims, and promised payment to the amount of twenty-five millions of francs in six annual instalments. The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Washington on February 2, 1832. Five days later the treaty was presented to Congress, which immediately passed the Acts necessary to secure to France the commercial advantages conceded to her by the arrangement. The treaty had been previously ratified with full solemnity by the King of France, in terms which are certainly no mere formality: "We, regarding the above convention as satisfactory in all and each of the conclusions which it contains, declare, both for ourselves and for our heirs and successors, that it is accepted, approved, ratified, and confirmed, and by these presents, signed with our hand, we do accept, approve, ratify, and confirm it, promising upon our faith and word as King to observe and to secure its observance inviolably without contravention at any time and without permitting direct or indirect contravention for any reason or pretext whatsoever." The official announcement that ratifications had been exchanged with the United States reached Paris while the Chambers were in session. The extraordinary delays prejudicial to ourselves by the introduction of which the French Government have prevented the execution of the treaty, have already been explained to Congress. It is sufficient to point out that the session then opened was allowed to pass without any effort being made to obtain the necessary funds; that the two following sessions also went by without any action resembling a serious effort to secure a decision upon the question; and that not until the fourth session, nearly four years after the conclusion of the treaty, and more than two years after the exchange of ratifications, was the law referring to the execution of the treaty put to the vote and rejected.

Meanwhile the United States Government, in full confidence that the treaty concluded would be executed in good faith, and with equal confidence that measures would be taken to secure payment of the first instalment, which was to fall due on February 2, 1833, negotiated a bill for the amount through the Bank of the United States. When this bill was presented by bearer the French Government allowed it to be protested. Apart from the loss incurred by non-payment, the United States had to meet the claims of the bank, which asserted infringement of its interests, in satisfaction of which this institution seized and still holds a corresponding amount from the State revenues.

Congress was in session when the decision of the Chambers was communicated to Washington, and an immediate announcement of this decision on the part of France was a step which was naturally expected from the President. The profound discontent shown by public opinion and the similar excitement which prevailed in the Congress, made it more than probable that a recourse to immediate measures for securing redress would be the consequence of any appeal made upon this question to Congress itself.

With a sincere desire to preserve the peaceful relations which have so long existed between the two countries, I wished to avoid this step if I could be convinced that in thus acting, neither the interests nor the honour of my country would be compromised. Without the most complete assurance upon this point I could not hope to discharge the responsibility which I assumed in allowing the Congress to adjourn without giving it an account of the affair. These conditions seemed to be satisfied by the assurances which were given to me.

The French Government had foreseen that the feeling in the United States aroused by this second rejection of the credit vote would be as I have described it, and prompt measures had been taken by the French Government to anticipate the consequences. The King personally expressed through our Minister at Paris his profound regret for the decision of the Chambers and promised to send a ship of war with despatches to his Minister here, forthwith authorising him to give every assurance to the government and the people of the United States that the treaty would be in any case faithfully performed by France. The warship arrived and the Minister received his instructions. Professing to act in virtue of these instructions he gave the most solemn assurances that immediately after the new elections, and as soon as ever the Chamber would allow, the French Chambers would be convoked and that the attempt to obtain the necessary credit would be renewed; that all the constitutional power of the King and his Ministers would be exerted to secure this object. It was understood that he pledged himself to this end, and this Government expressly informed him that the question ought to be decided at a date sufficiently near to enable Congress to learn the result at the commencement of the session.

Relying upon these assurances, I undertook the responsibility of allowing Congress to separate without offering any communication upon the matter.

Our expectations, reasonably based upon promises so solemnly given, were not realised. The French Chambers met on July 31, 1834, and though our Minister at Paris urged the French Ministers to lay the matter before the Chambers, they refused. He then insisted that if the Chambers had been prorogued without coming to any conclusion in the matter, they should be again convoked in time to enable their decision to be known at Washington before the meeting of Congress. This reasonable demand was not only refused, but the Chambers were prorogued until December 29, a date so remote that their decision in all probability could not have been obtained in time to reach Washington before the Congress was forced to adjourn by the terms of the Constitution. The reasons given by the Ministry for their refusal to convoke the Chambers at a nearer date were afterwards shown to have been by no means insurmountable, for the Chambers were convoked on December 1 for the special purpose of considering home affairs, though this fact did not become known to our Government until after the last session of the Congress. As our reasonable expectations were thus deceived, it was my imperative duty to consult Congress as to the advisability of reprisals, in case the stipulations of the treaty were not promptly carried out. For this purpose a communication was indispensable. It would have been unworthy of us in the course of this communication to refrain from an explanation of all the facts necessary for an exact comprehension of the affair, or to shrink from truth for fear of offending others. On the other hand, to have gone a step further with the object of wounding the pride of a government and a people with whom we have so many reasons to cultivate friendly relations to our mutual advantage would have been both imprudent and disastrous.

As past events had warned us of the difficulty of drawing up the most simple statement of our grievances without wounding the feelings of those who had become responsible for redressing them, I did my best to prevent any interpretation of the message containing the recommendations placed before Congress as a threat to France. I disavowed any such design and further declared that the pride and the power of France were so well known that no one would expect to extort satisfaction by fear. The message did not reach Paris until more than a month after the Chambers had met, and to such an extent did the Ministry disregard our legitimate claims, that our Minister was informed that the matter would not be made a Cabinet question when it had been brought forward.

Although the message was not officially communicated to the Government and although it contained definite declarations that no menace was intended, the French Ministers determined to regard the conditional proposal of reprisals as a threat and as an insult, which the national honour made it their duty to reject.

The measures by which they proceeded to show their resentment of this supposed insult were the immediate recall of their Minister from Washington, the offer of passports to the American Minister at Paris, and a declaration in the legislative Chambers that diplomatic relations with the United States Government were suspended.

After they had thus avenged the dignity of France, they proceeded to show their justice. For this purpose a law was immediately presented to the Chamber of Deputies asking for the funds necessary to perform the terms of the treaty. As this proposal afterwards became a law, the terms of which are now one of the chief subjects of discussion between the two nations, I am bound to retrace the history of this law.

The Financial Minister in his explanation alluded to the measures which had been taken in answer to the supposed insult, and represented the performance of the treaty as imperative upon the honour and justice of France. As the mouthpiece of the Ministry he declared that the message, until it had received the sanction of Congress, was merely the simple expression of the President's personal opinion. On the other hand he declared that France had entered into engagements which were binding upon her honour. In accordance with this point of view, the only condition upon which the French Ministry proposed to consider the payment of the money was to defer this payment until it was certain that the United States Government had done nothing which could injure the interests of France, or, in other terms, that Congress had not authorised any measure hostile to France.

At this moment the French Cabinet could not have known what was the attitude or the decision of Congress, but on January 14 the Senate decided that there was no reason for the moment to take any legislative measures with reference to the business proceeding between the United States and France, and no decision upon the subject was made in the Representative Chamber. These facts were known at Paris before March 28, 1835, when the Commission which had been considering the bill of indemnity presented its report to the Chamber of Deputies. This Commission repeated the opinions of the Ministry, declared that the Congress had put aside the proposals of the President, and proposed the adoption of the law with no other restriction than that originally stated. The French Ministry and the Chambers thus knew that if the position they had adopted, and which had been so frequently stated to be incompatible with the honour of France, was maintained, and if the law was adopted in its original form, the money would be paid and this unfortunate discussion would come to an end. But this flattering hope was soon destroyed by an amendment introduced into the law at the moment of its adoption, providing that the money should not be paid until the Government had received satisfactory explanations concerning the President's message of December 2, 1834. What is still more remarkable, the President of the Council [148] adopted this amendment and consented to its insertion in the law. As for the pretended insult which had induced them to recall their Minister and send our Minister his passports, not until then did they propose to ask for an explanation of this incident. The proposals and opinions which they had declared could not reasonably be imputed to the American people or government were put forward as obstacles to the accomplishment of an act of justice towards this government and people. They had declared that the honour of France required the performance of an undertaking into which the King had entered unless Congress adopted the proposals of the message. They were certain that Congress had not adopted them and none the less they refused to perform the terms of the treaty until they had obtained from the President an explanation of an opinion which they had themselves characterised as personal and ineffectual. The supposition that I had intended to threaten or to insult the French Government is as unfounded as any attempt to extort from the fears of that nation that which its feelings of justice would have made it refuse, would have been foolish and ridiculous; but the Constitution of the United States obliges the President to explain to Congress the situation of the country and the American people cannot admit the intervention of any Government whatever upon earth in the free performance of the domestic duties which the Constitution has imposed upon its public officials. The discussions proceeding between the different branches of our Government concern ourselves alone, and our representatives are responsible for any words which they may utter only to their own constituents and to their fellows in office. If, in the course of these discussions, facts have been inaccurately stated, or wrong inferences have been drawn from them, correction will necessarily follow when the mistakes are perceived, from their love of justice and their sense of self-respect; but they will never submit to be questioned upon that matter as a right by any foreign Power. When these discussions lead to action, then our responsibility to foreign Powers begins, but it is then a national and not an individual responsibility. The principle upon which a demand is issued for an explanation of the terms of my message would also justify the claim of any foreign Power to demand an explanation of the terms employed in a committee report or in the speech of a member of Congress.

It is not the first time that the French Government has taken offence at messages from American presidents. President Washington and President Adams, in the performance of their duties to the American people, encountered ill-feeling on the part of the French Directory. The grievance raised by the Minister of Charles X. and removed by the explanations offered by our Minister at Paris, has already been mentioned when it was known that the Minister of the reigning King took offence at my message last year by interpreting it in a sense which the very terms of it forbade. Our last Minister at Paris in reply to the last note which showed dissatisfaction with the language of the message, sent a communication to the French Government under date January 28, 1835, which was calculated to remove all the impressions that undue susceptibility might have received. This note repeated and recalled to the attention of the French Government the disavowal contained in the message itself of any intention to use intimidation by threats; it declared in all truth that the message did not contain either in words or intention any accusation of bad faith against the King of the French; it drew a very reasonable distinction between the right of complaining in measured terms of the failure to perform the terms of the convention, and an imputation that the delay in performance was due to evil motives; in short it showed that the necessary exercise of this right was not to be regarded as an offensive imputation. Although this communication was made by our Minister without instructions and entirely upon his own responsibility, my approbation has since made it a governmental act and this approbation was officially notified to the French Government on April 25, 1835. However, it produced no effect. The law was passed with the unfortunate amendment, supported by the King's Ministers and was definitely approved by the King.

The people of the United States are reasonably inclined to pursue a pacific policy in their dealings with foreign nations; the people must therefore be informed of the loyalty of their government to this policy. In the present case this policy was carried to the furthest limits compatible with due self-respect. The note of January 28 was not the only communication which our Minister took the responsibility of offering upon the same subject and from the same point of view; when he found that it was proposed to make the payment of a just debt dependent upon the accomplishment of a condition which he knew could never be performed, he thought himself bound to make a further attempt to convince the French Government that, if our self-respect and our regard for the dignity of other nations prevented us from using any language which might give offence, at the same time we would never recognise the right of any foreign government to require an explanation of communications passing between the different branches of our public service. To prevent any misunderstanding the Minister recalled the language used in a preceding Note and added that any explanation which could be reasonably asked or honourably given, had already been furnished and that the annexation of this demand to the law as a condition, was not only useless but might be regarded as offensive and would certainly never be fulfilled.

When this last communication, to which I called the special attention of the Congress, was submitted to me, I conceived the hope that its obvious intention of securing a prompt and honourable settlement of the difficulties between the two nations would have been achieved, and I therefore did not hesitate to give it my sanction and my complete approbation. So much was due from me to the Minister who had made himself responsible for the act. The people of the United States were publicly informed of it and I am now communicating it to the people's representatives to show how far the Executive power has gone in its attempts to restore a good understanding between the two countries. My approval would have been communicated to the French Government if an official request for it had been received.

As the French Government had thus received all the explanations which honour and principle could allow, we hoped that there would be no further hesitation in paying the instalments as they fell due. The agent authorised to receive the money was instructed to inform the French Government of his readiness; by way of reply he was informed that the money could not then be paid because the formalities required by the act of the Chambers had not been fulfilled.

As I had received no official communication concerning the intentions of the French Government, and as I was anxious to conclude this disagreeable affair before the meeting of Congress, I instructed our Minister at Paris to inquire into the final determination of the French Government and if the due payment of the instalment was refused, to return to the United States without further explanations.

The results of this last step have not yet reached our knowledge, but we expect information daily. I trust that information may be favourable. As the different powers in France have recognised the justice of our rights and the obligations imposed upon them by the treaty of 1831, and as no real cause remains as an excuse for further delay, we may hope that France will at length adopt that course of procedure demanded no less imperiously by the interests of the two nations than by the principles of justice. When once the treaty has been carried out by France, few causes of disagreement will remain between the two countries, and in short there will be nothing that cannot be surmounted by the influence of a pacific and enlightened policy and by the influence of that mutual good will and those generous recollections which will, we trust, then be revived in all their early strength; but in any case, the question of principle which has been raised by the new turn given to the discussion is of such vital importance to the independent action of the government, that we cannot abandon it or make it the subject of a bargain without compromising our national honour. I need not say that such a sacrifice will never be made by any act of mine. I will never stain the honour of my country to relieve myself of my obligation to tell the truth and to do my duty; nor can I give any other explanations of my official act than those required by honour and justice. This determination, I feel sure, will meet with the approbation of my constituents. My knowledge of their character is very inadequate if the sum of twenty-five millions of francs should outweigh for a moment in their eyes any question which affects their national independence; and if unfortunately a different impression should prevail they would rally, I feel certain, about their chosen Government vigorously and unanimously, and silence for ever this degrading imputation.

Having thus frankly submitted to the Congress the further steps which have taken place since last session, in this interesting and important affair and also the views of the Executive power concerning it, it only remains for me to add, that as soon as the information expected by our Minister has been received, it will become the subject of a special communication. [149]

Speech by the Duc de Broglie, President of the Council, Chamber of Deputies in the Session of January 6, 1836, on the subject of Poland.

Gentlemen,

I do full justice to the high ideals and the noble passions with which the orator whom you have just heard has been inspired; [150] but I will venture to remind him that he has not done full justice to the Government and to the Ministry of 1831 in expressing his apparent belief that the difficulties of that period prevented our Cabinet from showing that interest in the Polish nation which a French Government will always feel for Poland.

At that moment, difficult and dangerous as it was, when the domestic circumstances of France were very perplexing, the French Government did for the Polish nation all that it was its duty to do. It did more than any other nation, and if history ever reveals the diplomatic correspondence of the French Government at that time, I venture to think that full justice will be done to the illustrious man who was then President of the Cabinet. [151]

What was done at that time in the interests of humanity and justice, the Government has never ceased to do whenever it thought that its intervention could be of any use to the population of Poland.

But in the presence of so enlightened a Chamber as this, it is unnecessary to recall the fact that the intervention of a foreign Power in the domestic administration of another state must be conducted with every care and precaution. There is often a reason to fear that such intervention, far from calming irritation and exasperation and far from weakening political animosity, may arouse these passions to greater power. In a word, such a task can only be fulfilled by the constant exercise of care and precaution.

I trust that the Chamber will understand me if I say that the French Government has never neglected any opportunity of intervening in the interests of humanity, but the Chamber will also understand perhaps that this is not the right moment for serving humanity and that it is indeed against the wishes of the Chamber to press the Government to further efforts in this place. It is to be feared that words actuated by generous feeling may indeed produce an effect entirely contrary to the sentiments which inspires them and may merely be translated abroad into greater ill-feeling. There is a fear, in short, that the cause of humanity may be betrayed in the very wish to serve it and without the knowledge of those who desire to defend it (General cries of Hear, Hear).

On this point I shall say no more. The former speaker has himself pointed out the difference that should characterise the observations of one who speaks for the Government, and those of an isolated member of the Chamber. The Chamber will certainly understand that it is not for me to reply severally to the observations which have been laid before you, because any answer to these observations will have an undue importance as coming from myself.

As to the other branch of the question, the existence of treaties which the first speaker has discussed, and to which the second [152] has also referred; I will speak upon the matter as shortly as I can. As far as I know, absolutely no one in Europe would assert that treaties should not be faithfully executed both in their letter and their spirit, but in the article of the treaty to which the two orators have referred, different principles are enounced; principles which are not incompatible, and should indeed be reconciled; on the one hand the Independence of Poland, and on the other the Union of Poland with Russia. In this article the principle is laid down that representation and certain national institutions should exist; but execution has been delayed until we know what these institutions are to be, and under what form they will be established.

This article was not drawn up with all the clearness that might have been desired. The possibility is thus open that the several Powers who signed the treaty of 1815 may interpret it in different senses, and emphasise more or less the principles therein enounced. It may be-I am only putting a hypothetical case-that the several Powers will not agree upon the application of these principles, or upon the nature of the action that lies before them. Are we to say that the moment a difference of opinion arises, we should immediately have recourse to force? The Chamber cannot countenance such an idea. The maintenance of relations between the Powers is upon the same footing as the maintenance of harmony between the public bodies. The mere fact that divergence of opinion is possible is no reason for an appeal to force. Discussion, reason, and time will enable the truth to prevail.

Well, gentlemen, I am confident that the Chamber will understand without further words from myself upon the question now before it, that there are divergences of opinion between the different Powers upon certain points. We consider that negotiations, discussion, and time will enable the truth to prevail, and we trust that upon this point you will agree with us. (Loud applause.) [153]

Eulogy upon Count Reinhart, delivered at the Academy of Moral and Political Science, by the Prince de Talleyrand, in the Session of March 3, 1838.

Gentlemen,

I was in America when the kindness of my friends appointed me a member of the Institute, and thus connected me with the study of Moral and Political Science, to which society I have had the honour to belong since its origin.

On my return to France my first care was to attend the sessions of the Institute, and thus to show the members of that time, many of whom we have every reason to regret, what pleasure I felt at finding myself one of their number. During the first session at which I was present the committee was reappointed, and I received the honourable post of secretary. The six months' report which I drew up, with all the care that I could bring to it, was perhaps of a too deferential character, as I was giving an account of work to which I was a complete stranger. It was work which doubtless had cost much research and much labour to one of our most learned colleagues, and was entitled, "Dissertations upon the Riparian Laws." At the same time in our public meetings I delivered some lectures which I was then allowed to insert in the Memoirs of the Institute. Forty years have elapsed since that date, during which this chair has been forbidden to me, first by long absences, and also by duties to which I was obliged to devote the whole of my time, and I may add by the discretion which times of difficulty make incumbent upon a man whose business is political; and, finally, by the infirmities which old age usually brings or aggravates.

But to-day I feel it necessary-and, indeed, regard it as a duty-to appear for the last time in memory of a man known throughout Europe, a man who was my friend, and who was our colleague since the formation of the Institute. I come forward publicly to testify to our esteem for his person and to our regret for his loss. His position and mine enable me to reveal several of his special merits. His principal, but not his sole title to glory consists in a correspondence extending over forty years, necessarily unknown to the public, who will probably never hear of it. I asked myself, "Who will speak upon that matter within these walls? Who will have any reason to speak of it except myself, who have known so much of it, who have been so pleased by it, and so often helped by it in the course of the Ministerial duties which I have had to perform under three very different reigns?"

Count Reinhart was thirty years of age and I was thirty-seven when I first met him. He entered public life with a large stock of information; he knew five or six languages, and was familiar with their literatures. He could have attained celebrity as a poet or historian or geographer, and in this latter capacity he became a member of the Institute at the time of its foundation.

At that time he was already a member of the Academy of Science in G?ttingen. Born and educated in Germany, he had published in his youth certain poems which had attracted the attention of Gessner, Wieland and Schiller. At a later date, when his health forced him to take the waters of Carlsbad, he was fortunate enough to meet and to know the famous Goethe, who so far appreciated his taste and his knowledge as to apply to him for information upon any outstanding features in French literature. Herr Reinhart promised to keep him informed. Undertakings of this nature among men of first-rate intellectual power are invariably mutual, and soon become bonds of friendship. The intimacy between Count Reinhart and Goethe gave rise to a correspondence which is now being printed in Germany.

Having thus reached that time of life when a man must definitely choose that career for which he thinks himself best fitted, we shall see that Herr Reinhart formed a resolution by no means consistent with his character, his tastes, his own position, and that of his family: remarkable as the fact was for that age, in preference to the many careers in which he could have been independent, he chose one in which independence was impossible, and gave his preference to diplomacy. His choice was a good one; he was fitted to occupy any post in this profession, and filled all posts in succession and all with distinction.

I will venture to assert that his early studies had fitted him admirably for his profession. His work in theology especially had brought him distinction in the seminary of Denkendorf and in the Protestant faculty of Tübingen; it had given him a strength and dexterity in argument which may be noted in every document from his pen. Lest I should seem to be pursuing a paradoxical idea, I may recall the fact that several of our great diplomatists were theologians, and have all made their mark in history by their conduct of the most important political affairs of their age. Cardinal Chancellor Duprat was as completely versed in canon law as jurisprudence, and fixed, in conjunction with Leo X., the principles of the Concordat which in large part survives to-day; Cardinal d'Ossat, notwithstanding the opposition of several great Powers, succeeded in reconciling Henry IV. with the Court of Rome; his surviving correspondence is still recommended for study to those of our young men who propose to follow a political career; Cardinal de Polignac, a theologian, poet, and diplomatist, after many unhappy wars, was able to preserve the conquests of Louis XIV. to France by the treaty of Utrecht.

Thus, too, amid theological books collected by his father, afterwards Bishop of Gap, was begun the education of M. de Lionne, to whose name fresh lustre has recently been added by an important publication.

The names which I have quoted will suffice to justify my idea of the influence which I conceive to have been exerted upon Count Reinhart's mind by the early studies to which his father's education had directed him.

The varied and profound information which he had acquired qualified him to perform at Bordeaux the honourable, if modest, duties of tutor in a Protestant family in that town. There he naturally began relations with several men whose talents, whose mistakes, and whose death brought such renown to our first Legislative Assembly. Count Reinhart was easily induced by them to enter the service of France.

I feel in no way obliged to follow in detail the many vicissitudes of his long career. The numerous posts which were entrusted to him, sometimes of importance, at other times of inferior rank, seem to have followed in no consecutive order, and, indeed, to denote a want of gradation which we could hardly understand at the present time; but in that age neither positions nor persons were subject to prejudice. In other times favour, and more rarely discrimination, called men to eminent positions, but during the time of which I speak, for good or for evil, positions were won by force, and such a system naturally produced confusion.

Thus we shall see Count Reinhart as First Secretary to the London Embassy; in a similar position at Naples; as Plenipotentiary Minister to the Hanseatic towns, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck; head of the third division in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Plenipotentiary Minister at Florence; Foreign Minister; Plenipotentiary Minister in Switzerland; Consul-General at Milan; Plenipotentiary Minister for the area of Lower Saxony; Resident in the Turkish provinces beyond the Danube, and Chief Commissioner of commercial relations in Moldavia; Plenipotentiary Minister to the King of Westphalia; head of the chancery in the Department of Foreign Affairs; Plenipotentiary Minister to the Germanic Diet and to the free town of Frankfort; and, finally, Plenipotentiary Minister at Dresden. How many posts, how much work, and how many interests were thus confided to the care of one man! And this at a time when talent seemed likely to be the less appreciated, as war appeared to be the chief arbitrator in every difficulty.

You will not expect me, gentlemen, to give you any detailed account with dates of the works which Count Reinhart produced in the various posts which I have just enumerated; such an account would need a volume. I need only speak to you of the manner in which he fulfilled his official duties, whether he was Head of a Department, Minister, or Consul.

Count Reinhart had not at that time the advantage which he might have had a few years later of seeing excellent models for his imitation; but he was well aware what high and different capacities should distinguish the head of a department of Foreign Affairs. His delicate tact showed him that the habits of such a head should be simple, regular, and retiring; that, remote from the uproar of the world, he should live for business alone, and bring to it an impenetrable secrecy; that while always ready to give an answer concerning facts and men, he should have constantly present to his memory every treaty, know the dates of them, their history, have a correct knowledge of their strong points and their weaknesses, their antecedent and consequent circumstances; that he should know the names of the chief diplomatists and even their family relations; and that while using this knowledge, he should be careful not to disturb the penetrating self-esteem of the Minister, and that if he should ever induce that Minister to share his own opinions, his success should remain concealed. He knew that he could only shine by reflection elsewhere, but he was also aware that so pure and modest a life would naturally command every respect.

Count Reinhart's faculty of observation did not stop at that point. It had shown him how unusual is the combination of qualities necessary for a Minister of Foreign Affairs. Such a Minister must, in fact, be endowed with a kind of instinct which will give him prompt warning and prevent him from compromising himself before any discussion begins: he must be able to appear frank while remaining impenetrable; must be reserved and yet seem careless; must discriminate even in the nature of his amusements; his conversation must be simple, varied, attractive, always natural, and sometimes open. In a word, he must never cease for a single moment in the twenty-four hours of the day to be Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the same time, unusual as these capacities are, they could hardly be adequate if loyalty did not give them that support which they almost always require. I am bound to mention the fact here in opposition to a prejudice generally current. Diplomacy is not a science of duplicity and trickery; if good faith is required anywhere, it is especially necessary in political transactions, for it alone can make them permanent and durable. Attempts have been made to identify reserve with duplicity; good faith will never authorise duplicity, but it may admit reserve, and reserve has the special faculty of increasing confidence.

Dominated by a sense of honour and of his country's interests, by the honour and interests of his Sovereign, by the love of liberty founded upon a respect for order and uniform justice, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, when he is equal to his task, occupies the highest position to which any lofty mind could aspire.

Much as is required of a competent Minister, how much more is required of a good Consul. The claims upon a Consul are infinitely varied and are of a totally different order from those which may affect the other officials of a Foreign Office. They require an amount of practical experience which can only be acquired by a special education. Within the area of their jurisdiction Consuls are required to perform for their compatriots the duties of judges, arbitrators, and mediators; often they are officers of the Civil State; they act as notaries, and sometimes as Admiralty officers; they watch and report upon sanitary affairs; their position enables them to give an accurate and complete idea of the state of trade, of navigation, and of manufactures in the country where they reside. Count Reinhart, who neglected nothing to secure the accuracy of that information with which it was his business to provide his Government, or the correctness of the decisions which as a political agent, as Consul and Admiralty officer, he was obliged to give, had made a profound study of international and shipping law. This study had induced him to think that a time would come when clever combinations would establish a general system of commerce and navigation in which the interests of every nation would be respected, and the basis of which would be so strong that not even war itself could alter the principle of it, though it might interrupt some of its results. He was also able to decide certainly and promptly all questions of interchange, arbitration, conversion of money, weights and measures, while no claims were ever raised in dispute of the information which he provided or of the judgments which he delivered. It is also true that the personal consideration which he enjoyed throughout his career gave much influence to his intervention in any matter which he conducted or in any dispute upon which he had to pronounce.

Wide as a man's knowledge may be and vast as his capacity, the complete diplomatist is but very rarely met with. Yet Count Reinhart might have attained this distinction if he had had one additional capacity. The clearness of his view and intelligence was admirable; he could write an excellent account of anything that he had seen or heard; his style was resourceful, easy, clever, and attractive. Of all the diplomatic correspondence of that age, the Emperor Napoleon, who had every right to be fastidious, showed a preference for the despatches of Count Reinhart; but admirably as he wrote, he could only express himself with difficulty. For action his intelligence required more time than conversation could provide, and for the easy reproduction of his mental speech he was obliged to work alone and unaided. Notwithstanding this real inconvenience, Count Reinhart always succeeded in performing his commissions thoroughly well. Whence did he derive the inspiration which enabled him to succeed?

The source of his power, gentlemen, was a real and profound belief which governed all his actions, the sense of duty. The strength of this belief is not often entirely realised. A life entirely devoted to duty is easily separated from ambition. Count Reinhart's life was given up to the duties which he had to perform, nor was there in him any trace of personal ambition or any claim to rapid promotion. The religion of duty to which Count Reinhart was faithful all his life, consists in perfect submission to the orders and instructions of superiors; in constant vigilance added to much perspicacity, which never leaves those superiors ignorant of what they ought to know; in a strict adherence to truth in every official report, whether agreeable or unpleasant; in an impenetrable discretion and a regularity of life which secure confidence and esteem; in decorum of outward conduct and in continual care to give the acts of his Government that colouring and that interpretation demanded by the interest of the affairs under his charge.

Though advancing age had warned Count Reinhart that it was time for rest, he would never have asked to be relieved, fearing that he might seem to show coldness in his pursuit of a career which had been life-long. The royal kindness, with its invariable attention, considered his necessities and gave this great servant of France a most honourable post, by calling him to the Chamber of Peers. Count Reinhart did not long enjoy this honour and died almost suddenly on December 5, 1837. He was twice married, and had a son by his first wife, who is now pursuing a political career. The best wish that we can offer the son is that he may resemble his father as nearly as possible.